Glass 
Book 




JIU/ 



i i 1& 



PubUcation No. 6 



THE GREEK WHITE BOOK 

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 

1913-1917 



PREFACED BY THE TREATIES DEALING WITH THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HELLENIC STATE AND THE 
INCORPORATION WITH IT OF THE IONIAN ISLANDS 



Translated from the Original Fbench and Greek 
Texts by THEODORE P. ION, D.CX. 

REVISED EDITION 
With the co-opbbation of CARROLL N. BROWN, PhJ). 



Reprinted from The American Joxtbnai* ob* Internatiohai. Law 
Supplement of April, 1918, Volume 1% Nnmher fi. at the expense of 
The Greek Nawowa* Hbrauj (Etkotkos Kmxx) of New York 



PUBLISHED FOR 

The American-Hellenic Society 
105 West 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 

BY 

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
American Branch: S5 West 32nd Street, New York 



<r* 



A' 






OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
CONTENTS 

TREATY ARRANGEMENTS DEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS OF GREECE 

Protocol of conference between Great Britain, France, and Russia, relative 

to the independence of Greece. (Extracts.) February 8,1830 1 

Convention between Great Britain, France, and Russia, on the one part, and 

Bavaria on the other, relative to the sovereignty of Greece. May 7, 1832 . 2 

Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Russia, on the one part, and 
Denmark, on the other part, relative to the accession of Prince William of 
Denmark to the throne of Greece. July 13, 1863 9 

Treaty between Great Britain, France, Russia, and Greece, respecting the union 

of the Ionian Islands to the Kingdom of Greece. March 29, 1864 .... 13 



- 



""'ocra-ifi 



DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1913-1917, ISSUED BY THE GREEK 
GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY OF 
ALLIANCE AND THE GERMANO-BULGARIAN INVASION INTO 
MACEDONIA. 

PART FIRST 
Geeco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance 



No. 


Name of signatory 


Place and date of 
transmission 


Summary 


Page 






I. TEXTS 
1913 






1 


Mr. Coromilas 
M r. Boschkovitch 


Athens, April 22/May 5 


Protocol concerning 
the conclusion of a 
treaty of alliance 
between Greece and 
Serbia. 


20 


2 


Mr. Alexandropoulos 


Salonika, May 19/ 


Treaty of alliance be- 


23 




Mr. Boschkovitch 


June 1 


tween the Kingdom 
of Greece and the 
Kingdom of Serbia. 




3 


Mr. Metaxas 
Mr. Pechitch 
Mr. Toufegdjitch 


Salonika, May 1/14 


First military conven- 
tion between the 
Kingdom of Greece 
and the Kingdom 
of Serbia. 


27 


4 


Mr. Stratigos 


Salonika, May 19/ 


Second military con- 


30 




Mr. Pechitch 


June 1 


vention between 






Mr. Toufegdjitch 


II. NEGOTIATIONS 


the Kingdom of 
Greece and the 
Kingdom of Serbia. 




5 


Mr. Coromilas 


Athens, May 10/23 


Modifications of Arti- 
cles 4 and 5 of the 
draft of the treaty 
of alliance and of 
Article 1 of the 
first military con- 
vention. 


35 


6 


Mr. Alexandropoulos 


Belgrade, May 10/23 


Telegram of Captain 
Stratigos in regard 
to the modifications 


36 



CONTENTS 



111 



No. 



Name of signatory 



Mr. Alexandropoulos 



Mr. Coromilas 



9 I Mr. Coromilas 



10 



11 



Mr. Coromilas 



III. 



Mr. Streit 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1913 



Belgrade, May 13/26 



Athens, May 14/27 



Athens, May 14/27 



Athens, May 17/30 



INTERPRETATION 

1914 
Athens, July 11/24 



Summary 



proposed by the 
Serbians to Articles 
1 and 6 of the first 
military conven- 
tion. 

Telegram of Captain 
Stratigos in regard 
to the modifica- 
tions demanded by 
the Serbians of 
Articles 1 and 2 of 
the first military 
convention and the 
addition of nev 
provisions. 

Modifications of Ar 
tides 1 and 2 of the 
first military con- 
vention and addi- 
tion of new provi- 
sions. Instructions 
concerning Article 
6 and the demand 
of Serbia for an 
outlet to the 
iEgean Sea. 

Communication of 
the preceding tele- 
gram to the King, 
in Salonika. 

Instructions sent to 
the Minister of 
Greece at Belgrade 
to conclude and 
sign the treaty of 
alliance and the 
second military 
convention. For- 
mula of the stipu- 
lation concerning 
the access of Ser- 
bia to the iEgean 
Sea. 

Visit of the Charg^ 
d' Affaires of Ger- 
many. The Ger- 
man Government 
informs the Hel- 



38 



40 



41 



42 



42 



IV 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name of signatory 



Place and date of 
transmission 



12 



13 



Mr. Alexandropoulos 



Mr. Theotoky 



14 



15 



16 



Mr. Venizelos 



Mr. Venizelos 



Mr. Streit 



17 



Mr. Venizelos 



1914 



Belgrade, July 12/25 



Berlin, July 12/25 



Munich, July 12/25 



Munich, July 13/26 



Athens, July 15/28 



Munich, July 16/29 



Summary 



lenic Government 
that in case of an 
Austro - Serbian 
conflict, which the 
events do not seem 
to exclude, it will 
side with Austria 
It advises Greece 
to keep away from 
Serbia. Answer of 
Mr. Streit. 

Questions put by the 
Serbian Govern- 
ment in regard to 
the military assist- 
ance of Greece. 

Advice given by Von 
Jagow to the Hel- 
lenic Government 
to keep away from 
Serbia and not to 
intervene even in 
case Bulgaria 
should attack Ser- 
bia. Reply of Mr 
Theotoky. A prob- 
able agreement 
between Austria 
and Bulgaria. 

Instructions concern 
ing the attitude of 
Greece in case of 
attack by Bulgaria 
against Serbia. 

Response to questions 
put by the Serbian 
Government con 
cerning the mili- 
tary assistance of 
Greece. 

Mr. Streit informs 
the Charge d'Af- 
faires of Germany 
that Greece will 
not tolerate an at- 
tack against Serbia 
by Bulgaria. 

Instructions concern- 
ins policy to be fol- 



Page 



43 



44 



45 



45 



46 



47 



CONTENTS 



No. 



18 



19 



20 



21 



22 



Name of signatory 



Mr. Streit 



Mr. Theotoky 



Mr. Theotoky 



Mr. Streit 



Mr. Theotoky 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1914 



Athens, July 20/ Aug. 2 



Berlin, July 22/Aug. 4 



Berlin, July 22/Aug. 4 



Athens, July 25/Aug. 7 



Berlin, July 25/Aug. 7 



Summary 



lowed by Greece in 
the course of a Eu- 
ropean conflict. 

Reply of the Hellenic 
Government to the 
questions put by 
the Serbian Gov- 
ernment concerning 
the military assist 
ance of Greece. 

Telegram to King 
Constantine. Em 
peror William, in 
announcing the 
conclusion of an 
alliance between 
Germany and Tur 
key and the cer- 
tain cooperation of 
Bulgaria and Rou 
mania, appeals to 
King Constantine 
to place himself at 
the Emperor's side. 

Telegram to King 
Constantine. An 
account of a con- 
versation with Von 
Jagow, who con- 
firms the Alliance 
with Turkey and 
the cooperation of 
Bulgaria and Rou- 
mania. He ad- 
vises Greece to 
side with the 
Balkan States 

against Serbia and 
Russia. 

Reply of King Con- 
stantine to the ap- 
peal of Emperor 
William. 

Mr. Theotoky sug- 
gests that the Hel- 
lenic Government 
come to an under- 
standing with Bul- 



Page 



48 



49 



50 



51 



52 



VI 



CONTENTS 



No. 



23 



Name of signatory 



Mr. Theotoky 



24 



Mr. Theotoky 



25 



Mr. Streit 



26 



Mr. Venizelos 



27 



Mr. Theotoky 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1914 



Berlin, July 27/Aug. 9 



Berlin, July 29/Aug. 11 



Athens, July 30/Aug. 12 



Athens, Aug. 31/ 

Sept. 13 



Berlin, Oct. 18/31 



Summary 



garia With a view 
to t a ^common at- 
tack against Serbia. 

The reply of King 
Constantine was 
delivered to Em- 
peror William 
through Von Ja 
gow. The latter 
has repeated .to 
Mr. Theotoky his 
advice concerning 
an understanding 
with Sofia and Con- 
stantinople. 

An account of an in 
terview with Mr. 
Zimmermann on 
the situation in 
the Balkans. The 
Under-Secretary of 
State also advises 
an understanding 
with Sofia and Con 
stantinople. 

The Minister of Ger- 
many threatens to 
ask for his pass- 
ports in case Bul- 
garia while attack 
ing Serbia should 
be attacked by 
Greece. Answer of 
Mr. Streit. 

Circular to the Royal 
legations to the En- 
tente Powers and 
Bucharest concern- 
ing a communi- 
cation of the Min- 
ister of Germany 
in regard to the 
Turko - Bulgarian 
agreement. 

An account of a con- 
versation with Mr. 
Zimmermann on 
the declaration of 
war by Russia 



Page 



53 



53 



54 



55 



56 



CONTENTS 



Vll 



No. 



28 



29 



30 



31 



32 



33 



Name of signatory- 



Mr. Zographos 



Mr. Psychas 



Mr. Gounaris 



Mr. Venizelos 



Mr. Zaimis 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1914 



1915 

Athens, Feb. 25/ 

Mar. 10 



Athens, Feb. 28/ 

Mar. 13 



Bucharest, July 17/30 



Athens, July 20/Aug. 2 



Athens, Aug. 21/ 

Sept. 3 



Athens, Sept. 25/Oct. 8 



Summary 



against Turkey. 
The Under-Secre 
tary of State again 
advises that even if 
Bulgaria inter 

venes against Ser- 
bia it would be to 
the interest of 
Greece not to inter 
vene. 

A communique of 
the Gounaris Gov- 
ernment concern 
ing its policy. 

Assurance given to 
Serbia concerning 
the attitude of 
the new Cabinet 
towards her. 

Germany has affirmed 
at Sofia that Greek 
neutrality is as 
sured even in case 
of an attack by 
Bulgaria against 
Serbia. 

Circular to the Royal 
legations in which 
Mr. Gounaris de- 
nies the informa 
tion that the neu 
trality of Greece is 
assured even in 
case of an attack 
against Serbia by 
Bulgaria. 

The Hellenic Gov- 
ernment informs 
the German Gov 
e r n m e n t that 
Greece could not 
remain indifferent 
in the event of an 
attack against Ser- 
bia by Bulgaria. 

Circular of Mr. 
Zaimis on the 
policy of the new 
government. 



Page 



57 



57 



58 



58 



59 



60 



Vlll 



CONTENTS 



No. 



34 



Name of signatory 



Mr. Zaimis 



35 



36 



37 



38 



Mr. Skouloudis 
Mr. Skouloudis 

Mr. Skouloudis 

Mr. Panourias 



39 



Mr. Romanos 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1915 

Athens, Sept. 29/Oct. 12 



Athens, Oct. 26/Nov. 8 
Athens, Oct. 26/Nov. 8 

Athens, Oct. 26/Nov. 8 

Mitrovitsa, Nov. 2/15 



1916 

Paris, Mar. 28/April 10 



Summary 



Serbia invokes the 
casus foederis and 
requests Greece to 
carry out the treaty 
of alliance. Re 
fusal of the Hel 
lenic Government 
and reasons given 
in support of this 
refusal. 

Circular concerning 
the policy of the 
SkouloudisCabinet 

Declaration by the 
new government of 
its friendly senti- 
ments toward Ser- 
bia. 

Assurances given to 
the Entente Powers 
that Greece will 
observe a benevo- 
lent neutrality. 

Serbian reply to the 
refusal of the 
Greek Government 
to carry out the 
treaty of alliance. 
Refutation of the 
considerations in 
voked by the Greek 
Government. 



The refusal of the 
Greek Government 
to permit the pas- 
sage of Serbian 
troops through its 
territory, from Cor- 
fu to Salonika, dis- 
pleases the French 
Government, which 
refuses its financial 
assistance. Violent 
language of the 
French press. 



Page 



60 



63 



63 



63 



64 



67 



CONTENTS 



IX 



No. 



Name of signatory 



Place and date of 
transmission 



Summary- 



Page 



40 



Mr. Skouloudis 



1916 

Athens, Mar. 29/ 

April 11 



41 



Athens, April 7/20 



42 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Athens, April 8/21 



43 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Athens, April 14/27 



Protest to the French 
Government for its 
refusal to give finan 
cial assistance to 
Greece and recrim- 
inations against 
the policy followed 
in Greece by the 
Entente Powers. 

Note - verbale from 
the Serbian Gov 
ernment requesting 
the Greek Govern 
ment to permit the 
passage of Serbian 
troops through its 
territory. 

Presentation by the 
Minister of Serbia 
of the above men- 
tioned note-verbale 
of the Serbian Gov- 
ernment. Reply of 
Mr. Skouloudis. 

The Ministers of 
France and Great 
Britain support the 
Serbian step con 
cerning the passage 
of Serbian troops 
through Greek ter- 
ritory. Reply of 
Mr. Skouloudis. 
Exposition of the 
reasons which jus- 
tify the refusal of 
the Greek Govern- 
ment. Mr. Skou- 
loudis asks for the 
intervention of the 
British, Italian and 
Russian Govern- 
ments in Paris in 
order to induce the 
French Govern- 
ment to renounce 
the plan for the 
passage of the Ser 
bian troops. 



68 



69 



70 



71 



CONTENTS 



No. 



44 



Name of signatory 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1916 

Athens, April 14/27 



Summary 



Communication of 
the preceding tele- 
gram to the Charge 1 
d'Affaires of Greece 
in Paris. 



PART SECOND 
Germano-Bulgarian Invasion into Macedonia 



45 



General Bairas 



Serres, April 27/ 

May 10 



46 



47 



General Yannakitsas 



Mr. Skouloudis 



48 



49 



50 



Athens, April 28/ 

May 11 



Athens, April 29/ 

May 12 



Count Von Mirbach 



Mr. Passarof 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Athens, May 9/22 



Athens, May 9/22 



Athens, May 10/23 



A Bulgarian com- 
manding officer an- 
nounces the occupa 
tion of the heights 
of Lehovo in con- 
sequence of an 
agreement with the 
Greek Government. 
Explanations given to 
the Fourth Army 
Corps in regard to 
the agreement en- 
tered into with the 
Germans and Bul- 
garians concerning 
the occupation of 
certain points of 
Hellenic territory. 
Protest addressed to 
Sofia against the 
occupation by the 
Bulgarians of cer- 
tain points to the 
north of Vetrina 
and the heights of 
Lehovo. 
Occupation by the 
Germano - Bulga 
rians of the narrow 
passes of Roupel 
Occupation by the 
Germano - Bulga- 
rians of the narrow 
passes of Roupel. 
Occupation by the 
Germano - Bulga- 
rians of the narrow 
passes of Roupel. 



73 



74 



74 



75 



76 



77 



CONTENTS 



XI 



No. 



51 



52 



53 



54 



55 



Name of signatory 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Mr. Theotoky 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1916 

Athens, May 11/24 



Berlin, May 13/26 



Athens, May 14/27 



56 



57 



Mr. Theotoky 



Mr. Coromilas 



58 



Mr. Caclamanos 



Athens, May 15/28 



Athens, May 16/29 



Berlin, May 17/30 



Rome, May 17/30 



Paris, May 19/ June 1 



Summary 



Occupation by the 
Germano - Bulga- 
rians of the narrow 
passes of Roupel 

Mr. Theotoky antici- 
pates an approach- 
ing advance of the 
Germano - Bulga- 
rians to the passes 
of Roupel. 

Protest addressed to 
Berlin, Vienna and 
Sofia against the 
occupation of Fort 
Roupel and in gen 
eral against the 
Germano - Bulga 
rian invasion in 
Macedonia. 

Similar protest to the 
Ministers of Ger 
many, Austria and 
Bulgaria in Athens. 

The Greek Govern 
ment communi- 
cates to the lega- 
tions of Greece to 
the Entente Powers 
etc., its protest 
against the Ger- 
mano - Bulgarian 
invasion in Mace- 
donia. 

Communique" of the 
German General 
Staff announcing 
the occupation of 
the Roupel passes. 

Impression made in 
Italy by the Ger- 
mano-Bulgarian in- 
vasion of Greek 
territory. Pessimis- 
tic forebodings of 
Mr. Coromilas. 

Impression made on 
the government 
and public opinion 
in France by the 



Page 



78 



79 



79 



80 



81 



81 



82 



82 



Xll 



CONTENTS 



No. 



59 



Name of signatory 



Place and date of 
transmission 



Mr. Panas 



60 



61 



62 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Mr. Caclamanos 



1916 

Petrograd, May 21/ 
June 3 



Athens, May 23/June 5 



63 



Mr. Caclamanos 



Athens, May 24/June 6 



Paris, May 24/June 6 



Summary 



Page 



Paris, May 24/June 6 



Germano - Bulga- 
rian invasion. 

Report of a conver- 
sation with the Di- 
rector of Political 
Affairs concerning 
the Germano-Bul- 
garian invasion. 
Unfavorable com- 
ments caused by an 
interview of Gen 
eral Dousmanis. 

Minutes of the sitting 
of the Hellenic 
Chamber contain- 
ing the declarations 
made by Mr. Skou 
loudis in regard to 
the occupation of 
Roupel and in gen- 
eral concerning the 
Germano - Bulga- 
rian advance in 
Greek territory. 

Mr. Skouloudis de 
nies the existence 
of a previous agree 
ment concerning 
the occupation of 
Roupel. 

Conversation with 
Mr. Briand. Meas- 
ures to be taken in 
Greece by the En 
tente in conse 
quence of the Ger 
mano-Bulgarian ad 
vance and the pas 
sive attitude of the 
Greek Government 

French comments on 
the situation ere- 
ated by the occu- 
pation of Roupel 
German informa 
tion concerning the 
existence of a pre- 
vious agreement 
Rumor of consent 



83 



84 



87 



89 



90 



CONTENTS 



Xlll 



No. 



Name of signatory 



Place and date of 
transmission 



Summary 



Page 



64 



65 



Mr. Passarof 



1916 

Athens, May 27/June 9 

Athens, June 7/20 



66 



Mr. Skouloudis 



Athens, June 8/21 



67 



Athens, Aug. 9/22 



68 



69 



Count von Mirbach 



Colonel Troupakis 



Athens, Aug. 15/28 



Salonika, Aug. 28/ 

Sept 10 



to a loan to Greece 
by German-Ameri 
can capitalists. 

Response of the Bul- 
garian Government 
to the Greek pro- 
test concerning the 
occupation of Rou 
pel, etc. 

Memorandum of the 
Director General of 
the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs in 
regard to the docu 
ments concerning 
the surrender of 
Roupel. 

Mr. Skouloudis trans 
mits to the Minis 
try for Foreign Af 
fairs the documents 
concerning the oc 
cupation of the 
passes of Roupel. 

Extract from the 
Confidential Regis- 
ter of the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, 
where the note of 
the German Lega 
tion was recorded 
affirming that the 
Germano-Bulgarian 
troops would not 
enter Serres, Drama 
and Cavalla. 

The Greek troops of 
Cavalla have volun- 
tarily surrendered 
the fortresses, bat- 
teries and material. 

Report addressed to 
the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs on 
what took place in 
Eastern Macedonia 
at the time of the 
Germano - Bulga- 
rian invasion at the 



92 



92 



93 



93 



94 



94 



XIV 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name of signatory 



70 



Mr. Naoum 



71 



Mr. Zalocostas 



72 



Mr. Naoum 



73 



Mr. Zalocostas 



74 



Mr. Naoum 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1916 



Sofia, Dec. 5/18 



Athens, Dec. 13/26 



1917 

Sofia, Jan. 1/14 



Athens, Jan. 5/18 



Sofia, Feb. 15/28 



Summary 



expense of the 
Greek inhabitants 
and authorities. 

Bulgarian occupation 
in Hellenic Mace- 
donia. Sufferings 
endured by the 
Greek populations 
Pillaging, devasta- 
tion, destruction of 
villages, murders 

Step taken by the 
Greek Government 
in Berlin for the 
cessation of the un- 
bearable situation 
created in Greek 
Macedonia by the 
Bulgarians. 

Conversation with 
General Taneff , 
Governor of Mace- 
donia occupied by 
the Bulgarians, con 
cerning the deplor 
able condition of the 
Greek populations. 

Mr. Zalocostas rec- 
ommends to the 
Minister of Greece 
in Sofia to follow 
closely the question 
of the Greek popu- 
lations in occupied 
Macedonia. 

Report of the Greek 
prefect of Drama 
on the abnormal 
situation reigning 
in his district. Nu 
merous deaths by 
starvation. He 

asks the Greek 
Government to 
open a credit for 
the support of 
cheap bakeries in 
order to prevent 



Page 



96 



98 



99 



99 



100 



CONTENTS 



XV 



No. 



Name of signatory 



75 



76 



Mr. Naoum 



77 



Mr. Naoum 



Place and date of 
transmission 



1917 



Germany, Mar. 9/22 



Sofia, Mar. 27/ April 9 



Sofia, June 1/14 



Summary 



further deaths en 
masse. Action to 
that effect taken 
by Mr. Zalocostas 

Report of a superior 
official on the events 
which took place in 
Cavalla from the 
date of the Bulga 
rian occupation 
until the first days 
of February. The 
situation in Drama 

The situation is get- 
ting worse in all 
parts of Eastern 
Macedonia occu 
pied by the Bulga^ 
rians. "Numerous 
deaths from starva- 
tion in Cavalla, 
Drama and Serres. 
Same situation in 
the villages. Ener- 
getic steps by Mr 
Naoum. 

Annex: Note sent 
by Mr. Naoum to 
the Bulgarian Gov- 
ernment. 

The population of 
Eastern Macedonia 
occupied by Bulga- 
rians is transferred 
to the interior of 
Bulgaria. The situ- 
ation of the fami- 
lies thus taken 
away is desperate. 
Deaths from star- 
vation run into the 
thousands. Appeal 
by the mayor of 
Cavalla to the 
Greek Government 
in favor of financial 
aid in the form of a 
loan to the munici- 
pality. 



Page 



100 



105 



108 



DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 

TREATY ARRANGEMENTS DEFINING THE INTER- 
NATIONAL RELATIONS OF GREECE 

PROTOCOL OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND 
RUSSIA, RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 1 

London, February 3, 1830 

[The following clauses of this protocol were referred to in the treaty 
of 7th May, 1832. 2 ] 

(Translation as laid before Parliament) 
Present: The plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Russia. 

Independence of Greece 

§ 1. Greece shall form an independent state, and shall enjoy all 
the rights, political, administrative, and commercial, attached to 
complete independence. 

Form of Government 

§ 3. The Greek Government shall be monarchical, and hereditary 
according to the order of primogeniture. It shall be confided to a 
prince, who shall not be capable of being chosen from among those of 
the families reigning in the states that signed the treaty of the 6th 
July, 1827, 3 and who shall bear the title of Sovereign Prince of Greece. 
The choice of that prince shall form the object of subsequent com- 
munications and stipulations. 

1 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II, p. 841; for French version, see 
British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XVII, p. 191. 

2 Printed infra, p. 68. 

* This treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia, for the pacifica- 
tion of Greece as a dependency of Turkey. Hertslet, Vol. I, p. 769. 

1 



Guarantee of three Powers 

§ 8. Each of the three courts shall retain the power, secured to it 
by Article VI of the treaty of the 6th July, 1827, of guaranteeing the 
whole of the foregoing arrangements and articles. The Acts of Guar- 
antee, if there be any, shall be drawn up separately; the operation and 
effects of these different Acts shall become, in conformity with the 
above-mentioned article, the object of further stipulations on the part 
of the high Powers. No troops belonging to one of the contracting 
Powers shall be allowed to enter the territory of the new Greek state, 
without the consent of the two other courts who signed the treaty. 



CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ON THE 
ONE PART, AND BAVARIA ON THE OTHER, RELATIVE TO THE SOVER- 
EIGNTY OF GREECE. 1 

Signed at London, May 7, 1832 

(Translation as laid before Parliament) 

The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, exercising the 
power conveyed to them by the Greek nation, to make choice of a 
sovereign for Greece, raised to the rank of an independent state, and 
being desirous of giving to that country a fresh proof of their friendly 
disposition by the election of a prince descended from a royal house, 
the friendship and alliance of which can not fail to be of essential service 
to Greece, and which has already acquired claims to her esteem and 
gratitude, have resolved to offer the crown of the new Greek state to 
the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second son of his Majesty the 
King of Bavaria. 

His Majesty the King of Bavaria, on his part, acting the character 
of guardian of the said Prince Otho during his minority, participating 
in the views of the three courts, and duly appreciating the motives 
which have induced them to fix their choice upon a prince of his House, 
has determined to accept the crown of Greece for his second son, the 
Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria. 

1 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II, p. 893; for French version, see 
State Papers, Vol. XIX, p. 33. 



In consequence of such acceptance, and for the purpose of agreeing 
upon the arrangements which it has rendered necessary, their Majesties 
the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King 
of the French, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the one part, and 
His Majesty the King of Bavaria on the other, have named as their 
plenipotentiaries, viz.: — 

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, the Right Honorable Henry John, Viscount Palmerston, 
Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a member of His Britannic Majesty's 
Most Honorable Privy Council, a Member of Parliament, and his 
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; 

His Majesty the King of the French, the Sieur Charles Maurice de 
Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince-Duke de Talleyrand, Peer of France, his 
said Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten- 
tiary to His Britannic Majesty, etc.; 

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Christopher, 
Prince of Lieven, General of Infantry in his Armies, his Aide-de-Camp 
General, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His 
Britannic Majesty, etc.; and the Sieur Adam, Count Matuszewic, 
Privy Councillor of His said Majesty, etc.; 

And His Majesty the King of Bavaria, the Sieur Augustus, Baron 
de Cetto, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to> 
His Britannic Majesty; 

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good 
and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles: 



Offer of hereditary sovereignty of Greece to Prince Otho of Bavaria 

Art. I. The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, duly 
authorized for this purpose, by the Greek nation, offer the hereditary 
sovereignty of Greece to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second 
son of His Majesty the King of Bavaria. 



Acceptance of hereditary sovereignty by King of Bavaria 

Art. II. His Majesty the King of Bavaria, acting in the name of 
his said son, a minor, accepts, on his behalf, the heridetary sovereignty 
of Greece, on the conditions hereinafter settled. 



Title of King of Greece 

Art. III. The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall bear the title of King 
of Greece. 1 

Greece to form a monarchical and independent state, under the guarantee 
of Great Britain, France, and Russia 

Art. IV. Greece, under the sovereignty of the Prince Otho of 
Bavaria, and under the guarantee of the three courts, shall form a 
monarchical and independent state, according to the terms of the pro- 
tocol signed between the said courts on the 3d February, 1830, and 
accepted both by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte. 

Limits of Greece 

Art. V. The limits of the Greek state shall be such as shall be 
definitively settled by the negotiations which the courts of Great 
Britain, France, and Russia have recently opened with the Ottoman 
Porte, in execution of the protocol of 26th September, 1831. 

King of Greece to be a contracting party to definitive treaty 

Art. VI. The three courts having beforehand determined to con- 
vert the protocol of the 3d of February, 1830, into a definitive treaty, 
as soon as the negotiations relative to the limits of Greece shall have 
terminated, 2 and to communicate such treaty to all the states with 
which they have relations, it is hereby agreed that they shall fulfil 
this engagement, and that His Majesty the King of Greece shall become 
a contracting party to the treaty in question. 

Three courts to obtain recognition of King Otho 

Art. VII. The three courts shall, from the present moment, use 
their influence to procure the recognition of the Prince Otho of Bavaria 
as King of Greece, by all the sovereigns and states with whom they 
have relations. 

1 The title of the present king is "King of the Hellenes," the change of title 
being made by protocols of 3d August, and 13th October, 1863. Hertslet, Vol. II, 
pp. 1563-4. 

2 Arrangement of 21st July, 1832. Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 903. 



Royal crown to be hereditary 

Art. VIII. 1 The Royal Crown and dignity shall be hereditary in 
Greece; and shall pass to the direct and lawful descendants and heirs 
of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, in the order of primogeniture. In the 
event of the decease of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, without direct and 
lawful issue, the crown of Greece shall pass to his younger brother, 
and to his direct and lawful descendants and heirs, in the order of primo- 
geniture. In the event of the decease of the last-mentioned prince also, 
without direct and lawful issue, the crown of Greece shall pass to his 
younger brother, and to his direct and lawful descendants and heirs, 
in the order of primogeniture. 2 

Crowns of Greece and Bavaria not to be united 

In no case shall the crown of Greece and the crown of Bavaria be 
united upon the same head. 

Majority of Prince Otho 

Art. IX. The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of 
Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his 20th 
year, that is to say, on the first of June, 1835. 

Regency during minority of King of Greece 

Art. X. During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King 
of Greece, his rights of sovereignty shall be exercised in their full extent, 
by a regency composed of three councillors, who shall be appointed by 
His Majesty the King of Bavaria. 

Prince Otho to retain his appanages in Bavaria, and to 
be assisted by King of Bavaria 

Art. XI. The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall retain the full posses- 
sion of his appanages in Bavaria. His Majesty the King of Bavaria, 

1 King Otho renounced his right of succession to the throne of Bavaria on the 
18th March, 1836. 

2 See explanatory and supplemental article, 30th April, 1833. Hertslet, 
Vol. II, p. 919. 



6 

moreover, engages to assist, as far as may be in his power, the Prince 
Otho in his position in Greece, until a revenue shall have been set 
apart for the crown in that state. 

Guarantee of loan by three Powers l 

Art. XII. In execution of the stipulations of the protocol of the 
20th of February, 1830, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias 
engages to guarantee, and their Majesties the King of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of the French, 
engage to recommend, the former to his Parliament, and the latter to 
his Chambers, to enable their Majesties to guarantee, on the following 
conditions, a loan to be contracted by the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as 
King of Greece. 

Extent of loan 

1. The principal of the loan to be contracted under the guarantee 
of the three Powers shall not exceed a total amount of 60,000,000 of 
francs. 

Loan to be raised by instalments 

2. The said loan shall be raised by instalments of 20,000,000 of 
francs each. 

Guarantee of interest and sinking fund by three Powers 

3. For the present, the first instalment only shall be raised, and the 
three courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third 
of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of the said 
instalment. 

4. The second and third instalments of the said loan may also be 
raised, according to the necessities of the Greek state, after previous 
agreement between the three courts and His Majesty the King of 
Greece. 

5. In the event of the second and third instalments of the above- 
mentioned loan being raised in consequence of such an agreement, the 
three courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third 
of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of these two 
instalments, as well as of the first. 

1 See treaty of 29th March, 1864, infra, p. 79. 



Payment of interest and sinking fund by Greece 

6. The sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be bound to 
appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund, of such 
instalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee 
of the three courts, the first revenues of the state, in such manner 
that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury shall be devoted, first 
of all, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall 
not be employed for any other purpose until those payments on account 
of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three 
courts shall have been completely secured for the current year. 

Representatives of three courts to watch over fidfilment of 
engagement by Greece 

The diplomatic representatives of the three courts in Greece shall 
be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last-mentioned 
stipulation. 

Pecuniary compensation to Turkey to be paid out of proceeds of loan 

Art. XIII. In case a pecuniary compensation in favor of the Otto- 
man Porte should result from the negotiations which the three courts 
have already opened at Constantinople for the definitive settlement of 
the limits of Greece, it is understood that the amount of such compen- 
sation shall be defrayed out of the proceeds of the loan which forms 
the subject of the preceding article. 

Bavarian troops to be raised for King of Greece. Evacuation of 
Greece by Allied troops 

Art. XIV. His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall lend his assistance 
to the Prince Otho in raising in Bavaria a body of troops, not exceed- 
ing 3,500 men, to be employed in his service, as King of Greece, which 
corps shall be armed, equipped, and paid by the Greek state, to be 
sent thither as soon as possible, in order to relieve the troops of the 
Alliance hitherto stationed in Greece. The latter shall remain in that 
country entirely at the disposal of the Government of His Majesty the 
King of Greece, until the arrival of the body of troops above mentioned. 
Immediately upon their arrival the troops of the Alliance already 
referred to shall retire, and altogether evacuate the Greek territory. 



8 

Bavarian officers to organize a national military force 

Art. XV. His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall also assist the 
Prince Otho in obtaining the services of a certain number of Bavarian 
officers, who shall organize a national military force in Greece. 

Regency to proceed to Greece without delay 

Art. XVI. As soon as possible after the signature of the present 
convention, the three councillors who are to be associated with His 
Royal Highness the Prince Otho by His Majesty the King of Bavaria, 
in order to compose the Regency of Greece, shall repair to Greece, shall 
enter upon the exercise of the functions of the said Regency, and shall 
prepare all the measures necessary for the reception of the sovereign, 
who, on his part, will repair to Greece with as little delay as possible. 

Declaration of three courts to Greek nation 

Art. XVII. The three courts shall announce to the Greek nation, 
by a joint declaration, the choice which they have made of His Royal 
Highness Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, and shall afford 
the Regency all the support in their power. 

Ratifications 

Art. XVIII. The present convention shall be ratified, and the 
ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if 
possible. 

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the 
same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms. 

Done at London, the 7th May, in the year of our Lord, 1832. 

(L. S.) Palmerston. 
(L. S.) Talleyrand. 

(L. S.) LlEVEN. 

(L. S.) Matuszewic. 

(L. S.) A. De Cetto. 

[An Act was passed by the German Diet, 4th October, 1832, recog- 
nizing Prince Otho as King of Greece.] 

[An Act of Parliament was passed on the 16th August, 1832 (2 and 
3 Will. IV, cap. 121), to enable His Majesty to carry out the above 
convention.] 



TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN", FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE 
PART, AND DENMARK, ON THE OTHER PART, RELATIVE TO THE ACCES- 
SION OF PRINCE WILLIAM OF DENMARK TO THE THRONE OF GREECE. 1 

Signed at London, 13th July, 1863; ratifications exchanged at London, 

3d August, 1863 

(Translation as laid before Parliament) 

Reference to guarantee of Great Britain, France, and Russia 

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity 

Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, and the Emperor of All the 
Russias, being anxious to smooth the difficulties which have occurred 
in the Kingdom of Greece, placed under their common guarantee, have 
judged it necessary to come to an understanding with regard to the 
arrangements to be taken in order to give effect to the wish of the Greek 
nation, which calls the Prince William of Denmark to the Hellenic 
throne. 

His Majesty the King of Denmark, on his part, responding to the 
invitation of their said Majesties, has consented to afford them his 
cooperation with a view to that result, conformable to the interests of 
the general peace. 

In consequence, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, and the 
Emperor of All the Russias, on the one part, and His Majesty the 
King of Denmark on the other, have resolved to conclude a treaty, and 
have for that purpose named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say: 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, the Right Honorable John Earl Russell, her Principal 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, etc., 

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur John Baptist 
Louis Baron Gros, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to 
Her Britannic Majesty, etc.; 

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip Baron 
de Brunnow, his actual Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.; 

1 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II, p. 1545; for French version, see 
State Papers, Vol. LIII, p. 28. 



10 

And His Majesty the King of Denmark, the Sieur Torben de Bille, 
his Chamberlain, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten- 
tiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.; 

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and 
due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles: 

Acceptance of hereditary sovereignty of Greece by King of Denmark 
for Prince William of Denmark 

Art. I. His Majesty the King of Denmark, in accordance with the 
Prince Christian of Denmark, acting in the character of guardian of 
his second son the Prince Christian William Ferdinand Adolphus 
George, accepts for that prince, a minor, the hereditary sovereignty of 
Greece, which is offered to him by the Senate and the National Assembly 
of Greece in the name of the Hellenic nation. 

Title of King of the Greeks 

Art. II. The Prince William of Denmark shall bear the title of 
George I, King of the Greeks {Roi des Grecs). 1 

Greece to form a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state 

Art. III. Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of 
Denmark, and the guarantee of the three courts, forms a monarchical, 
independent, and constitutional state. 

Limits of Greek Territory. Annexation of Ionian Islands to Greece 

Art. IV. The limits of the Greek Territory, determined by the 
arrangement concluded at Constantinople between the three courts 
and the Ottoman Porte, on the 21st July, 1832, 2 shall receive an exten- 
sion by the union of the Ionian Islands with the Hellenic Kingdom, 
when such union, proposed by the Government of her Britannic 
Majesty, shall have been found to be in accordance with the wishes of 
the Ionian Parliament, and shall have obtained the assent of the courts 
of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia. 3 

1 See note l , p. 70, supra. 2 Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 903. 

3 Decree 18/'30th March, 1863, annexed to Protocol of 5th June, 1863. Hertslet, 
Vol. II, p. 1539. 



11 

Union of Ionian Islands to be under guarantee of protecting Powers 

Art. V. The Ionian Islands, when their union with the Kingdom 
of Greece shall have been effected, shall be comprised in the guarantee 
stipulated by Article III of the present treaty. 

Crowns of Greece and Denmark never to be united 

Art. VI. In no case shall the crown of Greece and the crown of 
Denmark be united on the same head. 

Religion of King of Greece 

Art. VII. In conformity with the principle of the Hellenic Con- 
stitution recognized by the treaty signed at London, on the 20th 
November, 1852, l and proclaimed by the decree of the National As- 
sembly of Greece, of the 30th March, 1863 the legitimate successors 
of King George I must profess the tenets of the Orthodox Church of 
the East. 

Majority of King of Greece 

Art. VIII. The majority of Prince William of Denmark, fixed by 
the law of the royal family at 18 years complete, that is to say, on the 
24th December, 1863, shall be considered as attained before that date, 
if a decree of the National Assembly should recognize the necessity 
thereof. 

Appropriation by Ionian Islands to civil list of King of the Greeks 

Art. IX. At the moment when the union of the Ionian Islands 
with the Hellenic Kingdom shall take place, according to the terms of 
Article IV of the present treaty, Her Britannic Majesty will recommend 
to the Government of the United States of the Ionian Islands to appro- 
priate annually a sum of £10,000 sterling to augment the civil list of 
His Majesty George I, King of the Greeks (Roi des Grecs). 

Personal dotation to King of the Greeks by protecting Powers 

Art. X. Each of the three courts will give up in favor of Prince 
William of Denmark £4,000 a year out of the sums which the Greek 
1 Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 1156. 



12 

Treasury has engaged to pay annually to each of them, in pursuance 
of the arrangement concluded at Athens by the Greek Government, 
with the concurrence of the Chambers, in the month of June, I860. 1 

It is expressly understood that these three sums, forming a total 
of £12,000 sterling annually, shall be destined to constitute a personal 
dotation of His Majesty the King, in addition to the civil list fixed by 
the law of the state. 

Financial engagements of Greece to be maintained. Greek loan 

Art. XI. The accession of Prince William to the Hellenic throne 
shall not involve any change in the financial engagements which Greece 
has contracted by Article XII of the convention signed at London, on 
the 7th May, 1832, towards the Powers guarantees of the loan. 

It is equally understood that the Powers will, in concert, watch 
over the execution of the engagement taken by the Hellenic Govern- 
ment in the month of June, 1860, upon the representation of the three 
courts. 

Recognition of Prince William of Denmark by foreign Powers 

Art. XII. The three courts shall, from this moment, use their 
influence in order to procure the recognition of Prince William of 
Denmark in the character of King of the Greeks (Roi des Grecs) , by all 
the sovereigns and states with whom they have relations. 

Arrival of King George I in Greece 

Art. XIII. His Majesty the King of Denmark reserves to himself 
to take the measures which may be most proper for facilitating the 
arrival of King George I in his dominions as soon as possible. 

Support to Greek Government 

Art. XIV. The three courts will bring the present treaty to the 
knowledge of the Greek Government, and will afford to that govern- 
ment all the support in their power, while awaiting the speedy arrival 
of His Majesty the King. 

1 Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 1445. 



13 



Ratifications 

Art. XV. The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifica- 
tions shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible. 

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the 
same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms. 

Done at London, the 13th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, 1863. 

(L. S.) Russell. (L. S.) Bille. 

(L. S.) Bon. Gros. 
(L. S.) Brunnow. 



TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND GREECE, 
RESPECTING THE UNION OF THE IONIAN ISLANDS TO THE KINGDOM 
OF GREECE. 1 

Signed at London, 29th, March, 186^; ratifications exchanged at London, 

25th April, 1864 2 

(Translation as laid before Parliament) 
Reference to Treaty of 5th November, 1815 

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland made known to the Legislative Assembly of the United 
States of the I'onian Islands that, with a view to the eventual union 
of those Islands to the Kingdom of Greece, she was prepared, if the 
Ionian Parliament should express a wish to that effect, to abandon the 
protectorate of those Islands, confided to Her Majesty by the treaty 
concluded at Paris on the 5th November, 1815, 3 between the courts of 
Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Such wish having been 
expressed by a vote of the said Legislative Assembly passed unani- 
mously on the 7/19th October, 1863, 4 Her Britannic Majesty consented 
by Article I of the treaty concluded on the 14th November, 1863, 5 

1 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. Ill, p. 1589. 

2 The Sultan acceded to this treaty on the 8th April, 1865. 

3 Hertslet, Vol. I, p. 337. « Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1565. 6 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1569. 



14 

between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the 
French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, to 
renounce the said protectorate under certain conditions specified in 
that treaty, and since defined by subsequent protocols. 

On their part, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor 
of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, 
consented by the same article, and under the same conditions, to accept 
such renunciation, and to recognize, in conjunction with Her Britannic 
Majesty, the union of those Islands to the Kingdom of Greece. 

In virtue of Article V of the treaty signed at London on the 13th 
July, 1863, it was moreover agreed b}^ common consent between Her 
Britannic Majesty and their Majesties the Emperor of the French and 
the Emperor of All the Russias, that the Ionian Islands, when their 
union to the Kingdom of Greece should have been effected, as con- 
templated by Article IV of the same treaty, should be comprised in 
the guarantee stipulated in favor of Greece by the courts of Great 
Britain, France, and Russia, in virtue of the convention signed at 
London on the 7th May, 1832. 

In consequence, and in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty 
of the 13th July, 1863, and with the terms of Article VI of the treaty 
of the 14th November, 1863, whereby the courts of Great Britain, 
France, and Russia, in their character of guaranteeing Powers of the 
Kingdom of Greece, reserved to themselves to conclude a treaty with 
the Hellenic Government as to the arrangements which might become 
necessary in consequence of the union of the Ionian Islands to Greece, 
their said Majesties have resolved to proceed to negotiate with His 
Majesty the King of the Hellenes a treaty for the purpose of carrying 
into execution the stipulations above mentioned. 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes having given his assent to 
the conclusion of such treaty, their said Majesties have named as their 
plenipotentiaries, that is to say: 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, the Right Honorable John Earl Russell, Viscount Amberley 
of Amberley and Ardsalle, a Peer of the United Kingdom, a member of 
Her Britannic Majesty's Privy Council, her Principal Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs; 

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur Godefroy Bernard 
Henry Alphonse, Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne Lauraguais, Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.; 



15 

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip Baron 
de Brunnow, his Actual Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.; 

And His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, the Sieur Charilaus S. 
Tricoupi, a representative in the National Assembly of the Hellenes; 

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and 
due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles: 



Renunciation of Great Britain to protectorate over the Ionian Islands 

Art. I. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, desiring to realize the wish expressed by the Legis- 
lative Assembly of the United States of the Ionian Islands, that those 
Islands should be united to Greece, has consented, on the conditions 
hereinafter specified, to renounce the protectorate over the Islands of 
Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Santa Maura, Ithaca, Cerigo, and Paxo, 
with their dependencies, which, in virtue of the treaty signed at Paris, 
on the 5th November, 1815, by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia, were constituted a single free and inde- 
pendent state, under the denomination of "the United States of the 
Ionian Islands," placed under the immediate and exclusive protection 
of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, his heirs and successors. 



Union of Ionian Islands to Greece 

In consequence, Her Britannic Majesty, His Majesty the Emperor 
of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in 
their character of signing parties to the convention of the 7th May, 
1832, recognize such union, and declare that Greece, within the limits 
determined by the arrangement concluded at Constantinople between 
the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and the Ottoman 
Porte, on the 21st July, 1832, including the Ionian Islands, shall form 
a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state, under the sover- 
eignty of His Majesty King George, and under the guarantee of the 
three courts. 



16 



Perpetual neutrality of Ionian Islands 1 

Art. II. The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, in their 
character of guaranteeing Powers of Greece, declare, with the assent 
of the courts of Austria and Prussia, that the Islands of Corfu and 
Paxo, as well as their dependencies, shall, after their union to the Hel- 
lenic Kingdom, enjoy the advantages of perpetual neutrality. 

Greece to maintain the neutrality 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, on his part, to maintain such 
neutrality. 

Treaties, etc., of commerce and navigation between Great Britain and 
foreign Powers relative to Ionian Islands to remain in force until 
conclusion of new treaty 

Art. III. The union of the Ionian Islands to the Hellenic Kingdom 
shall not involve any change as to the advantages conceded to foreign 
commerce and navigation in virtue of treaties and conventions con- 
cluded by foreign Powers with Her Britannic Majesty, in her character 
of protector of the Ionian Islands. 

All the engagements which result from the said transactions, as 
well as from the regulations actually in force in relation thereto, shall 
be maintained and strictly observed, as hitherto. 

In consequence, it is expressly understood that foreign vessels and 
commerce in Ionian ports, as well as the navigation between Ionian 
ports and the ports of Greece, shall continue to be subject to the same 
treatment, and placed under the same conditions as before the union 
of the Ionian Islands to Greece, until the conclusion of new formal 
conventions, or of arrangements destined to regulate between the 
parties concerned, questions of commerce and navigation, as well as 
questions relating to the regular service of communication by post. 

Terms within which new commercial treaties are to be concluded 

Such new conventions shall be concluded in fifteen years, or sooner, 
if possible. 2 

1 A protocol on this subject was also signed between the five Powers on the 
25th January, 1864. 

2 The Austrian and Prussian Governments assented to this arrangement. 



17 



Freedom of worship and religious toleration 

Art. IV. The union of the United States of the Ionian Islands to 
the Kingdom of Greece shall in no wise invalidate the principles estab- 
lished by the existing legislation of those Islands with regard to freedom 
of worship and religious toleration; accordingly the rights and im- 
munities established in matters of religion by Chapters I and V of the 
Constitutional Charter of the United States of the Ionian Islands, 1 
and specifically the recognition of the Orthodox Greek Church as the 
dominant religion in those Islands ; the entire liberty of worship granted 
to the established Church of the protecting Power; and the perfect, 
toleration promised to other Christian communions shall, after the. 
union, be maintained in their full force and effect. 

The special protection guaranteed to the Roman Catholic Church,, 
as well as the advantages of which that church is actually in posses- 
sion, shall be equally maintained; and the subjects belonging to that, 
communion shall enjoy in the Ionian Islands the same freedom 
of worship which is recognized in their favor by the protocol of 
the 3d February, 1830. 

The principle of entire civil and political equality between subjects 
belonging to different creeds, established in Greece by the same pro- 
tocol, shall be likewise in force in the Ionian Islands. 

Provision of Ionian Islands towards the civil list of the King of the Hellenes 

Art. V. The Legislative Assembly of the United States of the 
Ionian Islands has decreed by a resolution passed on the 7/ 19th 
October, 1863, that the sum of £10,000 sterling a year shall be appro- 
priated, in monthly payments, to the augmentation of the civil list 
of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, so as to constitute the first 
charge upon the revenue of the Ionian Islands, unless provision be 
made for such payment, according to the constitutional forms, out of 
the revenues of the Kingdom of Greece. 

In consequence, His Majesty the King of the Hellenes engages to 
carry that decree duly into execution. 

1 Ratified by the Sovereign of Great Britain on the 26th August, 1817. 



18 

Relinquishment by protecting Powers of portion of the annual sums to be 

paid to them by Greece 

Art. VI. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His 
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, agree to relinquish in favor 
of His Majesty King George I, each £4,000 sterling a year, out of the 
sums which the Greek Treasury has engaged to pay annually to each 
of them, in virtue of the arrangement concluded at Athens by the 
Greek Government, with the concurrence of the Greek Chambers, in 
the month of June, 1860 (No. 318). 

Amounts relinquished to form personal dotation of King of Greece 

It is expressly understood that these three sums, forming a total 
of £12,000 sterling annually, shall be destined to constitute a personal 
dotation of His Majesty King George I, in addition to the civil list 
fixed by the law of the state. The accession of His Majesty to the 
Hellenic throne shall not otherwise involve any change in the financial 
engagements which Greece has contracted 03^ Article XII of the con- 
vention of 7th May, 1832, towards the Powers guarantees of the loan, 
nor in the execution of the engagement taken bj r the Hellenic Govern- 
ment in the month of June, 1860, upon the representation of the three 
courts. 1 

Contracts between Ionian Islands and foreign Powers to be maintained by 

King of the Hellenes 

Art. VII. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes engages to take 
upon himself all the engagements and contracts lawfully concluded by 
the Government of the United States of the Ionian Islands, or in their 
name, by the protecting Power of those Islands, conformably to the 
Constitution of the Ionian Islands, whether with foreign govern- 
ments, with companies and associations, or with private individuals; 
and promises to fulfil the said engagements and contracts fully and 
completely, as if they had been concluded by His Majesty or by the 
Hellenic Government. Under this head are specially included: the 
public debt of the Ionian Islands; the privileges conceded to the Ionian 
Bank, to the navigation company known under the name of the 

1 An Act of Parliament was passed on the 14th July, 1864 (27th and 28 Vict., 
cap. 40), to give effect to this arrangement. 



19 

Austrian Lloyds, in conformity with the postal convention of the 1st 
December, 1853, and to the Malta and Mediterranean Gas Company. 

Pensions, etc., to British and Ionian subjects to be paid by Greece 

Art. VIII. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes promises to 
take upon himself, — 

1. The pensions granted to British subjects by the Ionian Govern- 
ment, in conformity with the rules established in the Ionian Islands 
respecting pensions. 

2. The compensation allowances due to certain individuals actually 
in the service of the Ionian Government, who will lose their employ- 
ments in consequence of the union of the Islands to Greece. 

3. The pensions which several Ionian subjects are in the enjoyment 
of, in remuneration of services rendered to the Ionian Government. 

Special convention to regulate amounts 

A special convention to be concluded between Her Britannic 
Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes shall determine 
the amounts of these different heads, and shall regulate the mode of 
their payment. 1 

Withdrawal of British forces from the Ionian Islands 

Art. IX. The civil authorities and the military forces of her 
Britannic Majesty shall be withdrawn from the territory of the United 
States of the Ionian Islands in three months or sooner, if possible, 
after the ratification of the present treaty. 2 

Ratifications 

Art. X. The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications 
shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible. 

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the 
same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms. 

Done at London, the 29th of March, in the year of Our Lord, 1864. 

(L. S.) Russell. (L. S.) Ch. Tricoupi. 

(L. S.) La Tour D'Auvergne. 
(L. S.) Brunnow. 

1 Convention of same date. Hertslet, Vol. Ill, p. 1596. 

2 See protocol of 28th May, 1864. Hertslet, Vol. Ill, p. 1606. 



DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1913-1917, ISSUED BY THE 
GREEK GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE GRECO- 
SERBIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND THE GERMANO- 
BULGARIAN INVASION INTO MACEDONIA. 1 



PART FIRST 
The Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance 

I. Texts 
No. 1 

PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN GREECE AND SERBIA 

Signed, April 22/ May 5, 1913. 

His Excellency Mr. Lambros A. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Greece, and His Excellency Mr. Mathias Boschkovitch, 
Minister of Serbia in Athens, acting on behalf of their governments 
and in accordance with their instructions, held a conference today 
and agreed as follows: 



The Governments of Greece and Serbia bind themselves to conclude 
and sign a treaty of amity and of defensive alliance within the period 
of twenty days from the signature of the present instrument. 

1 These documents, together with the preceding Table of Contents, cited as 
the Greek White Book, have been translated from the French and Greek, by Mr. 
Theodore P. Ion, of the Bar of New York and of the District of Columbia. 

Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 45, 46, 60, 65, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, have been trans- 
lated from the Greek; all others are from French originals. 

The words in brackets take the place of illegible words of the texts of the 
telegrams. Wherever it has been impossible to complete the meaning the state- 
ment [words illegible] has been inserted. 

The dates indicated in the body of the documents are those of the Julian 
calendar. — Translator. 

20 



21 



It will be covenanted in that treaty that the two governments will 
give mutual aid to each other in order that Greece and Serbia may have 
contiguous boundaries to the west of the Axios (Vardar) river and that 
the fixing of the new boundaries shall be done in principle on the basis 
of effective occupation. 

The general direction of this boundary shall be as follows : 

Starting from the mountain range of Kamena Planina (Kamna) 
which delimits the upper Schkoumbi to the southwest side of the Ochrida 
lake, the boundary line will pass round this lake to the south; it will 
reach the western shore of the Prespa lake at the village Kousko, and 
passing through the lake it will reach Dolni Dupliani on the eastern 
shore; from there it will pass eastward near Rahmanli, will follow 
the line of the water-shed between the Erigon (Tserna) river and 
the Moglenica and will reach the Axios (Vardar) river at about three 
kilometers to the south of Ghevgheli. 

The Greco-Bulgarian as well as the Serbo-Bulgarian boundary 
lines shall be fixed on the basis of the principle of effective possession 
and the equilibrium between the three states. 

The Serbian boundary line to the north of Ghevgheli will follow the 
Axios (Vardar) river as far as the confluence of the Bregalnitza river, 
which it will ascend to a point of the old Turkish-Bulgarian boundary. 

The Greco-Bulgarian boundary line will run to the south of Kilkitch, 
to the north of Nigrita, through Orliako, and from there, by the Achinos 
(Tachinos) lake and the Angitis (Anghista) river, will descend to the sea 
a little to the east of the harbor of Eleutherai. 

All these boundary lines will be fixed in a more detailed manner and 
will be inserted in the text of the aforesaid treaty of alliance. 



The Governments of Greece and Serbia bind themselves to act in 
unison, to afford to each other constant assistance in the negotiations 
which will be opened in regard to the division of the territories ceded 
by Turkey, and to mutually support the boundary lines indicated above, 
between Greece and Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, Serbia and Bulgaria. 



22 



Should a dissension arise with Bulgaria in regard to the boundaries 
above indicated and a friendly settlement become impossible, the 
Governments of Greece and Serbia reserve to themselves the right to 
propose jointly to Bulgaria that the dispute be submitted to mediation 
or arbitration. In case Bulgaria should refuse to accept this mode 
of peaceful settlement and assume a menacing attitude or attempt to 
impose her claims by force, the two governments, in order to secure 
the integrity of their possessions, bind themselves to afford to each 
other military assistance and not to conclude peace except jointly 
and together. 



A military convention shall be concluded with the least possible 
delay for the purpose of preparing and insuring the necessary defensive 
measures in case one of the two states, without provocation on its part, 
should be attacked by a third Power. 



7 

The Greek Government binds itself to afford all the facilities and to 
guarantee for fifty years the entire freedom of the Serbian export and 
import trade through the port of Salonika and the railway lines from 
Salonika to Uskup and Monastir. 



The present instrument shall be kept strictly secret. 
Done in duplicate, Athens, this twenty-second day of April in the 
year one thousand, nine hundred and thirteen. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs The Minister of 

of Greece. Serbia. 

L. A. COROMILAS. M. BOSCHKOVITCH. 



23 



No. 2 

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND THE 

KINGDOM OF SERBIA 

Signed, May 19/ June 1, 1913; ratifications exchanged at Athens, 

June 8/21,1918. 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of 
Serbia, considering that it is their duty to look after the security of their 
people and the tranquillity of their kingdoms; considering furthermore, 
in their firm desire to preserve a durable peace in the Balkan Peninsula, 
that the most effective means to attain it is to unite themselves in a 
close defensive alliance; 

Have resolved to conclude an alliance of peace, of friendship, and 
of mutual protection, promising to each other never to give to their 
purely defensive agreement an offensive character, and for that purpose 
they have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes; Mr. John Alexandropoulos, 
his Minister at Belgrade, Commander of the Royal Order of the Savior, 
Grand Commander of the Royal Order of Takovo; His Majesty the King 
of Serbia; Mr. Mathias Boschkovitch, his Minister at Athens, Grand 
Commander of the Royal Order of Saint Sava, Commander of the Royal 
Order of the Savior, who, after having exchanged their full powers 
found in good and due form, have today agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

The two high contracting parties covenant expressly the mutual 
guarantee of their possessions and bind themselves, in case, contrary 
to their hopes, one of the two kingdoms should be attacked without 
any provocation on its part, to afford to each other assistance with all 
their armed forces and not to conclude peace subsequently except 
jointly and together. 

Article 2 

At the division of the territories of European Turkey, which will 
be ceded to the Balkan States after the termination of the present 
war by the treaty of peace with the Ottoman Empire, the two high 
contracting parties bind themselves not to come to any separate under- 



24 

standing with Bulgaria, to afford each other constant assistance, and to 
proceed always together, upholding mutually their territorial claims 
and the boundary lines hereafter to be indicated. 

Article 3 

The two high contracting parties, considering that it is to the vital 
interest of their kingdoms that no other state should interpose between 
their respective possessions to the west of the Axios (Vardar) river, 
declare that they will mutually assist one another in order that Greece 
and Serbia may have a common boundary line. This boundary line, 
based on the principle of effective occupation, shall start from the 
highest summit of the mountain range of Kamna, delimiting the basin 
of the Upper Schkoumbi, it shall pass round the the lake Achris 
(Ochrida), shall reach the western shore of the Prespa lake at 
the village Kousko and the eastern shore at Lower Dupliani (Dolni 
Dupliani), shall run near Rahmanli, shall follow the water-shed be- 
tween the Erigon (Tserna) river and the Moglenica and shall reach 
the Axios (Vardar) river at a distance of nearly three kilometers to the 
south of Ghevgheli, according to the line drawn in detail in Annex I 
of the present treaty. 

Article 4 

The two high contracting parties agree that the Greco-Bulgarian 
and Serbo-Bulgarian boundary lines shall be established on the prin- 
ciple of actual possession and the equilibrium between the three states, 
as follows: 

The eastern frontier of Serbia from Ghevgheli shall follow the 
course of the Axios (Vardar) river up to the confluence of Bojimia- 
Dere, shall ascend that river, and, passing by the altitudes 120, 350, 
754, 895, 571, and the rivers Kriva, Lakavitza, Bregalnica and Zletovska 
shall proceed towards a point of the old Turkish-Bulgarian frontier on 
the Osogovska Planina, altitude 2225, according to the line drawn in 
detail in Annex II of the present treaty. 

The Greek frontier on the side of Bulgaria shall leave to Greece 
on the left shore of the Axios (Vardar) the territories occupied by 
the Greek and Serbian troops opposite Ghevgheli and Davidovo as 
far as the mountain Beles and the Dq'iran lake; then, passing to the 
south of Kilkitch it shall cross the Strymon river north of the Orliako 



25 

"bridge and shall proceed through the Achinos (Tachinos) lake and the 
Angitis (Anghista) river to the sea, a little to the east of the Gulf of 
Eleutherai according to the line drawn in detail in Annex III of the 
present treaty. 

Article 5 

Should a dissension arise with Bulgaria in regard to the frontiers 
as indicated above, and every friendly settlement become impossible, 
the two high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to pro- 
pose, by common agreement, to Bulgaria, that the dispute be submitted 
to the mediation or arbitration of the sovereigns of the Entente Powers 
or the chiefs of other states. In case Bulgaria shall refuse to accept 
this mode of peaceful settlement and assume a menacing attitude 
against either of the two kingdoms, or attempt to impose her claims 
by force, the two high contracting parties bind themselves solemnly 
to afford assistance to each other with all their armed forces and not to 
conclude peace subsequently except jointly and together. 

Article 6 

In order to prepare and to secure the means of military defense, 
a military convention shall be concluded with the least possible delay 
upon the signature of the present treaty. 

Article 7 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes covenants that his government 
shall grant all the necessary facilities and guarantee for a period of 
fifty years the complete freedom of the export and import trade of 
Serbia through the port of Salonika and the railway lines from Salonika 
to Uskup and Monastir. This freedom shall be as broad as possible, 
provided only it is compatible with the full and entire exercise of the 
Hellenic sovereignty. 

A special convention shall be concluded between the two high 
contracting parties within one year from this day in order to regulate 
in detail the carrying out of this article. 

Article 8 

The two high contracting parties agree that upon the final settlement 
of all the questions resulting from the present war, the General Staffs of 



26 

the two armies shall come to an understanding with the view of regulat- 
ing in a parallel manner the increase of the military forces of each state. 

Article 9 

The two high contracting parties agree furthermore that, upon 
the final settlement of all the questions resulting from the present war, 
they will proceed by common agreement to the study of a plan for a 
customs convention, in order to draw closer the commercial and eco- 
nomic relations of the two countries. 

Article 10 

The present treaty shall be put in force after its signature. It 
can not be denounced before the expiration of ten years. The inten- 
tion for the cessation of its force shall be notified by one of the two high 
contracting parties to the other six months in advance, in the absence 
of which the agreement shall continue to be binding upon the two states 
until the expiration of one year from the date of the denunciation. 

Article 11 

The present treaty shall be kept strictly secret. It can not be com- 
municated to another Power either totally or partially, except with the 
consent of the two high contracting parties. 

It shall be ratified as soon as possible. The ratifications shall be 
exchanged in Athens. 

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this 
treaty and affixed their seals. 

Executed in Salonika, in duplicate, the nineteenth day of May in 
the year one thousand nine hundred and thirteen. 

John Alexandropoulos. M. Boschkovitch. 



27 



No. 3 

MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OP GREECE AND THE 

KINGDOM OF SERBIA 

Signed, May l/l4, WIS} 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of 
Serbia, desiring to complete the treaty of alliance concluded between 
the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, by a military con- 
vention, have appointed for that purpose as their plenipotentiaries: 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, Captain John Metaxas, of 
the Corps of Engineers and of the General Staff of the Army; His 
Majesty the King of Serbia, Colonel Petar Pechitch of the General 
Staff, and Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch, of the Infantry, who, after 
having communicated to each other their full powers found in good and 
due form, have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

In case of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Serbia and 
Bulgaria, or in case of a sudden attack by the Bulgarian army against 
the Greek or the Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, 
promise to each other mutual military assistance, Greece with all her 
land and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces. 

Article 2 

In the beginning of the hostilities, at whatever moment they begin, 
Greece is bound to have an army of ninety thousand fighting men con- 
centrated in the region between the Pangaion Mountain, Salonika and 
Goumenitsa, and Serbia an army of one hundred and fifty thousand 
fighting men concentrated in the region of Ghevgheli, Veles (Kioprulu), 
Koumanovo, Pirot. Besides, Greece is at the same time bound to 
have her fleet in the iEgean Sea ready for action. 

1 The present military convention was signed ad referendum, but was not 
ratified. It was replaced by the military convention of May 19/June 1, 1913, 
printed infra. 



28 

Article 3 

The two states are bound to transport to the zone of operations the 
remainder of their military forces, as soon as these shall become available. 

Article 4 

A decrease of the forces mentioned in Article 2, either by demobiliza- 
tion or the transportation of troops elsewhere, is not permitted, unless 
there is a written agreement to that effect between the General Staffs 
of the armies of the two allied states. 

Article 5 

The military operations against Bulgaria shall be based upon a com- 
mon plan of operations. This plan of operations shall be drawn up by 
the respective General Staffs of the two states, or by their delegates. 
It may subsequently be modified in consequence of a change of the 
military situation by a common agreement in writing of the two General 
Staffs. 

Article 6 

After the opening of hostilities, whatever the course of the military 
operations may be and whatever the localities through which, during 
the military operations, the troops of the one or the other allied states 
may pass, and whatever the cities, villages or positions which may be 
occupied by these troops for military necessities, the occupation of the 
country lying beyond the boundary line between Greece and Serbia on 
the one hand and Bulgaria on the other, as provided for by the Greco- 
Serbian Treaty of Alliance, of which the present convention is a comple- 
ment, is regulated as follows : 

The Greek army has the right to occupy the country situated to the 
south and southeast of the line of Gradec, — the crest line of the Beles 
mountain, — summit 1800 to the northwest of Karakioi, — altitude 
2194 Perelik; the Serbian army, the country lying to the north and 
northwest of the said line. 

If during the military operations one of the two armies shall occupy 
part of the country, cities, or villages situated in the zone which should 
be occupied by the other army, it shall evacuate them as soon as the army 
which, according to the previous paragraph, has the right to their occu- 
pation, demands it. 



29 

Article 7 

The ultimate object of the military operations of the allied Greek 
and Serbian armies being the destruction of the military forces of Bul- 
garia, if one of the two armies can not attain that object in its own 
theatre of operations, it is bound to accept the assistance of the other 
army in the same theatre of operations. Still, the army which has 
attained this object in its own theatre of operations is bound to go to 
the assistance of the other, independently of whether this assistance 
was asked for or not, in order that by a joint action of the two allied 
armies, Bulgaria may be forced to submit to the conditions which shall 
be laid down by the two allied states and conclude peace. 

Article 8 

Neither of the two allied armies can conclude an armistice of a dura- 
tion of more than twenty-four hours nor can it tacitly suspend hostilities. 

An armistice of a duration of more than twenty-four hours can not 
be concluded except upon a joint agreement in writing of the two allied 
states; this agreement shall at the same time determine the conditions 
of the armistice. 

Article 9 

The present convention shall be valid as long as the treaty of alliance 
between Greece and Serbia, of which it forms a complement, remains 
in force. 

Article 2 of the present convention may be modified by a joint 
agreement in writing of the General Staffs of the two respective 
states, after the passing of the present crisis and the ordering of 
demobilization. 

Article 10 

The present convention shall come into force from the day of its 
ratification by their Majesties the King of the Hellenes and the King 
of Serbia, or by the respective governments of the allied states. 

In faith whereof, the plenipotentiaries have signed the present 
convention. 

Done in duplicate, in Salonika, the first day of May in the year 1913. 

For Greece: For Serbia: 

Captain J. P. Metaxas. Colonel Petar Pechitch. 

Colonel Dotjchan Toufegdjitch. 



30 
No. 4 

MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND 
THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA 

Signed, May 19/ June 1, 1913; ratifications exchanged at Athens, 
June 8/21, 1913. 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of 
Serbia, desiring to complete the treaty of alliance concluded between 
the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, by a military 
convention, have appointed for that purpose as their plenipotentiaries: 

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, Captain Xenophon Stratigos, 
of the Corps of Engineers, and of the General Staff of the Army; His 
Majesty the King of Serbia, Colonel Petar Pechitch, of the General 
Staff, and Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch, of the Infantry, who, after 
having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and 
due form, have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

In case of war between one of the allied states and a third Power, 
arising in the circumstances provided for by the treaty of alliance 
between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack by important 
masses — at least two divisions — of the Bulgarian army against the 
Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, 
promise to each other mutual military support, Greece with all her land 
and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces. 

Article 2 

In the beginning of the hostilities, at whatever moment they begin, 
Greece is bound to have an army of ninety thousand fighting men con- 
centrated in the region between the Pangaion Mountain, Salonika, 
and Goumenitsa, and Serbia an army of one hundred and fifty thousand 
fighting men concentrated in the region of Ghevgheli, Veles (Kioprulu), 
Koumanovo, Pirot. Besides, Greece is bound to have at the same time 
her fleet in the iEgean Sea ready for action. 

Article 3 

The two states are bound to bring to the zone of operations their 
remaining military forces, as soon as these shall become available. 



31 

Article 4 

A decrease of the forces mentioned in Article 2, either by demobi- 
lization or by the transportation of troops elsewhere, is not permitted, 
except on a written agreement between the General Staffs of the 
armies of the two allied states. 

But if Greece, in the case provided for in Article 1, should, at the 
same time, be found under the necessity of defending herself against 
an attack of a Power other than Bulgaria, she shall be bound to go to 
the assistance of Serbia, attacked by Bulgaria, by a number of troops 
fixed by a joint agreement at the proper time between the two General 
Staffs, according to the military situation and having due regard to 
the security of the territory of the Kingdom of Greece. 

Conversely, if Serbia should be in need of defending herselfagainst 
an attack by a Power other than Bulgaria, she shall be bound to go 
to the assistance of Greece, attacked by Bulgaria, by a number of 
troops fixed by common agreement at the proper time between the two 
General Staffs, according to the military situation, and having due re- 
gard to the security of the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia. 

Article 5 

In case one of the contracting parties shall declare war against 
Bulgaria or against another Power, without a previous agreement 
and the consent of the other contracting party, the latter shall be 
released from the obligations imposed by Articles 1 and 2 of the 
present convention. It shall nevertheless maintain a benevolent 
neutrality towards its ally during the continuation of the war and 
shall be bound to mobilize immediately in its territory, Greece, at 
least forty thousand fighting men and Serbia at least fifty thousand 
fighting men, in such a manner as to protect its neutrality and con- 
sequently the liberty of movement of the allied army. 

Article 6 

The military operations against Bulgaria shall be based on a 
common plan of operations. This plan of operations shall be drawn 
up by the respective General Staffs of the two states or by their 
delegates. It may be subsequently modified in consequence of a 
change of the military situation, by a joint agreement in writing of 
the two General Staffs. 



32 



Article 7 



After the opening of the hostilities, whatever the course of the 
military operations may be and whatever the localities through which, 
during the military operations, the troops of the one or the other of the 
allied states may pass, and whatever may be the cities, villages or posi- 
tions occupied by these troops for military necessities, the final 
occupation of the country lying beyond the boundary line between 
Greece and Serbia on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other, provided 
for by the treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece, of which the 
present convention forms a complement, is regulated as follows: 

Greece has the right to occupy definitely and to annex the 
country lying to the south and east of the line which, starting from 
a point on the Vardar immediately to the north of Sehovo, "passes 
between the villages of Bogoroditsa and Mazucovo, afterwards by 
the crest line between the villages of Selimli and Dautli, it proceeds 
towards the altitudes 535, 227, runs through the lake proceeding 
towards the altitude 208, and afterwards towards the altitudes 397, 
1494, the crest line of the Beles mountain, summit 1800 M to the 
northwest of Karakioi up to altitude 2194 (Perelik). 

Serbia has the right to occupy definitely and to annex the country 
lying to the north and the northwest of the said line. 

Greece concedes that Serbia shall occupy a zone of territory of 
a width of ten kilometers, lying on the left shore of the Nestos-Mesta 
(Karassou), to the north of Xanthi and to the east of Buru-Golu. 
Serbia, on the other hand, is bound to allow Greece free passage 
through this zone and declares that she recognizes the influence of 
Greece in all the territory lying to the east of this zone and recog- 
nizes that she has no claim whatever upon it. 

If, during the military operations, one of the two armies occupies 
part of the country, cities or villages, situated in the zone which 
should be occupied by the other army, it is bound to evacuate them 
as soon as the army which, according to the previous paragraph, has 
the right to their occupation, demands it. 

Article 8 

The ultimate object of the military operations of the allied Greek 
and Serbian armies being the destruction of the military forces of 
Bulgaria, if one of the two armies can not attain that object in its own 



33 

theatre of operations, it is bound to accept the assistance of the 
other in the same theatre of operations. Still, the army which has 
attained this object in its own theatre of operations is bound to go 
to the assistance of the other, independently of whether this assist- 
ance was asked for or not, in order that by a joint action of the two 
allied armies, Bulgaria may be forced to submit to the conditions which 
shall be laid down by the two allied states and conclude peace. 

Article 9 

Neither of the two allied armies can conclude an armistice of more 
than twenty-four hours duration or tacitly suspend hostilities. 

An armistice of more than twenty-four hours duration can not be 
concluded except upon a joint agreement in writing of the two allied 
states. This agreement shall at the same time determine the con- 
ditions of the armistice. 

Article 10 

The allied armies shall mutually enjoy, each on the territory 
of the other high contracting party, all the rights and privileges 
granted to the (national) armies of the country by virtue of the laws 
and ordinances in force, — except as to requisitions, — in regard to 
general maintenance, revictualling, sanitary service, transportation of 
the wounded and sick, burial of the dead, and the transportation of all 
the material and provisions destined for the use of the troops. To 
these ends the military and civil authorities of the two contracting 
parties are bound to render every assistance and service requested 
by the allied troops. 

The payment for the purchases made for the needs of the army 
of one of the two allied states stationed in the territory of the other, 
shall be made regularly in cash, at the market price. In excep- 
tional cases payments may be made by vouchers placed at the dis- 
posal of the allied army at its request by the proper authorities of 
the other ally. 

The current rate of the Greek and Serbian coin or paper money 
shall be fixed by a joint agreement of the two allied governments. It 
goes without saying that in the territories taken from the enemy and 
occupied by the allied armies, the two contracting parties shall 
enjoy in regard to the maintenance and the revictualling of their 
troops the rights conceded by the laws of war. 



34 

Each allied army shall enjoy these privileges only in the territory 
which belongs to its own zone of occupation, as this is indicated 
in Article 6 of the present convention. The expenses for the trans- 
portation of troops, all necessary material in general, war booty, etc., 
by railways or ships, shall be borne by the contracting state in whose 
territory such transportations shall be effected. 

Article 11 

The war booty shall belong to the allied army which captures it. 

In case the booty is captured in a common battle of the allied 
armies, on the same battle-field, it shall be divided in proportion to 
the number of fighting men of the two armies who participate in it. 

Article 12 

The present convention shall be valid as long as the treaty of 
alliance between Greece and Serbia, of which it forms a complement, 
remains in force. 

Article 2 of the present convention may be modified by a joint 
agreement in writing of the General Staffs of the two respective 
states, after the passing of the present crisis and the ordering of 
demobilization. 

Article 13 

The present convention shall come into force from the day of its 
ratification by their Majesties the King of the Hellenes and the King 
of Serbia, or by the respective governments of the allied states. 

In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present 
convention. 

Done in duplicate, in Salonika, the nineteenth day of May in the 
year 1913. 

For Greece : For Serbia : 

X. Stratigos. Colonel Petar Pechitch. 

Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch. 



35 

II. Negotiations 

No. 5 

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alex- 
andropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, May 10/23, 1913. 

We have just received your telegram about the note which the 
Serbian Government will send to Sofia. Notwithstanding the Bul- 
garian attack, which is becoming general at Pangaion, we did not wish 
to take the offensive and march against Serres — which would have 
compelled the Bulgarians to change their attitude — in order not to 
find ourselves unexpectedly in a state of war. But the situation 
can not be protracted, because it is very dangerous and we should 
come to a decision. The time for the signature of the treaty expires on 
the 12th of May (O. S.) and it is necessary that it should be signed 
in Belgrade. You have by telegram the text of the full powers which 
we shall send to you by special courier. You can sign before it 
reaches you. 

In regard to the modifications to be made in the secret treaty,, 
which are mentioned in your telegram of the 9th instant, accept in 
Article 5 after the words "to mediation or arbitration " the insertion 
of the words "of the sovereigns of the Entente Powers or the chiefs 
of other states." Accept equally the omission of the words "as soon as. 
possible." In the same article instead of the wording "the two high 
contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to propose, etc." 
we prefer the original wording "the two high contracting parties will 
propose, etc." As I informed you by my communication of April 
30, the change of the verb "will propose" to "reserve to themselves" 
was due to the omission of the words which we now accept. We 
also accept that the second paragraph of Article 4 should be worded 
as follows: "The eastern frontier of Serbia from Ghevgheli shall follow 
the Axios river, etc." 

In regard to the modifications of the military convention, Article 
1, according to your telegrams, should be worded as follows: "In 
case of war between the two allied states and another state, entered 
into under the circumstances provided for in Article 5 (the number 



36 

is missing in your telegram) of the treaty of alliance between Greece 
and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack of the Bulgarian army 
against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece 

and Serbia, promise to each other (up to:) all her land forces." 

We accept it in the above wording. 

In regard to the provisions of Article 6 of the convention, we give 
you full liberty to negotiate on them, trying to improve them and at 
last to accept them, if there is no way of doing otherwise. You will 
have in that the aid of Captain Stratigos. Try to finish as soon as 
possible. 

Offer our thanks to the Serbian Government for its step at 
Sofia. As soon as it presents a note for the revision, we can accelerate 
our joint steps, in order to hasten the negotiations of partition. 

Coromilas. 

No. 6 

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. L. 
Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Belgrade, May 10/23, 1913. 

I communicate the following telegram drawn up by Captain 
Stratigos : 

After an understanding with the President of the Ministerial 
Council and in the presence of Colonel Toufegdjitch, who signed the 
military convention in Salonika, the Minister of Serbia at Athens 
handed to us a memorandum containing the modifications proposed 
by the Serbians in Articles 1 and 6 of the military convention signed 
in Salonika. He wishes urgently to have an answer on these 
propositions. 

In regard to Article 1, the Serbians propose to modify it as 
follows: "In case of war between one of the two allied states and 
a third Power, entered into under the circumstances provided for 
by Article of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Ser- 
bia, or in case of a sudden attack." The remainder is not modi- 
fied. This article as it was worded at Salonika, is from the military 
point of view much more advantageous to us, while as it is now worded, 
it serves only the interests of Serbia. The strictly defensive character 
of the alliance is to the advantage of the Serbians, who do not claim 
from the Bulgarians more than what they now possess, while it 
deprives us of the right to claim all the territory which has been 



37 

defined in the protocol to the south of the Kilkitch-Orliaco line, 
occupied now entirely by the Bulgarians, inasmuch as an advance on 
our part with the view of occupying these points might be inter- 
preted by the Serbians as a provocation. Besides, this strictly 
defensive character contributes to leave to Bulgaria every initiative 
and liberty of action, which from the military point of view is very 
disadvantageous. The extension of the alliance not only against 
Bulgaria but also against any third Power is, from the military 
standpoint, detrimental to our interests and favorable only to the 
Serbians. In fact, the latter have but land frontiers and have as 
neighbors more states than we have with whom they could at a given 
time come into conflict, in which case we would be obliged to assist 
them; on the contrary, it is only with Bulgaria that we can come 
in conflict by land and it is in that case only that the help of Serbia 
could be useful to us. For our eventual differences with other Powers 
who could attack us by sea, the assistance of Serbia would amount 
to nothing. So, in order to bring into harmony Article 1st of the 
military convention with the respective provisions of the treaty of 
alliance, we venture to suggest that it would perhaps be more advan- 
tageous to modify the respective provisions of the treaty of alliance 
according to the exigencies of our military interest. 

As for Article 6 of the military convention the Serbians demand 
that it be modified as follows : 

After the beginning of the hostilities, whatever the course of the military 
operations may be and whatever the places through which, during the military 
operations, the troops of one or the other of the allied states pass and what- 
ever may be the cities, villages or localities which may be occupied by these troops 
for the sake of military necessity, the occupation of the territories situated to the 
east of the Serbian frontier on the Vardar (Axios) river, as it is determined by the 
treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece, of which the present convention 
forms a complement, is regulated as follows: 

The Greek army has the right to occupy the territories situated to the south 
and the southeast of the line, which, starting about three kilometers to the 
south of Ghevgheli on the Vardar, proceeds towards the east between the villages 
Bogoroditcha and Mazucovo, to the north of the village Selimli, to the south of 
Dautli, and from there ascends up to the altitude 535, it proceeds towards the 
altitude 420, by Hissar-Tepe; altitude 127, altitude 217, altitude 490, altitude 
576, from there by the mountain range of the Kroussa Balkans up to the altitude 
645 [to] the Butkova lake and reaches the Strouma river, from which it [words 
illegible] towards the altitude 1800, to the north of Karakioi, altitudes 2194, 4038, 
8994, 8475. The Serbian army has the right to occupy the territories situated to 
the north of the same line. If during the course of the operations . . . etc. 

The Serbians claim this line, as fixed above, alleging that in case 
of a successful war against Bulgaria, we shall be sufficiently compen- 
sated by an extension of our frontier to the east. Such a proposi- 
tion — which in every other circumstance may be debatable — 



38 

should now be rejected, not so much because we shall be deprived 
of a sufficiently large extent of a rich country, but especially for 
purely military reasons; for by accepting the line proposed by the 
Serbians we shall find ourselves, even after a successful war against 
Bulgaria, deprived of natural and strong boundaries to the north of 
Salonika, such as Mount Beles would constitute. Mount Beles and, 
to the east, the narrow pass of Demir Hissar in the hands of another 
state would give to her the advantage of being able to concentrate 
against us her army in the valley of Strouma and to advance without 
hindrance toward the plain of Serres and Salonika. Our occupation 
of Milovitsa and the narrow pass would oblige it on the contrary to 
concentrate itself much more to the north and delay greatly its 
advance, which would be an incalculable benefit and greatly favor a 
possible operation in that region. Another very great inconvenience 
offered by the proposed line is that it would deprive us of an entire 
portion of the Salonika-Serres Railway line, from Kilindir to the 
Hani-Derven Bridge, on the Strouma. The building of a new rail- 
way line from Salonika to Serres beyond the proposed boundaries, 
would meet great difficulties on account of the very configuration 
of the ground. 

Alexandropoulos. 



No. 7 

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. L. 
Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Belgrade, May 18/26, 1913. 

I communicate to you the following telegram of Captain Stratigos: 

The modifications of the military convention, which the Serbians 
demand, as a result of a study by their General Staff, are as follows: 

Article 1. In case of war against one of the two states, entered into, in the 
circumstances provided for in Article 1 of the treaty of alliance between Greece 
and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack of important masses of the Bulgarian 
army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, 
promise to each other mutual support, Greece by all her land and naval forces and 
Serbia by all her land forces. 

They demand that this forrmfa should be final, and insist that 
this article should be connected not with the fifth article of the treaty 
which has in view a war against Bulgaria alone, but with Article 1, 
which extends the alliance against other states, adding that if it re- 
ferred only to Bulgaria they would not have needed our alliance. 
Furthermore, in consequence it seems of the last engagements they add 
the words "important masses." It seems to me that we can accept this 



39 

latter point, provided a clear formula be found capable of avoiding 
al misunderstanding. As to the connection of this article either 
with the first or fifth articles of the treaty of alliance, as this con- 
stitutes a capital question, I shall await your instructions. 

Article 2. They demand that the Greek army shall be increased 
from 90,000 to 100,000 fighting men. I think that we can accept 
this modification. 

Article 3 unchanged. 

Article 4. The Serbians add a second paragraph which is as follows: 

But if Serbia, in the case provided for in Article 1, finds herself at the same 
time under the necessity of defending herself against an attack on the part of another 
Power than Bulgaria, she will be bound to go to the assistance of Greece, attacked 
by Bulgaria, with all her available military forces. Conversely, if Greece finds 
herself under the necessity of defending herself against the attack of a Power other 
than Bulgaria, she will be bound to go to the assistance of Serbia, attacked by 
Bulgaria, with all her available military forces. 

This addition is acceptable in principle. I have proposed that it 
should be formulated in a manner insuring a proper use of the military 
forces according to military necessity and in a manner so as to avoid 
every cause of abuse. 

After this article they propose an article 4 bis : 

In case one of the contracting parties should declare war against Bulgaria or 
against another Power, without the previous agreement and consent of the other 
contracting party, the latter will be freed from the obligations imposed by 
Articles 1 and 2 of the present convention. Still, it should observe a benevolent 
neutrality towards its ally throughout the duration of the war and be bound to 
mobilize immediately at least 50,000 fighting men and to concentrate them in a 
manner so as to protect the freedom of movement of the allied army. 

I think that it suits our purpose to accept this article up to the 
words "throughout the duration of the war." 

Articles 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 unchanged. 

The discussion on Article 6 will take place tomorrow. 

At the end of the convention we shall add: first an article con- 
cerning the revictualling, the sanitary service, the transportation of 
the wounded, the burial of the dead, the transportation of material 
and provisions, the manner of the payment of the expenses, the ex- 
ploitation of the resources of the occupied territories, and the manner 
of regulating the expenses of transportation by sea and railway; 
and secondly an article concerning the manner of the distribution 
of the booty 

In order to gain time we shall discuss the above articles with the 
military delegates and will agree upon a final formula under the 
reservation of your approval. 

Alexandropoulos. 



40 



No. 8 

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. 
Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, May 14/37, 1913. 

We reply to the two telegrams of Captain Stratigos dated May 
10 and 13. 

Article 1 of the military convention. We conclude that this 
article has been finally worded as follows: 

In case of war against one of the two states, entered into under the circum- 
stances provided for by their treaty of alliance, or in case of a sudden attack of 
important masses ("forces" preferably) of the Bulgarian army against the Greek 
or Serbian army, the two states promise to each other mutual support, Greece with 
all her land and sea forces and Serbia with all her land forces. 

Captain Stratigos had telegraphed that he would define in a clearer 
manner the words "important masses" in order to avoid all mis- 
understanding, but he has not communicated to us the modification 
announced by him. We accept the article in its final formulation 
under the reservation of formulating more clearly, if necessary, the 
words "important masses." 

Article 2. We have replied that the number of 90,000 for the 
Greek army should be kept. 

Article 3 unchanged. 

Article 4. As to the second paragraph "But if Serbia ..." up 
to the end "by Bulgaria, by all her available military forces," we 
accept it in principle, but we would prefer that you give us a better 
formula insuring a proper utilization of the military forces. 

Article 4 bis: "In case one of the two contracting parties should 
declare war against Bulgaria or against another Power, without the 
previous agreement and consent . . ." up to ". . . throughout the 
duration of the war." 

Captain Stratigos has telegraphed that it was not to our interest to 
accept what comes after this, namely, "and shall be obliged to mobi- 
lize immediately at least 50,000 fighting men and to concentrate them 
in a manner so as to protect the liberty of movement of the allied 



41 

army," but he did not inform us what the Serbians had finally 
accepted. We think that the words "shall be obliged to concen- 
trate fighting men," etc., might well be placed instead of to 

"mobilize, etc." 

The number of fighting men shall be fixed by the General-in- 
Chief, taking into consideration that our army will be more numerous 
in future. 

Article 5 unchanged. 

Article 6. We have noticed that Captain Stratigos has succeeded 
in obtaining in our favor an improvement of the line of the military 
occupation proposed by the Serbians, but he should have fixed it more 
in detail. We insist that the line, as it shall be finally fixed, shall con- 
stitute the eventual frontier between Greece and Serbia. Besides, the 
Serbians seem to accept it, provided the matter is kept secret, but as 
compensation for this line they demand that from Karakioi, Serbia 
may claim a strip of territory along the Nestos of a width of 10 kilo- 
meters maximum in order to acquire a port and a railway line of her 
own to the iEgean Sea. This would constitute a very great advantage 
for Serbia and in return for this she would perhaps cede to us half 
of the Doiran lake. This question, too, is worthy of great attention 
and I shall give you supplementary instructions as to this point. 

The other articles unchanged. 

We accept in principle the questions dealt with in the two addi- 
tional articles and are awaiting their formulation. 

Coromilas. 

No. 9 

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Majesty 
the King, at Salonika. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, May 14/27, 1913. 

I communicate to Your Majesty a telegram sent to Belgrade. 
I suppose that the Serbian delegates will come to Salonika and 
that the content of the said telegram may be of use to Captain 
Metaxas. 

I call the attention of Your Majesty to the new demand of Serbia 
for an outlet to the iEgean. I think that we can accept it on con- 



42 

dition that we shall be insured the freedom of passage and the right 
of way for our railways. The strip of territory should, at any 
rate, be fixed so as to pass between Xanthi, Yenidje and Giou- 
mouldjina, leaving these three cities outside the Serbian strip [of 
territory]. ^ 

J J COROMILAS. 

No. 10 

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. 
Alexandropoidos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, May 17/30, 1913. 

As the situation is aggravated in consequence of the continued 
attacks of the Bulgarians, and we are unable to confront them with- 
out attacking them elsewhere, the President of the Ministerial Council, 
in agreement with His Majesty, telegraphs to you to conclude and to 
sign, if possible, today. If Serbia still insists on the strip of terri- 
tory, you should accept it as follows: 

A strip of territory, of a width of not more than ten kilometers, starting from 
a point to be fixed on the line Karakioi-Perelik up to the iEgean Sea, passing 
between Xanthi and Gioumouldjina, is ceded to Serbia, which is to insure to 
Greece the free passage through it, as well as all the facilities. 

Answer at once. Coromilas. 

III. Interpretation 
No. 11 

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. E. Venizelos, 
President of the Ministerial Council, at Trieste. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, July 11/24, 1914. 

The Charge* d 'Affaires of Germany called upon me and read 
strictly confidentially a telegram from his government, according to 
which, as the course of events do not seem to exclude a conflict 
between Austria and Serbia, the Imperial Government will be at the 
side of its ally. Bulgaria would probably take advantage of such 



43 

a, situation. It is not known if Turkey will remain indifferent. It 
would be desirable that Greece should break away from Serbia in 
time; that, under such circumstances, the conclusion of an alliance 
with Turkey now would seem to be impracticable, but an arrange- 
ment for mutual neutrality would seem to be indicated. 

Before I gave an answer to these suggestions, I reserved to myself 
the right to communicate with Your Excellency and His Majesty 
whom I shall see this afternoon. I have, however, given assurances 
that the Royal Government will not fail to act in the sense of the 
maintenance of peace and, at the same time, I have pointed out 
the difficulty of our situation in case of the participation of Bulgaria 
which might perhaps attack Serbia, both in consequence of the 
obligations assumed [by us] and in view of [the danger of] our being 
isolated if a similar situation should subsequently present itself to 
Serbia in a Greco-Bulgarian conflict. 

Streit. 

No. 12 

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. E. 
Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, at Munich. 

(Telegram) 

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914> 

The President of the Council has just begged me to ask you: 
"Whether the Serbian Government can count on armed aid on the 
part of Greece : 1st, in case Serbia is attacked by Austria, 2nd in case 
Serbia is attacked by Bulgaria." A similar question will be put to 
the Royal Government by the Minister of Serbia in Athens. 

The President of the Council has told me that Montenegro will 
range itself with Serbia in both contingencies, and that Rumania is 
taking steps to adjust the situation in order to prevent the war 
between Austria and Serbia, and that she will come to a decision later 
in case of a European War. His Excellency has added that, according 
to their last advices from Petersburg, the Ministerial Council in Russia 
has decided to support Serbia militarily, but that they are awaiting 
the decision of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

Alexandropoulos. 



44 



No. 13 

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit, 
Minister for Foreign Affair's, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, July 12/25, 1914. 

I have just had a very long interview with Von Jagow, who told 
me that, as soon as he saw that the relations between Austria and 
Serbia were taking a critical turn, he instructed the representative of 
Germany at Athens to inform Your Excellency of this situation, and 
to give us the advice to draw away as much as possible from Serbia, 
even in case Bulgaria should participate in the Austro-Serbian con- 
flict, which is most probable. I replied that I had knowledge of that 
communication, having been just informed about it by the President 
of the Ministerial Council from Munich, 1 and I added that Mr. 
Venizelos had informed me that in case Bulgaria should think it proper 
to intervene, Greece could not permit it and that we would also im- 
mediately intervene. Von Jagow insisted in a very particular manner 
on the dangers which he foresaw in the case of the intervention of 
Greece in order to check Bulgaria. These dangers consist, according 
to him, in the possibility of seeing Turkey act against us, inasmuch as 
Serbia would be engaged in fighting Austria, and, on the other hand, 
the possibility, on which he seems to be counting, of the abstention of 
Rumania from any interference [in favor] of Serbia, even though at- 
tacked by Bulgaria, because Rumania has always tacked about in the 
waters of the Triple Alliance and she would not at this moment be 
willing to find herself opposed to Austria and to the Triple Alliance. I 
insisted on the impossibility of our permitting Bulgaria to change the 
equilibrium established by the Treaty of Bucharest, and I explained 
to him that if we permitted such an aggrandizement of Bulgaria, we 
ran the risk of seeing this Bulgaria become stronger than our- 
selves and[ attack us a few years from now. I said at last to Von 
Jagow that if he wished very much that none of the Balkan States; 
should intervene, he should act at Sofia in order to compel Bulgaria 
to keep quiet. 

I must advise you that from the reserve which I noticed in the 
language of Von Jagow concerning the action of Bulgaria, I carried 

1 See document No. 11. 



45 

away the impression that Austria must have concluded some sort 
of an agreement with Bulgaria about a common action. 

Von Jagow admitted that he fully understood the extremely 
delicate position in which we would be placed, but he repeated again 
his advice about abstention and neutrality, even in the case of Bul- 
garian intervention. 

The Minister, reverting to the disposition of Turkey, told me that 
he was informed from various sources that the military party in 
Turkey always had far from friendly dispositions towards Greece, 
and that we should not lose sight of this circumstance. 

Theotoky. 

No. 14 

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Air. 
G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Munich, July 12/25, 1914. 

In regard to our attitude in case of an armed conflict between 
Austria. and Serbia, reserving entirely our opinion on the application 
of the treaty of alliance, it would be necessary not to leave any 
doubt in the mind of those with whom you converse about our deci- 
sion that we shall not stand with crossed arms in the presence of a 
Bulgarian attack against Serbia. It would be impossible for us to 
tolerate such an attack, which might result in an aggrandizement of 
Bulgaria and bring in question the Treaty of Bucharest. It is not 
only our duty as the ally of Serbia, but an imperative necessity 
imposed upon us for our own self-preservation. 

Venizelos. 

No. 15 

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Mr. J. 
Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade. 

(Telegram) 

Munich, July 13/26, 1914. 

In regard to the communication made by the President of the 
Ministerial Council l please tell His Excellency that before I give 

1 See document No. 12. 



46 

a precise answer, I must come to an understanding with His Majesty 
the King and the Royal Government. 

But, I authorize you to say to His Excellency that I transmitted 
to you my personal views, authorizing you to speak to him about it 
in a strictly confidential manner. These are my views : First, as for the 
contingency of a war between Austria and Serbia, I have the firm hope 
that such a war, which would be a real calamity for all of us, may 
be avoided, thanks to the well-known conciliatory spirit of His Excel- 
lency, strengthened by the advice of Russia and by that of all the 
real friends of Serbia; but if, by misfortune, the war broke out, 
we would take a decision as soon as we became cognisant of all 
the elements, taking into account the efficiency of our aid. Second, 
in regard to the contingency of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, 
I am resolved to propose to His Majesty the King and to the Royal 
Government to array all our forces against Bulgaria, in order to re- 
lieve Serbia from every anxiety about the Bulgarian danger and to 
insure the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest. 

Venizelos. 

No. 16 

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, 
Minister of Greece at Berlin. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, July 15/28, 191 4. 
Referring to your telegram of the 12th instant l I have the 
honor to inform you that I have had a conversation with the Charge" 
d'Affaires of Germany, in the course of which I have explained to him 
that a possible interference of Bulgaria in the Austro-Serbian conflict 
would create for Greece the duty to oppose this by all means. If, in 
fact, Bulgaria, notwithstanding the declarations of Mr. Rodoslavof, 
should be led to take advantage of the position of Serbia in order to 
attack her, there would follow a real upsetting of the equilibrium of 
the forces in the Balkans and Greece would be in danger of being 
encircled and exposed to attack on the first occasion. The most 
elementary sentiment of self-preservation and security impels Greece 
not to tolerate an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria in order to reopen 
questions which have already been solved by the Treaty of Bucharest. 

1 See document No. 12. 



47 

Please take advantage of the first opportunity which presents 
itself to speak to this effect to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Streit. 
No. 17 

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Mr. G. 
Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

Munich, July 16/29, 1914. 

At the moment when the declaration of war by Austria obliges 
us to face serious contingencies, I think that I must indicate to you 
certain guiding views. 

If in a war localized between Serbia and Austria, we can remain 
neutral, we should not forget that our alliance obliges us to mobilize 
immediately forty thousand men. Still, it is in the common interest 
of Serbia and Greece not to proceed immediately to such a step which 
might provoke the general mobilization of Bulgaria and greatly risk 
the precipitation of some very grave events. Please give at once the 
necessary instructions to our minister so that he may explain to 
the Serbian Government the reasons for our attitude and give to it 
the repeated assurance of our firm resolution to mobilize immediately 
in. case of a Bulgarian mobilization. He should add that our atti- 
tude corresponds absolutely to that which the Serbian Government 
had decided to take, in the common interest, at the time of our 
crisis with Turkey. 

I am at the same time of the opinion that the cooperation of 
Greece and Rumania should have an immediate manifestation at 
Sofia, by an identical declaration of the two Cabinets that they are 
resolved to mobilize without delay in case of Bulgarian mobilization. 
Please come to an understanding with Bucharest in order that joint 
instructions may be given to the above effect to the respective 
ministers. 

Besides, we should consider the possibility of a generalization 
of the war in order to determine beforehand our policy. My well 
considered opinion is that, in such a contingency, the Royal Govern- 
ment could at no price whatever, be induced to range itself with the 
camp opposed to Serbia and cooperate with her enemies against 
her; that would be contrary to the vital interests of Greece, the 



48 

good faith of the treaties and the dignity of the state. I shall 
under no pretext whatever deviate from this policy. 

Venizelos. 

No. 18 

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alex- 
dropoulos, Minister of Greece at Nisch (Serbia). 

(Telegram) 

Athens, July 20/ 'August 2, 191J+. 

In regard to the questions put by the Serbian Government con- 
cerning the attitude which the Royal Government intended to take 
in the Austro-Serbian conflict, 1 please make the following declaration 
to the President of the Ministerial Council, a copy of which you are 
authorized to leave with him should he request you to do so: 

Without entering into an examination of the obligations result- 
ing from its alliance with Serbia, the sole consideration that the 
independence and territorial integrity of Serbia are an essential factor 
in the Balkan equilibrium as established by the Treaty of Bucharest, 
to the maintenance of which Greece is firmly and resolutely attached, 
is sufficient to dictate to the Royal Government the decision which 
it should take, at least for the present, in order to come more effec- 
tively to the aid of the friendly and allied nation. 

The Royal Government is convinced that it fully discharges its 
duty as friend and ally by the decision that it has taken to maintain 
towards Serbia a most benevolent neutrality and to be ready to repel 
every attack on the part of Bulgaria of which Serbia might be the 
object. 

In fact, the participation of Greece in the war which is being waged, 
far from being useful to Serbia, would in fact be very prejudicial to her. 
Greece by becoming belligerent would offer to her ally but very feeble 
forces in comparison with the power of her adversary, while she would 
necessarily condemn Serbia to see Salonika, the only open port through 
which she [Serbia] is revictualled, become the object of the resolute 
attacks of Austria. 

Furthermore, the entrance of Greece into the war would fatally 
weaken the force of her army, which it is important in the common 
interest to maintain intact in order to hold Bulgaria in check. 

1 See document No. 12. 



49 

The Royal Government is convinced that the Serbian Government 
will recognize that its decision is inspired by real anxiety for their 
common interests and that it bears the stamp of the greatest wisdom. 

The Royal Government repeats that it is ready to face the danger 
of a Bulgarian attack. It has already taken all the proper steps to 
facilitate, if the case requires, the mobilization of its army. If it 
has not yet mobilized, it is only in order not to provoke in Bulgaria 
a similar measure, which would undoubtedly precipitate events by 
complicating the present state of affairs without any advantage. 
Besides, the Greek mobilization will be finished, when the time comes, 
if not sooner, at least simultaneously with that of Bulgaria. 

The Royal Government hopes that its views on this subject agree 
absolutely with those of the Serbian Government, which, if the case 
requires, will kindly communicate to us its opinion. 

Streitv 

No. 19 

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the 
King, at Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, July 22/ August 4, 1914. 

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany has just telegraphed to me 
asking me to go and see him immediately. As soon as I was ushered 
in, His Majesty handed me a telegram to read which he had just 
received from Your Majesty transmitted by the Charge d'Affaires of 
Germany. His Majesty the Emperor asked me to telegraph at once to 
Your Majesty the following: 

The Emperor informs Your Majesty that an alliance has been 
today concluded between Germany and Turkey; that Bulgaria and 
Rumania are equally ranging themselves on the side of Germany; that 
the German ships which are in the Mediterranean will be joined with 
the Turkish fleet in order to act together. From the above Your Maj- 
esty will see that all the Balkan States have sided with Germany in 
the struggle which has been undertaken against Slavism. His Majesty 
in bringing these considerations to the knowledge of Your Majesty 
begs you, appealing to a comrade, a German Marshal,— of whom the 
German army felt proud when that title was bestowed upon you,— 
and to a brother-in-law, and reminding you that it was thanks to the 



50 

support of His Imperial Majesty that Greece retained Ca valla definitely, 
to be pleased to order the mobilization of your army; to place yourself 
at the side of the Emperor and to march together, hand in hand, 
against Slavism, the common enemy. The Emperor added that he is 
making this last and earnest appeal to Your Majesty, at this most 
critical moment, and that he is convinced that Your Majesty will re- 
spond to his appeal. If Greece does not side with Germany then there 
will be a complete break between Greece and the Empire. 

Finally, His Majesty told me that what he asks of you is to put 
into execution what Your Majesty and he had so many times dis- 
cussed. He observed to me that since the Bulgarians, to whom the 
Emperor and Germany had never been very [favorable], are siding 
with Germany, he can still hope that Greece will likewise do so. 

I think I must add that the Emperor appeared to me absolutely 
determined in what he told me. 

Theotoky. 

No. 20 

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the King, 

at Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, July 22 /August 4, 1914- 

After having seen the Emperor I had a long conversation with Von 
Jagow, who confirmed to me, under the seal of absolute secrecy, the 
conclusion of an alliance between Turkey and Germany. The Turkish 
troops will be under the high command of the Sultan and the Turkish 
generals, but General Liman will intervene in their direction. Bulgaria 
and Rumania will fight on the side of Germany. Between Turkey 
and Bulgaria there exists a sure understanding, thanks to which these 
two countries will fight against every state which does not follow the 
same policy. Von Jagow is of opinion that our security [imposes] 
upon us to fight with the other Balkan States against Russia and 
Serbia. On my pointing out to him the danger of a coup de main on 
the part of England to which we are exposed by reason of our geo- 
graphical situation, he replied that he did not think that England 
would act against us. 

From what I have been able to understand, the negotiations with 
Bulgaria are conducted in Vienna. In regard to compensations, I 



51 

have gained the impression that these are to be looked for in Serbia 
and Albania in case Italy maintains the reserve which she is now- 
observing. I do not think that Vienna and Sophia have exactly 
agreed on the compensations which will be accorded to Bulgaria in 
case of success, and I have reason to believe that these have been 
simply outlined by the general term of " countries upon which Bulgaria 
has historical and ethnological rights." 

If we decide to accede to the appeal of the Emperor, I think that 
we ought, after declaring that, in principle, we are ready to comply 
with that appeal, to demand precise statements as to what they wish us 
to do, and as to what they would secure for us in case of success. I 
have the impression that they would not object at all to see us ag- 
grandized at the expense of Serbia. 

I beseech you to weigh in a most careful manner the immense con- 
sequences, for the present and for the future, which a refusal on our 
part to accede to the appeal of the Emperor would entail. 



Theotoky. 



No. 21 



Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, 
Minister of Greece in Berlin. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, July 25 /August 7, 1914- 
I communicate to you the following telegram of His Majesty the King : 

Please transmit the following, in answer to your telegram of July 22 x : 

The Emperor knows that my personal sympathies and my political views 

draw me to his side. I shall never forget that it is to him that we owe Cavalla. 

After mature reflection, however, it is impossible for me to see how I could be 

useful to him, if I mobilized my army immediately. The Mediterranean is at the 

mercy of the united fleets of England and France. They would destroy our fleet 

and our merchant marine, occupy our islands and especially would prevent the 

concentration of my army which can only be effected by sea because there does 

not yet exist any railway. Without being able to be useful to him in anything, 

we would be wiped off the map. I am necessarily of opinion that neutrality is 

imposed upon us, (and this could also be useful to him), with the assurance that 

I shall not touch his friends, my neighbors, as long as they do not touch our 

local Balkan interests. 

Const antine R. 

1 See document No. 19. Streit. 



52 

No. 22 

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit, Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, July 25/ August 7, 1914- 

The news which you give me from Constantinople may be accu- 
rate as far as the present is concerned, but this does not preclude that, 
notwithstanding the assurances which the Turks now give concerning 
their mobilization, they are pursuing the object indicated by my 
telegram to His Majesty. One should not lose sight of the fact that 
Turkey needs a whole month in order to mobilize and that she must do 
everything possible not to be disturbed in that. Her situation in the 
Balkans will present itself, as I had the honor of describing it to you, 
namely: Bulgaria will at a given moment march against Serbia. She 
will not be prevented by Rumania and will be insured against a pos- 
sible attack by Turkey, so that, if Germany and Austria are victorious 
over Russia, it is incontestable that Bulgaria will be aggrandized at 
the expense of Serbia, and Rumania at that of Russia. That being so, 
have we an interest in watching this aggrandizement, which we can 
not prevent, without trying to aggrandize ourselves also? I do not 
think so. The only waj^ to succeed would be to attack the Serbians 
together with the Bulgarians, and, if Germany and Austria are vic- 
torious, the Serbians will be so reduced that they will never be able 
to recover. We must try to come to an understanding for that pur- 
pose with the Bulgarians, to remain neutral as long as they also do so 
and to act as soon as they act. If we try to find [illegible words] we 
shall run the risk of being supplanted by all the others. 

I think that such a policy would be perfectly comprehensible here, 
where they have no reason whatever to spare Serbia, which has today 
declared war against Germany. Furthermore, in view of the attitude 
which Italy maintains towards Germany and Austria, I am of opinion 
that, if an understanding is reached with Vienna, Berlin would have 
no objection whatever to our receiving compensations in Albania, for 
with a non-existing Serbia, the reasons which have contributed to its 
[Albania's] creation and maintenance will cease to exist for Austria. 

Of course, I fully understand the scruples which such a policy 



53 

would inspire in you in regard to the relations that we have with Serbia; 
but it is now a question of our existence, and of our profiting as much 
as possible from the general upheaval. 

Theotoky. 

No. 23 

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the 
King, at Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, July 27 /August 9, 1914. 

I transmitted through Von Jagow to His Majesty the Emperor of 
Germany the telegram which Your Majesty has done me the honor to 
send under date of July 25. 1 Von Jagow told me that he thinks that 
the Emperor will understand the necessity indicated by Your Majesty 
to maintain neutrality for the present. The minister repeated to me 
the advice which he. gave the day before yesterday, that we should come 
to an understanding, as soon as possible, with Sofia and Constanti- 
nople, and added that Serbia was now considered "the bear's skin." 

Theotoky. 
No. 24 

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit, Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, July 29/ August 11, 1914- 

I have just had a long interview with Mr. Zimmermann, which 
may be summarized as follows: 

The Under Secretary of State thinks that Rumania does not care 
about the Treaty of Bucharest except in so far as that treaty concerns 
her. Bulgaria and Turkey are already linked together. Bulgaria 
will act at the favorable moment against Serbia. As for Turkey, he 
counts on her acting against Russia. Mr. Zimmermann does not ex- 
clude the possibility of Turkey and Bulgaria attacking us also, if we 
attempt to check the attack of Bulgaria against Serbia. As you see, 
we are isolated. 

1 See document No. 21. 



54 

Mr. Zimmermann expresses also the opinion that we must try to 
come to an understanding with Sofia and Constantinople, although the 
thing seems to him to be very difficult. If an understanding can be 
reached, we must remain neutral as long as the others remain so and 
act as soon as they act, having Serbia as the objective. If this is not 
done, the only thing left to us is to maintain neutrality. The Under 
Secretary is of opinion that as soon as the German troops have achieved 
one or two great victories against France, the Balkan States will act. 

Theotoky. 

No. 25 

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, 
Minister of Greece at Berlin. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, July 80/ August 12, 1914. 

I have the honor to inform you that the Minister of Germany came 
today to speak to me again about the possibility, which His Excellency 
considered as being imminent, of an attack by Bulgaria against Serbia, 
and of the attitude which Greece should from now on take in order 
that she may release herself from Serbia. His Excellency further- 
more demanded that Greece should, in any case, maintain neutrality 
and not come to the assistance of Serbia; that, in case Bulgaria while 
attacking Serbia was attacked by Greece, he would be obliged to de- 
mand his passports and to leave his post in order to show that he con- 
siders such an action of the Royal Government as hostile. 

I replied to the Minister of Germany that I should have to consider 
the declaration about the possibility of the rupture of the relation 
with Greece as not corresponding to the present situation, because 
such a contingency has not yet presented itself, and that according 
to our information, there is not yet even a Bulgarian mobilization. 
If Bulgaria mobilized, we would also do so immediately, and that 
independently of the attitude which we would take, because otherwise 
Bulgaria could take advantage of it in order to attack us. 

I developed afterwards at length the point of view which you know, 
and according to which, if we impose upon Bulgaria the maintenance 
of neutrality, this action has only in view our primordial right of self- 
preservation, has a purely Balkan character, and is not directed against 
the two Central Powers, one of which, namely, Ausrtia-Hungary, has 



55 

today declared to us that she is exercising in the same sense a 
pressure at Sofia. 

I added as my personal opinion that it seemed to me that the Bulga- 
rian mobilization should be avoided in the interests of the Central Powers 
themselves, because Bulgarian duplicity being known, the probability 
is not at all excluded that Bulgaria, once mobilized, may be carried 
away by the Russophile current to take sides with the Triple Entente, 
finding it to her interest to come to an understanding with Serbia. 

Please add these arguments to the ones I have already communi- 
cated to you in my previous dispatch, and do not lose sight of the fact 
that the German Government, in approving our neutrality, does not 
demand from us at this moment to march with Bulgaria against Serbia. 

Please ascertain also if the above declaration about the rupture 

of the relations with Greece reflects in fact the view of the German 

Government. ~ 

Streit. 

No. 26 

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations in the countries of the 

Entente Powers and in Bucharest. 

(Telegraphic Circular) 

Athens, August SI /September 13, 191 4- 

The Minister of Germany came to see me in order to tell me that 
an agreement has been definitely reached between Bulgaria and Tur- 
key. The latter will lend Bulgaria two army corps, with a view to a 
joint attack against Serbia, and will maintain four army corps in 
Thrace by way of threat against a possible attack of Rumania upon 
Bulgaria. The Minister of Germany told me that neither Bulgaria 
nor Turkey intended to attack Greece. 

I replied to the Minister of Germany that, as I had already declared 
to him, it would be impossible for Greece to be a passive spectator of 
an attack by Turkey and Bulgaria upon Serbia, and that apart from 
her interests, her obligations as ally oblige her to go to the defense of 
Serbia in case the action announced should be realized. 

It is not impossible that the Minister of Germany made this com- 
munication to me in order to obtain a promise of neutrality on the 
part of Greece, which the German Government would utilize at Sofia 



56 

in order to ask Bulgaria to come to an understanding with Turkey for 
the purpose of a joint attack against Serbia. 

Please make the above known without delay and confidentially 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and telegraph to me his impression. 

Venizelos. 
No. 27 

Mr. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Bei lln, to Mr. E. Venizelos, 

President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, October 18/31, 1914. 

This morning I had a conversation with Mr. Zimmermann, which 
may be summarized as follows: 

The German Government seems to be satisfied that events have 
obliged Russia to declare war against Turkey, for it hopes that 
the state of war, which will necessarily extend to France and England, 
will contribute, on the one hand, to the diversion of the Russian forces 
from their principal objective, namely, Germany and Austria, and on 
the other hand, it hopes that owing to the state of war, Turkey will be 
able to declare a sacred war in Asia, in India and in Africa, and that 
the rising of the Islamic world will embarrass France and particularly 
England, which might fear for her position in Egypt and India. 

In regard to us, the Under Secretary of State gave me again the 
most categorical assurance that Turkey is not thinking of attacking 
us and that the German interests require that Turkey should limit 
herself to waging war against Russia. He therefore advises us to 
remain passive spectators in this struggle. 

As for Bulgaria, Mr. Zimmermann thinks that she will not inter- 
vene for the present and he expressed the opinion that, even should 
Bulgaria intervene later against Serbia, we would have every interest 
not to intervene. Having observed to him that we have a treaty with 
Serbia, he answered that today treaties have very little value, and he 
mentioned the small importance which the treaties binding Germany 
and Austria to Italy and to Rumania have exercised on the attitude 
which these last two Powers have followed from the beginning of the 
war. "Try to make," concluded the Under Secretary of State, "your 
links with Serbia as loose as possible." Theotoky 



57 



No. 28 

Communique of the Gounaris Cabinet given to the press on February 
25 /March 10, 1915, the day that it assumed power. 

Greece, after her victorious wars, had the imperative need of a 
long period of peace in order to work for the prosperity of the country. 
The organization of the public services, of the land and sea forces, and 
the development of the public wealth would have guaranteed her 
against any attack on what she had acquired at so much sacrifice. 
They would also have permitted her to put into execution a program 
serving the interests of the state and to adopt a policy in conformity 
with the national traditions. 

Under these circumstances, neutrality from the beginning of the 
war was a necessity for Greece. She had and always has the absolute 
duty to carry out her obligations of alliance and to pursue the satis- 
faction of her interests, without however running the danger of com- 
promising the integrity of her territory. 

The Greek Government, conscious of its duty thus to serve the 
interests of the country, is convinced that the patriotism of the people 
will insure the entire preservation of these interests. 

No. 29 

Mr. G. Christaki-Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. 
Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Nish (Serbia). 

(Telegram) 

Athens, February 28 /March 18, 1915. 

After the official communique which was published on the assump- 
tion of power by the new Cabinet, ] I instructed our representatives 
at London, Paris and St. Petersburg, to give to the respective govern- 
ments categorical assurances that the new Cabinet would follow the 
policy inaugurated by Greece from the beginning of the present war, 
and that in no way was it intending to deviate from a line of conduct 
traced by its traditional sentiments, the bonds which unite her with 
the Protecting Powers and her vital interests. The divergences which 
brought about the recent crisis had to do with the dangers of an im- 

1 See document No. 28. 



58 

mediate action, but do not touch the basis of our policy. I have ex- 
pressed the same opinion to the Minister of Serbia at Athens, adding 
that the Royal Government is thoroughly conscious of the community 
of interests existing between the two allied and friendly countries and 
that it has always been faithfully attached to the treaty of alliance be- 
tween Greece and Serbia. 

Please see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and speak to him to 
this effect in order to dispel any uneasiness which may have arisen 
in his mind in consequence of the change of government in Greece. 

Zographos. 

No. 30 

Mr. P. Psychas, Minister of Greece at Bucharest, to Mr. D. Gounaris, 

President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Bucharest, July 17/30, 1915. 

My English colleague has told me that according to positive infor- 
mation, Germany has given formal assurances to the Government of 
Sofia that the neutrality of Greece was definitely secured, even in case 
of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria. 

Psychas. 

No. 31 

Telegraphic Circular of Mr. D. Gounaris, President of the Ministerial 
Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Rotjal Legations at Paris T 
London, Rome, Petrograd, Nisch (Serbia), Berlin, Vienna and Sofia. 1 

Athens, July 20/ August 2, 1915. 

I communicate to you herewith a telegram of our Bucharest Lega- 
tion 2 and I beg you, in case similar language is used to you to repeat 
what we have so often declared, that a Bulgarian attack against Serbia 
could not leave us indifferent, and that the Bulgaro-Turkish agree- 
ment will only strengthen the bonds between the two countries. 

Gounaris. 

1 This circular was communicated to the Minister of Greece at Bucharest. 

2 See document No. 30. 



59 



No. 32 

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin. 

(Telegram) 
Athens, August 21 /September 8, 1915. 

The prospect of a possible attack against Serbia by the combined 
Austro-German forces continues to preoccupy intensely the Royal 
Government and this on account of the more and more evident rap- 
prochement between Bulgaria and the Central Empires. If this 
rapprochement had no other effect than to insure to the Teutonic 
forces a free passage through Bulgaria, we would have no reason 
whatever to be alarmed. But if, taking advantage of the arrival of 
Teutonic forces, Bulgaria should undertake to attack Serbia, we could 
not remain indifferent to the prospect of a probable crushing of our 
ally by Bulgaria. Independently of the extent of our obligations of 
alliance, our vital interest would compel us to do everything in order 
to forestall a Bulgarian victory, of which we would become, sooner or 
later, the first victims. 

The German Government will undoubtedly have in view these 
various contingencies in deciding upon the expedition through Bulgaria, 
but you would do well to seize a favorable opportunity in order to give 
again an explanation of these views in your private character, by saying 
that they represent the opinion predominating in the country. We 
think that the German Government has no interest in seeing the out- 
break of a Balkan War and will continue to wish that Greece may not 
abandon her neutrality. We may therefore hope that, in any case, 
even in case the eastern expedition is organized, it will use all its in- 
fluence to check Bulgaria, dissuading her from any attack on Serbia 
in order to insure the maintenance of peace on our own frontiers. 

Please transmit without delay the result of your steps. 

Venizelos. 



60 



No. 33 

Mr. A . Zaimis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Legations. 

(Telegraphic Circular) 

Athens, September 25 /October 8, 1915. 

The new Cabinet, having studied the various aspects of the exceed- 
ingly complicated international situation before which it now finds 
itself, is in a position to affirm that its policy will rest on the same 
essential bases as the policy followed by Greece from the beginning 
of the European War. Greece, in order the better to insure her vital 
interests, will remain in a state of armed neutrality and will adapt 
herself to events, the evolution of which the new Cabinet will follow 
with unabated attention. 

Please be guided by the above both in your diplomatic conversa- 
tions and interviews with the representatives of the press. 

Za'imis. 

No. 34 

Mr. A. Zaimis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign 

Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of 

Greece at Nish (Serbia). 

(Telegram) 
Athens, September 29 /October 12, 1915. 

The Minister of Serbia left with me a copy of a telegram from his 
government, which, considering that the expectation of an impending 
attack of the Bulgarian forces against the Serbian army constitutes 
the casus foederis provided for by our alliance, requests us to inform 
it at once if, in accordance with our agreements, the Greek army 
will be ready to act against Bulgaria, and if the Royal Government 
will be disposed to give to the General Staff the nece-sary instructions 
to come to an understanding with the Serbian Staff in order to deter- 
mine the details of the plan for a cooperation against Bulgaria. 

The Royal Government regrets exceedingly that it can not accede 
to the demand of the Serbian Government formulated in that manner. 



61 

In the first place, it considers that in the present circumstances, 
the casus foederis does not arise. In fact, the alliance which was con- 
cluded in the year 1913 in anticipation of a Bulgarian attack and with 
the view of establishing and maintaining an equilibrium of forces be- 
tween the States of the Peninsula after the partition of the territories 
obtained by joint conquest from the Ottoman Empire, has, accord- 
ing to the very preamble of the treaty, a purely Balkan character, im- 
posing in no way the application of the treaty in the contingency 
of a general conflagration. In spite of the generality of the terms of 
article first, the treaty of alliance and the military convention which 
completes it, prove that the contracting parties had in view only the 
hypothesis of a singlehanded attack by Bulgaria directed against one 
of them. Article 4 of the military convention furnishes in itself the 
proof of this, because being intended to limit the aid of one of the 
allies already occupied elsewhere, it does not foresee any other casus 
foederis but the attack of Bulgaria against the other ally. Nowhere 
is there any question of a combined attack of two or more Powers. 
On the contrary, no matter how broad the general provision of the 
first article of the military convention may be in its terms, it is limited 
to the hypothesis of a war between one of the two allied states and 
a single other Power. And it could not have been otherwise; it 
would have been an act of foolish conceit in the event that one of 
the parties would be at war with several states at the same time, to 
stipulate the granting of an evidently feeble and ridiculous assistance 
of the military forces of the other party. 

It is therefore beyond question that exactly this hypothesis now 
presents itself. If the Bulgarian attack feared by the Serbian Govern- 
ment takes place, it will be due to an agreement made with Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Turkey. It will be carried out in combination 
with the attack already undertaken against Serbia by the two Central 
Empires. It will appear as an incident of the European War. The 
Serbian Government itself has already recognized that this was the 
character of the attack by breaking her diplomatic relations with 
Bulgaria in order to follow the example of the Entente Powers, her 
European allies, without previously coming to an understanding with 
Greece, her Balkan ally. It is therefore evident that the attack will 
be found to be outside the provisions as well as the spirit of our 
alliance. 

But the Royal Government is not only convinced that under these 



62 

circumstances it is not bound by any contractual obligation, but it is 
also persuaded that its military assistance offered spontaneously at 
such a time would badly serve the common interest of both countries. 
It is on account of this interest that it has remained neutral in the 
European War, believing that the best service which it could render 
to Serbia was to hold Bulgaria in check, preserving its forces intact 
and its communications free in view of a possible attack on her part. 
It was always ready to face the Bulgarian danger even in case it 
should appear in the course of the European War, although Serbia 
was already struggling with two great Powers. For that reason, it 
hastened immediately to answer the Bulgarian mobilization by a gen- 
eral mobilization of its army. But it had always in view a Bulgarian 
attack undertaken separately, even though in connection with the other 
hostilities undertaken against Serbia. The hypothesis of an attack 
concerted with that of other Powers was and ought to be outside of 
its anticipations; because Greece, intervening in such a case, would 
have been lost, without having the least hope of saving Serbia. Evi- 
dently, Serbia can not desire such a result. The common interest re- 
quires, on the contrary, that the Greek forces should be kept in reserve 
for a better use of them subsequently. It is therefore of importance 
that Greece should remain neutral and under arms and should follow 
attentively the march of events, with the resolution always, and by 
the most appropriate means, to watch over the preservation of her 
own vital interests and the protection of the interests which she has 
in common with Serbia. 

The Royal Government, being convinced that the Serbian Govern- 
ment will recognize the correctness of the reasons which prevent Greece, 
in the present circumstances, from promising its armed assistance to 
Serbia, and feeling a profound regret for the actual impossibility, for 
the present, of doing more for Serbia, wishes to assure her, that faith- 
ful to their friendship, she will continue to give her all the aid and 
facilities compatible with her international position. 

Please read the above to Mr. Pachitch, leaving with him a copy 
if he asks for it. 

Za'imis. 



63 



No. 35 

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Legations. 

(Telegraphic Circular) 

Athens, October 26 /November 8, 1915. 
The new Cabinet intends to follow in foreign affairs exactly the 
same policy as its predecessor. I am referring, in regard to this, to the 
dispatch of my predecessor of September 25th. 1 In your diplomatic 
conversations with the representatives of the press, please be inspired 
by the declarations therein contained. Skouloudis. 

No. 36 

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Panourias, Charge d' Affaires 

of Greece at Mitrovitsa (Serbia) . 

(Telegram) 

Athens, October 26 /November 8, 1915. 
In speaking to the Serbian Government, please give the most cate- 
gorical assurances of the sentiments of sincere friendship with which 
we are animated toward Serbia, as well as of our firm resolution to 
continue to afford her all the facilities and every support compatible 
with our vital interests. Skouloudis. 

No. 37 

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, 
London, Rome and Petrograd. 

(Telegraphic Circular) 

Athens, October 26 /November 8, 1915. 
In speaking with the Minister for Foreign Affairs please give on 
my behalf the most categorical assurance of our firm resolution to 
continue our neutrality with the character of the sincerest benevolence 

1 See document No. 33. 



64 

towards the Entente Powers. Please add that the new Cabinet 
adopts as its own the repeated declarations of Mr. Zaiimis about the 
friendly attitude of the Royal Government towards the Allied troops in 
Salonika; that it is too conscious of its real interests and of what it 
owes to the Protecting Powers of Greece to deviate in the least from 
this line of conduct. It therefore hopes that the sentiments of friend- 
ship of these Powers for Greece will not at any time be influenced by 
the malicious and misleading news which is circulated intentionally 
in the vain hope of impairing the good relations of the Entente with 
Greece. 

Skouloudis. 

No. 38 

Mr. J. Panourias, Charge d' Affaires of Greece in Serbia, to Mr. E. 
Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Mitrovitsa, November 2/15, 1915. 

I duly spoke to the President of the Ministerial Council accord- 
ing to the import of your telegram of the 26th ultimo 1 received late 
yesterday evening, telling him of the declarations contained in the 
telegram of September 25th. 2 I developed again the arguments 
supporting our point of view. The President of the Council thanked 
me for the communication and added that the vital interests of 
Greece are identical with those of Serbia, that the aggrandizement 
of Bulgaria would be the ruin both of Serbia and of Greece, that the 
victory of the Austro-Germans could by no means guarantee the vital 
interests of Greece, and that he has the firm hope that Greece will in- 
tervene at the last moment. 

I also had a conversation to the same import with the Assistant 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me nearly the same thing as 
the President of the Council, and communicated to me, — justifying 
himself for the delay due to the march of events, — the reply of the 
Serbian Government given by [illegible words] on the foreign policy 
of the Zaiimis Cabinet. 

Here is the text of this reply : 

1 See document No. 36. 2 See document No. 33. 



65 

"At the end of September last, the Minister of Greece in Serbia 
delivered to the Serbian Government a copy of a telegram from his 
government 1 in which Greece, in reply to the appeal made to her 
by Serbia at the moment when the Bulgarian attack against Serbia was 
impending, declared that she regretted that she was not able to give a 
favorable answer to our appeal to intervene against Bulgaria as soon as 
the latter should attack Serbia. 

The reasons given by Greece in that reply were, that she con- 
sidered that such a possible attack by Bulgaria at the present moment 
came under the contingencies of the European War and that in no 
case could it constitute a casus foederis, the Greco-Serbian alliance 
having a purely Balkan character. 

The Serbian Government, being solely inspired by the solidarity 
of the vital interests of Greece and Serbia in the face of the Bulgarian 
danger, — the importance of which is also recognized by Greece in 
her reply, — considers that it is its duty to submit to the Greek 
Government the arguments which militate in favor of immediate 
action by Greece against Bulgaria. The spirit of the treaty of alli- 
ance, which guarantees the territorial integrity of each of the con- 
tracting states in case of attack, as well as its text, in which no mention 
is made that the treaty will cease to have binding force if Bulgaria is 
in alliance with another Power, prove in a clear and logical manner 
that Greece is bound to come to the assistance of Serbia, if the latter, 
without provocation on her part, is attacked by Bulgaria or another 
Power. The Serbian Government has not the slightest doubt that 
Bulgaria is attacking Serbia solely for the purpose of taking away 
from her the territories which she acquired by the Treaties of 
London and Bucharest, and in order to prevent Serbia and Greece 
from having contiguous frontiers. The object of the treaty of 
alliance with Serbia is to guarantee the situation which was created 
after the wars in the Balkan Peninsula, and this treaty has the 
character of a treaty of mutual guarantee of the integrity of Serbia 
and Greece. (Article 1st) This article, in fact, does not state that 
Serbia and Greece must be attacked by one enemy only and not 
by many; it speaks of an attack in general and not of the number 
of the attacking Powers. To suppose that the treaty foresaw the 
case of the attack of one Power only and not of more, would mean 
that the treaty was intended to guarantee Greece and Serbia against 
the lesser danger but not against the greatest dangers. It there- 
fore results from this interpretation that the application of the 
treaty would cease to have binding force precisely at the moment 
when it was most necessary. 

The attack of Bulgaria against Serbia shows, according to the 
opinion of the Serbian Government, the evident intention of changing 
the existing situation in the Balkans. But even if it had been only 

1 See document No. 34. 



66 

an incident in the present European War and not an event of a 
preeminently Balkan character, the important question would have 
been not to know what is the character of this war, but what is its ob- 
ject and what are the consequences which may result from it? Whether 
the territorial status quo in the Balkans is changed through a purely 
Balkan war, or through a combined European and Balkan war, 
amounts to the same thing. In either case the Greco-Serbian interests 
are equally injured. [The disadvantage offered by the possibility] of 
a combined attack of Germans and Bulgarians against Serbia is 
[counterbalanced] by the military aid of the Powers of the Triple 
Entente, who have as their object the maintenance of the situation 
which was created and guaranteed by the Treaty of Bucharest. 

Serbia in breaking diplomatic relations with Bulgaria without 
previously coming to an understanding with Greece, did not wish 
to recognize the European character of the possible Bulgarian attack; 
she wished only to characterize the Bulgarian mobilization as being 
directed against Serbia and [to consider it as] a menace to her exist- 
ence. She did not come to an understanding with Greece in regard 
to the breaking of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria for the simple 
reason that she did not have the choice and it did not depend upon 
her to break or to maintain those relations. The rupture became 
inevitable on account of the aggressive attitude of Bulgaria. There- 
fore, we think that Greece, having ordered without a previous under- 
standing with Serbia the general mobilization of her army immedi- 
ately after the Bulgarian general mobilization, has [acted] in the 
same [manner as Serbia]. 

Greece herself recognizes that the present Serbo-Bulgarian war 
may endanger her own interests, and for that reason she promises 
to intervene at a favorable time, as much for the guarantee of our 
•common interests as for her own special interests; but, according to 
the opinion of the Greek Government, this intervention, in order 
to become effective, must be made at a favorable time. The Greek 
Government then admits that it may intervene in the present war 
against the Bulgarian danger, which might present itself during the 
European War; it [admits] consequently the [possibility] of an inter- 
vention against two adversaries of Serbia, but only if their attack 
against Serbia is simultaneous and not combined, which from the 
military standpoint is the same thing. Whether therefore her adver- 
saries are allies or not, Serbia is bound to fight on two fronts and 
the military difficulties for Greece are the same. 

[However], the Greek Government recognizing the possibility of 
its intervention during this war, considers that this intervention, 
should take place at the apportune moment. It is more than evi- 
dent that Serbia and Greece, joining their forces, could defeat the 
Bulgarians even if the latter were aided by the Germans, more 
easily than Greece, if isolated, could defeat a Bulgaro-German coali- 
tion, to which she would have previously given time to defeat Serbia. 



67 

Greece by her present attitude gives to this coalition the opportunity 
of subduing first Serbia and afterwards Greece, while it is certain that 
it couid not vanquish them simultaneously. 

Having in view all the above [arguments] and the common 
[Greco-Serbian] interests, [the Serbian Government] begs to draw 
the attention of the Greek Government to the fact that Greece has 
repeatedly given to us the assurance that she would take part in the 
war, under the reservation only that Bulgaria must first attack 
Serbia. [The very interest] of Greece imposes upon her the duty 
of beginning operations immediately against Bulgaria with all her 
forces, even if no Greco-Serbian treaty of alliance existed. Any 
delay in the intervention of Greece may become fatal not only to 
Serb a but also to Greece. The Serbian Government therefore makes 
a final appeal to the Greek Government in order that this interven- 
tion may be effected immediately." 

Panourias. 

No. 39 

Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris, to Mr. E. Skouloudis 

President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Paris, March 28/ April 10, 1916. 
I have the honor to inform you that the rejection by the Royal Gov- 
ernment of the proposals of the British and French Ministers concerning 
the question of facilitating [the passage] of the Serbian army through 
our territory, which came to the knowledge of the Ministry many 
days ago, has disposed the French Government very unfavorably 
toward us. Mr. Brian d told me that under these conditions there 
could no longer be any question of furnishing to us an advance of 150 
millions asked for by the Royal Government. The commissary officer 
Bonnier told me the same thing in regard to the army supplies. For 
three days the newspapers, particularly the Echo de Paris, have pub- 
lished very violent articles, and news suggesting a blockade and other 
coercive measures on account of the attitude of Greece in general, 
without referring to the question of the passage of the Serbian troops. 
I have asked a well informed journalist, an acquaintance of mine, 
the reason for this campaign. He told me that this language of the 
French press is due to our refusal to allow the passage to the Serbians. 
They avoid, however, for the moment, speaking about the question of 
the passage of the [Serbian army], because, if the public were informed 



68 

about it, there would be a general reprobation of us and the French 
Government would perhaps be obliged to adopt an attitude which 
is repugnant to Mr. Briand, who desires to maintain friendly rela- 
tions between the two countries. The President of the Council would 
like to have the Serbians transported by sea around the Matapan 
promontory, but the Minister of Marine is opposed to it, because he 
considers the passage as dangerous and difficult on account of the 
submarines. It can not be denied that if a Serbian transport were 
sunk, public opinion would throw the responsibility for it upon us. 

Romanos. 
No. 40 

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister 

for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Romanos, Minister 

of Greece at Paris. 1 

(Telegram) 

Athens, March 29 /April 11, 1916. 
I can not but be painfully surprised by the declaration of Mr. 
Briand that, on account of the point of view of the Royal Govern- 
ment in the matter of the passage of the Serbian army, there can no 
longer be any question of giving to us the advance of the 150 millions 
which we had asked. In fact, we did not ask this advance as a price 
for the violation of neutrality, to which we never thought of consent- 
ing, and nothing in our attitude can permit the French Government to 
attach such a meaning to our request. We asked the financial assist- 
ance of the Western Powers, thinking rightly that it could not be a 
matter of indifference to them to see Greece weakened militarily and 
disorganized financially. This point of view was certainly preoccupy- 
ing the Powers because they did not oppose to our request any refusal 
of acceptance in principle. Under these circumstances, the difficulty 
which has now arisen does not seem to be of a nature to alter the 
position of the financial matter, unless Mr. Briand intends to set aside 
deliberately considerations of a general and permanent order, in order 
to inflict upon Greece a sort of punishment for her refusal to con- 
sent to a serious violation of her neutrality. This conclusion is so 
illogical and iniquitous that it is impossible that it can be definitively 

1 This telegram was communicated to the Royal Legations at London, Rome, 
and Petrograd. 



69 

reached by a mind so penetrating and liberal as that of Mr. Briand, 
and this all the more because he is too keen not to perceive that, if 
Greece, wishing to remain neutral, is obliged to repulse energetically 
every new violation of her neutrality, she does not possess the neces- 
sary means to resist the pressure of a coalition of great Powers. 
There are many things that Greece has had to submit to or endure 
because she could not help herself and the Powers already know this, 
from long experience. There are others which, on account of the 
rapidity of their execution and the fact that they are less annoying to 
our country, escape the action and even the vigilance of the authorities. 
Thus, in the very matter which had so excited the Powers, something 
has just happened which confirms the experience of the past, because 
Sunday evening the French transport Jean Corbiere, carrying Serbian 
detachments from Corfu to Salonika, passed through the canal of 
Corinth, almost completely unobserved, thanks to its innocent exterior. 
Please be guided by the above, and have a semi-official and friendly 
conversation with Mr. Briand, in which you will not have any trouble 
in making him understand that Greece, being placed between two 
groups of Powers, is obliged to submit to the recriminations, the 
protests and the bad humor of the one, whenever her neutrality is in 
fact violated in favor of the other, and that, under these conditions, 
it is impossible for the Royal Government to maintain officially an 
attitude different from her present attitude. Skouloudis 

No. 41 

Note-verbale of the Serbian Government to the Hellenic Government com- 
municated by Mr. J. Balougdjitch, Minister of Serbia at Athens. 

Athens, April 7/20, 1916. 

In order that the transportation to Salonika of the Serbian troops, 
now in Corfu, may be effected as soon as possible (which is undoubtedly 
also the desire of the Greek Government) and with the least possi- 
ble risk (this being the principal anxiety of the Serbian Government) 
it is necessary that the transportation should be done by land from 
Patras. 

The Serbian Government appeals first of all to the sentiments of 
humanity of the Hellenic Government, and begs that it may permit 
this passage; because, although there are other ways in Greek terri- 
tory through which this transportation can be effected, the Serbian 



70 

Government insists on the above mentioned road simply for the sake 
of avoiding the sinking of any of its transports. The losses sustained 
by Serbia during this war are so great and so much out of proportion 
to her real forces, that the Serbian Government considers it has the 
right to find the means of avoiding at least unnecessary losses which 
are not connected with the operations. 

This desire seems to it the better founded as the Hellenic Gov- 
ernment, by permitting to the Serbian army this passage through its 
territory, would in no way help the military operations and, con- 
sequently, would not be suspected of departing from the neutral con- 
duct which it has observed up to the present. It would simply perform 
an act of friendship and of benevolent neutrality towards Serbia, 
upon which the Serbian Government hopes to be able to count by 
reason of the very spirit of the Greco-Serbian treaty, independently 
of the interpretations which may be given to its various provisions. 

Awaiting with confidence the decision of the Greek Government, 
the Serbian Government considers it to be its friendly duty to call 
its attention to the disagreeable consequences which might result 
to Greco-Serbian relations, from a possible accident which might 
happen to a transport of Serbian troops, in consequence of the refusal 
of the Greek Government to permit their passage by land. 

No. 42 

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris and London. 1 

(Telegram) 

Athens, April 8/21, 1916. 

The Minister of Serbia came to see me yesterday and handed to 
me a note 2 by which Serbia, appealing to Greece as an ally, begs 
her to consent to the transportation of the Serbian troops now at Corfu 
to Salonika, via Patras and the railway. The reason given is that any 
other means of transportation incurs the risk of the destruction of the 
ships carrying these troops by enemy submarines. 

In my answer, I declared to the Minister that I had already replied 
to the representatives of the Entente that the transportation of the 
Serbian troops by land could not possibly be permitted by the Royal 

1 This telegram was communicated to the Royal Legations at Rome and 
Petrograd. 2 See document No. 41. 



71 

Government and that, consequently, I could not enter into any new 
conversation on this subject. 

I called to the Minister's attention that my declaration was cate- 
gorical and could in no way be modified, but that I had no objection 
to having a study of an absolutely private nature made into the ques- 
tion but that it could in no case, however, have a political result or 
influence the declarations which we have already made. The Min- 
ister said that he would telegraph to this effect to his government. 

I communicate the above to you for your exclusive guidance and 
beg you not to make any use of it in your conversations, unless the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs first brings up the question of this step 
of the Serbian representative. Skouloudis 

No. 43 

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at London, 

Rome and Petrograd. 

(Telegraphic Circular) 

Athens, April 14/27, 1916. 

Continuing my telegram of the 8th instant, 1 I have the honor 
to inform you that on Tuesday the Ministers of France and England 
came and declared to me that their governments had instructed them 
to support the step taken by the Minister of Serbia on April 7, and to 
give me the assurance that in using our railway the Serbian troops 
would not stop at Athens or anywhere else, except to change trains. 

I replied that these declarations were to no purpose, since the 
Royal Government persisted resolutely in its refusal, expressed from 
the very beginning, to permit any transportation of foreign troops by 
our railways. 

As Monsieur Guillemin said in reply that he had learned from the 
Minister of Serbia that I was negotiating with him, I answered that 
that was a serous error. I told him what had passed between the 
Minister of Serbia and myself, according to the statement contained in 
my above mentioned telegram of the 8th instant, and I affirmed that, 
according to our opinion, the exchange of views between the respec- 
tive officers could in no way modify our decision to oppose energeti- 
cally the passage by land of the Serbian troops. 
1 See document No. 42. 



72 

I gave the same explanation to the Minister of Serbia, who came 
to see me after his colleagues of France and England, and to the Min- 
isters of Russia and Italy, who came on Wednesday to make the same 
representation as the other [two ministers]. 

As the Ministers of the Entente, and particularly Monsieur 
Guillemin, do not seem to have well understood the very serious and 
absolutely legitimate reasons for our refusal, I consider it necessary 
to record them here, requesting you to explain to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, in the hope that, realizing the gravity of the situation, 
he will be good enough to use all his influence at Paris to persuade 
the French Government to renounce the plan of having the Serbian 
army pass through our territory. 

Such a passage would constitute the most flagrant and the most 
serious violation of our sovereignty and neutrality, which the other 
belligerent group would consider as a hostile act on the part of Greece, 
because it would amount to a grip on the very heart of our 
country. It would fatally create an unbearable derangement of the 
transportation of persons and goods over the principal railway of 
the kingdom. It would result, notwithstanding all assurances to the 
contrary, by the very force of circumstances, in the establishment of 
encampments of foreign troops in proximity to our principal cities 
and up to the very suburbs of the capital, thereby causing inevitable 
friction with the local authorities, inconveniences for the revictualling 
of our own populations, and serious dangers to the preservation of 
order and public health. It would finally lead to constant inter- 
ferences of foreigners in the administration of the public services 
and to numerous arbitrary acts and restrictions upon personal liberty, 
of which we are constant spectators and have had sad experience at 
Salonika and Corfu. 

It is because public opinion has immediately perceived the real 
danger to which the independence of the country would be thus 
exposed, being threatened in its most vital activities, that it rose 
indignantly against the plan of the passage by land and is resolved 
to demand from the Royal Government to use all its power in order 
to prevent its realization. Public opinion although bearing hard the 
numerous violations which have already taken place, has submitted to 
them with a resignation which hardly concealed its emotion, whenever 
it was possible to excuse them on the ground of military necessity. 
But this time its patience is exhausted and its indignation, aroused to 



73 

the point of leading it to commit desperate acts, is justified because 
the Entente can not allege any necessity for the passage of the Serbians 
by land, since their transports navigate the Mediterranean in all direc- 
tions from Alexandria to Salonika, from Salonika to Marseilles, from 
Marseilles to Corfu, without suffering much from the attacks of the 
enemy submarines. Therefore, it can not seriously be contended that 
there exists a greater danger to the transportation of the Serbians by 
sea, particularly since the canal of Corinth and the Straits of Euboia, 
the use of which we tolerate, allow the voyage to be limited to very 
small areas outside of our narrow seas. On the other hand, it can 
not be denied that the Serbians themselves were transported from 
Albania to Corfu, without any accident, notwithstanding the sub- 
marines and the mines in the Adriatic. 

Under these circumstances, the civilized world will unanimously 
justify the legitimate resistance of the Royal Government, just as it 
would unanimously condemn as a monstrous abuse of power any at- 
tempt of the Entente Powers to ignore our refusal. 

Please telegraph at once the result of your conversation. 

Skouloudis. 

No. 44 

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, to Mr. D. Caclamanos, Charge d' Affaires 

of Greece at Paris. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, April U/27, 1916. 

I communicate to you the following telegram l which I have 
just sent to London, Petrograd and Rome, by which please be guided 
in your conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs about this 
serious matter in a purely private character and in your own name. 
I am really of opinion that, in view of the obstinacy shown by the 
French Minister, who claims to interpret faithfully the instructions 
of his government, every official discussion is not only useless but may 
embitter the relations which, on our part, we continue to wish to be 
sincere and friendly. Skouloudis. 

See document No. 43. 



74 



PART SECOND 
The Germano-Bulgarian Invasion in Macedonia 

No. 45 

Lieutenant General Bairas, Commander of the 6th Division, to 
the General Staff of the Army, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Serres, April 21 1 May 10, 1916. 

A Bulgarian major, who met one of our officers, declared to 
him that by reason of an agreement entered into between Mackensen 
and our government, the Germano-Bulgarians were permitted to oc- 
cupy any point situated [up to] two kilometers of the frontier which 
might be considered suitable from a strategical and tactical point 
of view, and that, relying on this authorization and in consequence 
of an order from the Commander-in-Chief, he had occupied the hills 
dominating Lehovo; that all the boundary line was at our disposal, 
except the occupied points, that the entrance of Bulgarian troops 
into Lehovo had been forbidden and that [he expected] a friendly 
settlement of the question. 

Bairas. 

No. 46 

Lieutenant General Yannakitsas, Minister of War, to the IV Army 
Corps, at Cavalla. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, April 28 /May 11, 1916. 

The agreement entered into between the Germans and the Bulga- 
rians stipulates that in the section Ali Boutous — Se'imen-Kayassi we 
shall retire one to two kilometers from the boundary line, while the 
Germans and the Bulgarians may reach the boundary line without 
crossing it, in order that a neutral zone may be formed to our dis- 
advantage, since the Germano-Bulgarians are defending themselves 



75 

against the English and the French established in our territory. 
Consequently, both the slight advances to the north of Vetrina as 
well as the advance made near Lehovo constitute a violation of our 
agreement. Inform the Bulgarian major of Lehovo that he is mis- 
taken about the agreement. Explain to him what is really going 
on and tell him that the dispute will be settled by the governments. 
Add that, not doubting his good faith and in order to maintain 
friendly relations between the two states, you will not use force 
against him, and that he can stay where he is until the question now 
pending is settled by the government, but that you will prevent by 
force any new advance on his part or on the part of any other de- 
tachment. All this you will tell him as coming from you. The 
3rd Army Corps should, in what concerns it, conform itself to the 
contents of the present order. 

Yannakitsas. 

No. 47 

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister 

for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Naoum, Minister 

of Greece at Sofia. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, April 29/May 12, 1916. 

Bulgarian troops have occupied certain points in our territory to 
the north of Vetrina and the heights of Lehovo. A Bulgarian 
major explained to one of our officers of the boundary region that 
these occupations were made in accordance with the agreement entered 
into between Marshal Mackensen and the Royal Government, ac- 
cording to which the Bulgarians have acquired the right to occupy 
any point which might be useful for their operations in a zone of two 
kilometers on this side of the frontier. This is an evident mistake. 
What we have consented to is only that the Bulgarians should not 
be bound to respect the neutral zone of one kilometer on each side 
of the frontier which was established in fact in the beginning of our 
mobilization, and that in the sector of Ali Boutous — Se'imen-Kayassi 
we would withdraw our troops to a distance of one to two kilometers 
on this side of the frontier; the Germano-Bulgarians can, therefore, 
carry on operations there up to the frontier, but without crossing 
it. Consequently, the Bulgarian advance to Vetrina and Lehovo, 



76 

far from being in accordance with the agreement, is an evident vio- 
lation of it. Our officer on the boundary line explained to the Bul- 
garian major his mistake and [told him] that he tolerated temporarily, 
pending a friendly settlement between the two governments, the oc- 
cupations which have been wrongly effected, but that he would oppose 
by force any new advance. 

Please explain the above to the Minister for Foreign Affairs beg- 
ging him kindly to see that orders are given to the Bulgarian troops 
operating on the frontier to evacuate the points occupied in our ter- 
ritory and to respect strictly the agreement entered into, in order 
to avoid incidents the consequences of which might be very regrettable. 

Skouloudis. 

No. 48 

Letter sent by Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany at 
Athens, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Athens, May 9/22, 1916. 
(Received May 10/23, 1916.) 
Mr. President of the Council : 

In consequence of the aggressive measures recently undertaken 
by the troops of the Entente, Germany and her Allies are obliged 
to enter Greek territory in order to insure the free passage of the very 
important narrow passes of Roupel. This is a purely defensive measure 
which is due exclusively to the movements of the military forces of 
the Entente, and which will be maintained within the limits dictated 
by purely military interests. 

Proceeding from this point of view, the Imperial Government of 
Germany does not hesitate at all to give to the Royal Hellenic Gov- 
ernment the following assurances: 

(1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely 
respected. 

(2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as 
the military reasons requiring this action shall cease to exist. 

(3) Greek sovereignty will be respected. 

(4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious 
conditions will be respected. 

(5) Any damage caused by the German troops during their stay 
in Greek territory will be indemnified. 



77 

(6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly- 
manner towards the population of the country. 

Please receive, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my 
high consideration. 

Mirbach. 

No. 49 

Letter sent by Mr. G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria at Athens, to Mr. 
S. Skoulouolis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

Athens, May 9/22, 1916. 
(Received May 10/23, 1916.) 
Mr. President of the Council: 

Bulgaria and her Allies are obliged, on account of the aggressive 
movement of the troops of the Entente, to insure to themselves the 
free passage of the very important narrow passes of Roupel and for 
that object to effect the advance of their troops in Greek territories. 
It is merely a purely defensive measure which has been rendered 
necessary by the actions of the Entente, and which will be strictly 
limited to the military necessities. 

The Royal Government of Bulgaria begs furthermore to make 
to the Royal Government of Greece the following declarations : 

(1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely 
respected. 

(2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as 
the military reasons requiring this action shall cease to exist. 

(3) Greek sovereignty will be respected. 

(4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious 
conditions will be respected. 

(5) Any damage caused by the Bulgarian troops during their stay 
in Greek territory will be indemnified. 

(6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly 
manner toward the population of the country. 

Please receive, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my 
high consideration. 

G. Passarof. 



78 



No. 50 

Letter of Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of 

Germany at Athens. 

Athens, May 10/23, 1916. 
Mr. Minister: 

I have received the communication under yesterday's date which 

Your Excellency honored me by transmitting in order to inform me that 

in consequence of the aggressive measures recently undertaken by the troops 
of the Entente, Germany and her Allies are obliged to enter Greek territory in 
order to insure the free passage of the very important narrow passes of Roupel; 
this is a purely defensive measure which is due exclusively to the movements of 
the military forces of the Entente, and which will be maintained within the limits 
dictated by purely military interests; that proceeding from this point of view, the 
Imperial Government of Germany does not hesitate at all to give to the Royal 
Hellenic Government the following assurances: 

(1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely respected. 

(2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as the military 
rea-ons requiring this action shall cease to exist. 

(3) Greek sovereignty will be respected. 

(4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious conditions 
will be respected. 

(5) Any damage caused by the German troops during their stay in Greek 
territory will be indemnified. 

(6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly manner 
toward the population of the country. 

I take note of all the assurances contained in this communication, 
and beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my high con- 
sideration. Skouloudis. 

No. 51 

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, to Mr. G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria at 

Athens. 

(Letter) 

Athens, May 11/24, 1916. 

Mr. Minister: 

Acknowledging receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, 
I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that I take note of all 
the declarations contained therein. 

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my high consideration. 

Skouloudis. 



79 



No. 52 

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, 
President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, May 13/26, 1916. 

I have reasons which make me believe that we must count on the 
possibility of an approaching advance of the Germans and Bulgarians 
in the narrow passes of Roupel. Theotoky. 

No. 53 

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister 

for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Berlin, 

Vienna and Sofia. 

(Telegraphic Circular) 

Athens, May, 14/27, 1916. 

Yesterday afternoon German and Bulgarian detachments crossed 
our boundaries at Koula, to the north of Demir-Hissar, and attempted 
to occupy the fortress of Roupel, the garrison of which resorted to 
force in order to hold its position. Other detachments, consisting 
of 25,000 men, coming down this morning from the sectors of Tsingheli 
and Vetrina, occupied the heights toward Demir-Hissar and the bridge 
over the Strouma. They also took possession of the wooden bridge 
of Demir-Hissar. The population of this region is panic-stricken 
and is preparing to emigrate en masse, for it still retains the sad 
memory of the Bulgarian persecutions of 1912 and 1913. 

This irruption into Greek territory is contrary to the agreement 
entered into between the German and Bulgarian military authorities 
and our own, according to which their troops, having been released 
from the obligation of observing the neutral zone established since 
the mobilization, could advance up to the boundary line but not cross 
it. In face of the excitement caused by the above mentioned inva- 
sion, not only among the populations of the invaded regions but 
also on public opinion throughout Greece, the Royal Government 
is bound to protest in the strongest manner to the Imperial German 
Government and to the governments of its Allies, and to insist that 



80 

orders be given to evacuate as soon as possible the Greek territory- 
invaded by the German and Bulgarian troops. 

Please proceed without delay to a firm representation to the above 
import to the government to which you are accredited and acquaint me 
immediately with the result. Skouloudis 

No. 54 

Letter sent by Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, (1) to Count Von Mirbach-Harff, 
Minister of Germany, (2) to Mr. J. Szilassy, Minister of Austria- 
Hungary, (8) to G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria, City. 

Athens, May 15/28, 1916. 
Mr. Minister: 

On the afternoon of the day before yesterday German and Bulgarian 
detachments crossed our frontier at Koula, to the north of Demir- 
Hissar, and attempted to occupy the fortress of Roupel, the garrison 
of which was obliged to resort to force in order to hold its position. 
Other German and Bulgarian detachments, consisting of nearly 25,000 
men, penetrated yesterday the sectors of Tsingheli and Vetrina and 
occupied the heights towards Demir-Hissar, as well as the bridges of 
Strouma and Demir-Hissar. 

This sudden irruption of important forces into Greek territory 
not only constitutes a violation of neutrality, but is also contrary 
to the agreement entered into between our military authorities and 
those of the German and Bulgarian armies, according to which the 
troops of the Central Powers, having been released from the obli- 
gation of observing the neutral zone established since the mobilization, 
could advance up to the Greek boundary line but without crossing it. 

In face of this violation of neutrality and the lively emotion 
caused by it, not only among the populations of the invaded regions 
but also on public opinion throughout Greece, I must address to Your 
Excellency the strongest protests of the Royal Government, begging 
you to transmit them to your government, and I must insist that 
the German and Bulgarian troops evacuate as soon as possible the 
Greek territories invaded by them. 

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my high consider- 
ation- S. Skouloudis. 



81 

No. 55 

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 

Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome, 

Bucharest, Petrograd and Constantinople, and the Consulate General 

at Berne. 

(Telegraphic Circular) 

Athens, May 16/29, 1916. 

I have the honor to inform you that on the afternoon of the 13th 
of this month, German and Bulgarian detachments crossed our frontier 
at Koula, to the north of Demir-Hissar, and attempted to occupy 
the fortress of Roupel, the garrison of which was obliged to resort 
to force in order to hold its position. Other German and Bulgarian 
detachments, consisting of nearly 25,000 men, penetrated next day 
the sectors of Tsingheli and Vetrina and occupied the heights towards 
Demir-Hissar, as well as the bridges of Strouma and Demir-Hissar. 

In face of this violation of Greek territory, the Royal Government 
addressed yesterday evening to the Governments of Germany, Austria 
and Bulgaria a strong protest and demanded that the German and 
Bulgarian armies evacuate as soon as possible the Greek territories 
invaded by them. 

You may communicate the above in your next conversation with 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but without calling on him specially 
or giving him a copy. Skouloudis. 

No. 56 

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, 

President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 

Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Berlin, May 17/30, 1916. 

A communique of the General Staff announces only today the 
advance of the German and Bulgarian troops to the narrow passes of 
Roupel as follows: 

German and Bulgarian forces, in order to insure themselves against the sudden 

attacks which the troops of the Entente were intending to undertake, occupied 

the complex of the narrow passes of Roupel, near the Strouma. The weak Greek 

outpost withdrew before superior numbers. The sovereign rights of Greece have 

been respected. ^ 

1 HEOTOKY. 



82 

No. 57 

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister of Greece at Rome, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, 

President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 

Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Rome, May 17/30, 1916. 

I have seen some persons of importance since the telegrams from 

Greece and Sofia have announced that the Bulgarians with fifes and 

drums, have entered our territory occupying our outposts and villages, 

on the heels of our soldiers who withdrew without resistance. The 

impression which it made here is deplorable. For they recall our 

recent declaration that we would never allow our hereditary enemy, 

— from whom we can expect nothing but misfortunes and ruin, — 

to cross our frontier and to tread as conqueror the soil of Greece. 

Many persons ask what our assurances are worth; and the Italians 

are ready to believe that, as in Macedonia, so also in Epirus, we shall 

retreat before the Bulgarians, with or without the Austrians, and that 

it is better that no account whatever be taken of us, of our deceitful 

promises, and of our imaginary guarantees. Bulgaria, having at the 

head a German Marshal, who is her own king, invaded Greece under 

auspices such as she could never have dreamed of; she will never 

depart from there, unless we have the force to throw her out of our 

territory, and this force they do not see either in our will or in our 

army. If she is defeated, she will be defeated by others than us; if 

victorious, she will again and firmly erect her flag on the very spots 

which she has drenched with Greek blood in her old massacres, and 

very delusive is the hope that she will be dislodged in favor of those 

who have not fought, Coromilas. 

No. 58 

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Charge d 1 Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. 
Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Paris, May 19 /June 1, 1916. 
The impressions of the French Government on the invasion of Greek 
Macedonia were communicated to me by the Director of Political 
Affairs in a long conversation with him, which is as follows: 



83 

Mr. Margerie told me that public opinion was under the impression 
that the events which have taken place during these last days are the 
result of an agreement between Greece and the Central Powers. 
Furthermore, information from German sources proclaims it. As for 
the French Government, it was disposed to accept the explanation 
that considerations of defense had led the Bulgarians to occupy 
strategical positions such as the narrow passes which the fortress of 
Roupel commands, but the advance of the Bulgarian army into the 
interior of Greek Macedonia, the occupation by it of the environs 
of cities coveted by Bulgaria, the possible march of the Bulgarians on 
Cavalla, must necessarily lead it to draw the natural conclusion that 
Greece must have received assurances guaranteeing the restitution of 
these regions, of the value of which assurances she ought not to have 
the slightest illusion. 

In any case, the situation has just changed radically by reason of 
the Bulgarian advance. In fact, Greece, by her passive attitude in the 
face of an invasion which might weaken the military situation of the 
Allies, appears to be abandoning her policy of benevolent neutrality, 
and, consequently, the Entente can not but resume the necessary 
freedom in order to insure the preponderance of its armies acting in 
the Balkans. This freedom has reference as much to military opera- 
tions as to measures of internal police, and General Sarrail has to 
that effect received orders giving him an extent of action larger than 
heretofore. 

In my conversation with Mr. Margerie, I did not fail to make use 
of the information transmitted to me by your telegram. 1 

Caclamanos. 
No. 59 

Mr. D. Panas, Minister of Greece at Petrograd, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, 
President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Petrograd, May 21 /June 3, 1916. 

The Director of Political Affairs, speaking to me on the situation 
in Greece, told me today that in France and in England there is much 
irritation against us and that in official circles here there is the impres- 

1 See document No. 55. 



84 

sion, if not the conviction, that the occupation of Roupel and the 
advance of the Bulgarians in Macedonia, to which Greece has con- 
sented, prove the existence of a preliminary agreement with Bulgaria. 
They combine with these facts, upon which they comment very 
fully, the interview of General Dousmanis, published in April by a 
Swedish newspaper, a telegraphic summary of which, by a surprising 
coincidence, was only transmitted here yesterday. I hastened to 
explain to the Director that there was no truth in all this, and that one 
could not base a judgment as to the policy of a government on mere 
suppositions and attribute to it a design which it never had. As the 
words of the General have probably been distorted by the newspaper, I 
think it would be proper to make, as soon as possible, a categorical 
denial of the declarations attributed [to him]. 

I understand that the withdrawal of the guarantees which were 
given to us at the time of the temporary occupation of our territories 
is now the subject of an exchange of views between the Entente Powers 
and we may expect coercive measures. 

I must add that the Director is in constant touch with the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and reflects in his conversations the views of his chief. 

Panas. 

No. 60 

MINUTES OF THE BOULE OF THE HELLENES 

53d Session, May 23/ June 5, 1916. 

(Extract) 

The sitting having been resumed, Mr. S. Skouloudis, the President 
of the Government, addressing the Boule, made the following com- 
munication : 

"Since the suspension of the labors of the Boule, serious events have 
taken place in our country which may be thus narrated : 

"On the 13th of May at 12 o'clock noon, the Ministry of War 
received from the commander of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, a tele- 
gram according to which the 6th Division reported to the 4th Army 
Corps at 11:45 a.m. that a column of Germans and Bulgarians had 
informed our battalion near Roupel that it would enter our territory. 
The 4th Army Corps added, that in accordance with the previous 
orders of the Ministry, the 6th Division ordered our detachments 
at Roupel to resist by force the advance of the Germans and Bui- 



85 

garians. The same hour, at 12 noon, the Ministry of War received a 
telegram from the 3d Army Corps stating that the outposts of the 
company of Vetrina (in the narrow pass of Roupel on the other shore 
of the Strouma) reported that a detachment of the German army, led 
by German officers, had surrounded our outposts and declared that 
it would enter our territory in order to occupy important positions. 
In answer to the reply of our men that they had orders to resist, the 
commanding German officer declared that he would occupy the heights 
at any cost, and at the same time other German detachments were 
crossing the boundaries with convoys. At 1 :20 p.m. another telegram 
was received from the 4th Army Corps according to which two Bul- 
garian or German regiments had taken up their positions opposite 
Hodjogo (to the north of Roupel) and German troops had entered 
our territory in the sector of Topolnitsa, but from a telegram of 
the commander of the Roupel fortress which did not reach here until 
11 at night, it appeared that the German and Bulgarian forces who 
crossed our frontier had commenced to appear at 9:45 a.m. At 
5:40 p.m. of the same day, on the 13th of May, the Ministry of War 
received a telegram from the commander of the fortress of Salonika, 
according to which the Germans and Bulgarians, throwing the respon- 
sibility for what might happen on the Greek army, had crossed the 
boundary line at 2:30 p.m. and proceeded to the slopes of the fortress 
Roupel. The fortress fired twenty-four artillery shots at them. At 
the same time a telegram was received from the 4th Army Corps, 
according to which the covering infantry had also commenced to 
fire against the invaders, who came to a stop. 

At 1 :00 o'clock in the morning of the 13th to the 14th a telegram 
was received from the 6th Division, according to which the commander 
of the Germano-Bulgarian troops opposite Roupel declared to the 
commander of the fortress that it must be evacuated during the night 
because it would at all events be occupied by them. Under these cir- 
cumstances, the government, seeing on the one hand the determination 
of the invaders to occupy the fortress, and, on the other hand, that the 
continuation of armed resistance which might at any moment be 
transformed into a general clash would lead to the abandonment of the 
policy of neutrality — which it does not intend to abandon, — ordered, 
through the Ministry of War, first, the cessation of resistance, and 
later that a declaration should be made to the German commander 
that in the face of a general invasion of the German army in the narrow 



86 

pass of Demir-Hissar, inside of which the fortress is located, the gar- 
rison of the fortress was obliged to withdraw, carrying with it all the 
war material in the fortress. Since the evening of May 13th our 
military authorities had lodged protests against the Germans and 
Bulgarians. On May 15th, at 2:00 p.m. the Ministry of War received 
a telegram from the commander of the fortress of Salonika, bearing 
date of the previous day, according to which on May 14th, at 9:45 a.m., 
namely, twenty-four hours after the first appearance of the invaders, 
our commander had departed from Roupel; that the garrison had 
taken with it the heavy guns and all the field guns, except two from 
which they had removed and carried away the breechblocks, a con- 
siderable quantity of rifle cartridges, all the sanitary material, and the 
gun sights, regulators, the tools of the engineering [corps], the dynamite, 
the gun-powder and the quick firing guns. A German officer by the 
name of Thiel occupied the fortress and drew up a protocol for the 
remaining material and the two field guns, which are to be restored. A 
more recent telegram from the 6th Division, dated May 15, reported that 
the war material of the Roupel fortress had been transported to Serres. 

On May 14 the government hastened to protest, in the strongest 
manner, to the Governments of Germany and her Allies against these 
occurrences. The same day that this protest had been sent, a telegram 
was received from the Minister of Greece at Berlin, dated the pre- 
vious day at 8:00 p.m., namely, the 13th day of May, in which the 
Minister informed the government that "he had reasons to believe 
that we should have in view the probability of an impending advance 
of the Germans and Bulgarians in the narrow passes of Roupel." 1 
From this telegram it is seen that the fact of the invasion, which com- 
menced on the morning of May 13th, had not been communicated to 
the minister at Berlin up to the evening of the same day. 

On May 17th, the following official communique of the German 
General Staff was published in Berlin: 

German and Bulgarian forces, in order to insure themselves against sudden 
attacks from the Entente troops, occupied the complex of narrow passes of 
Roupel, near the Strouma. The weak Greek garrisons withdrew before superior 
numbers. The sovereign rights of Greece have been respected. 2 

The documents exchanged between our officers and the invaders, 
the protests and protocols, as well as the detailed reports of our 

1 See document No. 52. See document No. 56. 



87 

officers, have not yet been received on account of the interruption 
of safe communications, which interruption also made telegraphic 
communication difficult during those days. 

It was in this way that the occupation of the narrow passes of 
Roupel took place. This report proves the groundless nature of the 
rumors, which were intentionally circulated in order to slander Greece, 
as having acted perfidiously towards the interests of the Entente and 
partially toward its adversaries. In view of such reports, I must de- 
clare and affirm in the most categorical manner that what happened 
was not due to an understanding with the Greek Government and 
that the Greek Government did not acquiesce in nor tolerate it, 
the proof of which is that the fortress of Roupel fired against the 
invaders. 1 

The reports maliciously circulated that the General Staff or any 
other branch of the government, had, as was alleged, come to a 
previous understanding with the Germans and Bulgarians to the end 
that Roupel should be surrendered to them, are unworthy of denial or 
even of any answer. Neither the General Staff, nor any other branch 
of the government, acts without proper direction, but all act under 
the orders and responsibility of the government. (Applause.) 

On the other hand, I ought not to omit to say that the character 
of the action of the Germans and Bulgarians who invaded Greek ter- 
ritory, according to the declarations which were made as to this, 
permits the government to give the assurance that it is an act which 
has been done with an absolutely military object in view and which 
does not in the least endanger the integrity or interests of the country. 
(Applause.) 

No. 61 

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome 
and Petrograd. 

(Telegraphic Circular) 

Athens, May 24/ June 6, 1916. 

From the time of the occupation of Roupel by the Germano-Bul- 
garian detachments, although the surrender of this fortress was a 
necessity imposed by the policy of neutrality followed by Greece, — 

1 See documents Nos. 48, 49, 50 and 51. 



a policy which in no way implied armed resistance when, as was the 
case here, detachments belonging to the Powers hostile to the Entente 
decided to occupy the positions which seemed to them to be nec- 
essary, — the most malicious reports have begun to be circulated in 
regard to our attitude in this matter. The opponents of the gov- 
ernment and foreigners who are interested in seeing the relations 
between Greece and the Entente Powers embittered have not hesitated 
to affirm that the surrender of Roupel fortress was agreed upon be- 
forehand between the Royal Government and the enemies of the 
Entente, in order to injure from a military point of view the security 
of the army of General Sarrail or the success of his future operations. 

For that reason I have deemed it necessary to refute these slanders 
by the declarations which I made yesterday in the Chamber, and of 
which a summary in extenso was transmitted by telegraphic agencies. 1 

Please take advantage of your first conversation with the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs in order to repeat to him the official assurance, 
that it is absolutely false that the Germano-Bulgarian troops occupied 
Roupel in consequence of any agreement whatever; that on the con- 
trary, the garrison in the beginning resisted by force the advance of 
the detachments in question, and that it was only in consequence of the 
declaration made by their chief to the commander of our fortress that 
if he did not withdraw during the night, Roupel would be occupied by 
force, that the government, in order to avoid an armed conflict which 
would have resulted in the abandonment of neutrality by Greece, 
gave the order for the evacuation of the position. You will add 
that the governments of the Entente should not allow themselves 
to be deceived by these slanderous maneuvers, against which both my 
predecessors and myself have been obliged to contend. Thus, under 
the Za'imis Ministry, the Royal Legations at Bucharest and at London 
had advised us that in diplomatic and press circles the report was 
persistently circulated that an agreement had been made between 
Greece and Bulgaria about the cession of Ghevgheli and Doiran, and 
on other questions. Mr. Za'imis had hastened to deny these reports 
and to denounce these maneuvers which were intended to compromise 
Greece in the eyes of the Entente. Several times the Bulgarian and 
Austrian newspapers have published similar news, trying to compromise 
the members of the Royal Government or the Greek representatives 
abroad, by publishing so-called interviews which were said to have 

1 See these declarations in No. 60. 



89 

h>een given by these persons to their correspondents, but which were a 
tissue of lies. The Allied Governments were finally on each occa- 
sion convinced of the falseness of these rumors, which were certainly 
inspired by malice. I hope that this time also the same results 
will follow the declarations made by the Royal Government before 
the Chamber, which you are herewith instructed on its behalf to 

communicate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Skotjloudis. 

No. 62 

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Charge d'Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. 
Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for For- 
eign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Paris, May 24/ 'June 6, 1916. 

I have just had a long conversation with Mr. Briand, to whom 
I handed a note formulating the protest which was contained in your 
telegram and stating our point of view as to the interpretation given 
by us to our benevolent neutrality towards the Entente. I have also 
verbally explained to the President of the Council that a neutrality, 
no matter how benevolent it may be towards anyone, can not involve 
military [action] against the adversaries of the latter, because it would 
cease then to be neutrality. The President of the Council, after having 
carefully read the note which was handed to him, entered into a 
discussion which may be summed up as follows: 

The proclamation of martial law in Salonika was the result of the 
decision [of Greece] not to oppose the invasion of her territory by the 
Bulgarian army, for it is only the Bulgarian army that is in Greece, 
the Germans not having available forces for that purpose. In taking 
this step, General Sarrail informed General Moschopoulos that the 
holiday of His Majesty the King could be celebrated as usual, and 
it was the latter who revoked the order for the celebration. As for 
the want of previous notification to the Royal Government, the latter 
had often been advised of this before, and in any case, the communi- 
cation of Mr. Guillemin took the place of such notice. 

Mr. Briand repeated to me that the attitude of Greece surprised 
him the more inasmuch as the Royal Government had often declared 
that it had received assurances that the Bulgarians [would not invade] 
Greece. He took special note of our express denial that there had 



90 

been a previous agreement between Greece and the Great Central 
Powers for the occupation of the fortress of Roupel. He added that, 
if the Bulgarians advance, General Sarrail "would take all the further 
measures which would seem to him to be proper in order to guarantee 
the security of the troops under his command." The President of 
the Council could not tell me what these measures would be, but said 
that in no case could the Allied troops be exposed to danger [words 
illegible] by reason of the passive attitude of Greece. According 
to Mr. Briand [words illegible], the aim of the Bulgarians was only 
too evident. Holding Serbian Macedonia, they wished also to hold 
[words illegible] in Eastern Macedonia in order to arrange "com- 
binations" in the future. He assured me that for some time past, 
they had attempted through various agents to lure the Powers of 
the Entente into negotiations. Holding the keys of the gates which 
lead to Serres, Drama and Cavalla, they [the Bulgarians] may get 
there whenever they consider the moment favorable. If they do not 
advance now, it is because their flank would be exposed to the attacks 

of the Allies - CACLAMANOS. 

No. 63 

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Charge d 1 Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S~ 
Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Paris, May 24/ June 6, 1916. 

The serious phase into which our relations with the Entente have 
entered, imposes upon me the duty to summarize as briefly as possible 
the situation as it is here regarded, and as developed from my official 
and other conversations, as well as to [transmit to you] the articles 
published in all the newspapers during these days, in order that Your 
Excellency may have all the elements necessary for the understanding 
of the sentiments of official circles and public opinion in France. 

First of all, one should note that the attitude of Mr. Briand is dic- 
tated by considerations both of an external and of an internal character. 
In fact, since the invasion of Greek territory by the Germano-Bul- 
garian forces without any effective resistance on our part and the 
consequent conviction which has been formed here that an agreement 
exists between Greece and the Central Powers, the President of the 



91 

Council seems to be haunted by the memory of previous discom- 
fitures at the hand of the Bulgarians, and to believe that he may 
be exposed to similar disappointments from us. In order, therefore, 
to defend himself against any subsequent charge of having shown too 
much benevolence towards Greece, he is beginning to take the initiative 
in rigorous measures to which I fear the proclamation of martial law in 
Salonika is only the prelude. The phrase uttered by a journalist, "if 
Ernest Renan were watching over the Acropolis, all that would not have 
happened," is sufficiently characteristic, and official organs do not cease 
to expatiate on the subject that only the Germans know how to show 
themselves strong, and that the Orientals are only impressed [by] force. 

As to the belief that the occupation of the Roupel fortress was agreed 
upon between Greece and the enemies of the Entente this was not 
accredited to the telegrams of the "Exchange" agency, which you 
instructed me to deny simultaneously with the denials transmitted 
directly from Athens through the agencies and published in the French 
press, but to information which appeared in the Neueste Nachrichten 
of Munich which alleged that an agreement between Greece and 
Bulgaria existed not only on the question of the invasion of Greek 
territory, but also on the other disputed questions between the two 
countries. To this information Mr. Margerie also alluded during 
our conversation the other day, 1 and the officious Wiener Allgemeine 
Zeitung has just published news which is considered here as a con- 
firmation of it. 

I will add that the French Government, although all but certain 
that Greece could not have opposed by force. the invasion of her ter- 
ritory by the Bulgarians, really hoped, as I positively know, that 
she would have prevented the invasion through diplomatic means be- 
cause of the excitement which such action would cause in Greece. 
Disappointed in this hope, he was forced to conclude that Greece was 
bound to the Central Powers by such important and definite agree- 
ments that even the occupation by the Bulgarian army of the Mace- 
donian regions coveted by Bulgaria could not disturb her. We should 
not overlook that the excitement of a portion of the Italian press is not 
without effect. Thus, its charge that the new loan furnished by the 
National Bank was only made possible through the assistance of Ger- 
man-American financiers, is beginning to receive wide publication here 
and naturally it does not fail to excite French public opinion still more. 

1 See document No. 58. CACLAMANOS. 



92 

No. 64 

Mr. J. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria in Athens, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, 
President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

,„.„., . ,. „ .. Athens, May 27 1 June 9, 1916. 

Mr. President of the Council: J ' 

In reply to Your Excellency's letter dated May 15th last, con- 
cerning the occupation by the German and Bulgarian troops of the 
fortress of Roupel, the heights and the bridge of Demir-Hissar, as well 
as of the bridge on the Strouma, the Royal Legation of Bulgaria, in 
the name of its government, has the honor to bring to the knowledge 
of the Hellenic Government that these military operations have been 
imposed as a measure of security and legitimate defense resulting from 
the considerable advance of the troops of the Entente on Greek ter- 
ritory in the section opposite the above mentioned places, an advance 
which will evidently be followed by an attack. 

The Royal Government of Bulgaria declares that imminent danger 
has compelled it to act thus in the circumstances, and that the 
measure which was adopted will in no way impair the sovereign rights 
of Greece. 

Please accept, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my 

high consideration. _ 

° Passarof. 

No. 65 

Memorandum of the General Director of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 

Athens, June 7/20, 1916. 
The official documents of the Bulgarian Government which have 
come into the possession of the Ministry concerning the surrender 
of the Roupel fortress make no mention of restitution. They are 
limited to the declaration that this occupation will not impair the 
sovereign rights of Greece. But, as the President informed me that 
he is in possession of documents pledging the restitution of the 
fortress by Germany and by Bulgaria, I begged him a few days ago 
to place these documents in the official files of the Ministry. The 
President answered me that he would do so in due time. Today I 
reminded him again of the necessity of such filing, as well as the 
recording of the protocol of the surrender of the fortress Roupel, a 
protocol which has not yet been received in the office. The President 
again repeated the promise that he would file these documents. 



93 



No. 66 

Letter of Mr. S. Skouloudis to Mr. N. Politis, General Director 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

Athens, June 8/21, 1916. 
Dear Mr. Politis: 

I am sending you, herewith attached, for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, two documents dated May 9/22 ultimo, the one from the 
German, the other from the Bulgarian, Legations here, and my answer 
to them. 1 As you will notice, the said Legations in presenting these 
documents characterized them as secret; but afterwards, at my re- 
quest, the Minister of Germany informed me, by order of his govern- 
ment, that the characterization of secrecy was withdrawn and that 
we could make use of the said documents whenever we wished. 

With high esteem, 

S. Skouloudis. 



No. 67 

Extract from the Confidential Record of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

for the year 1916. 



Number of 


Entered 


Date of 
recording 


Forwarding 
authority 


Summary of docu- 


order 


Date 


Number 


ment entered 


7242 


August 9 


7147 


9 August 


German 
Legation 


That the Germano- 
Bulgarian troops will 
not enter in the cities 
of Drama, Serres and 
Cavalla. 2 



1 See documents Nos. 48, 49, 50 and 51. 

2 This document was not found in the archives of the Ministry. 



94 

No. 68 

Letter sent by Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany at Athens, 

to Mr. A . Za'imis, President of the Ministerial Council, 

Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Athens, August 15/28, 1916. 
Mr. President of the Council : 

Referring to the communication which Mr. Caradja was pleased 
to make to me in your name last Tuesday, I have the honor to bring 
to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the situation in the dis- 
trict of Cavalla has since been modified by the fact that the Greek 
troops voluntarily surrendered to the Bulgarians the forts and bat- 
teries in question. An inventory of the material found there on that 
occasion was made by both parties. 

The Bulgarians have been stationed around the city but outside of 
its suburbs. General Jekoff has proceeded to take the necessary steps to 
insure the revictualling of the population as well as the Greek troops. 

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high esteem 
and devoted and sincere sentiments. 



Mirbach. 



No. 69 



Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Troupahis, Commander of the Gendarmerie 
in Macedonia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs {Bureau of 
Political Affairs), Athens. 

Salonika, August 28 /September 10, 1916. 

I have the honor to report that, after the invasion of the 
Bulgarians in Eastern Macedonia and its occupation by them, both 
postal and telegraphic communication were interrupted, and con- 
sequently my office has not been able since the 5th ultimo to com- 
municate with the police precincts of Serres and Drama, which are 
under my office, and is ignorant of what has happened and is happen- 
ing in the jurisdiction of said precincts to the injury of the inhab- 
itants and that of the military and other authorities. 

Only yesterday the police volunteers of the second class, namely, 
Joannes Tsikrikontis, Apostolos Chrysafides, and Apostolos Boyadjis, 
of the police precinct of Drama, having arrived here via Cavalla and 
Thasos, appeared before me and reported that the Bulgarians are 



95 

committing outrages against the Greek authorities, omitting no oppor- 
tunity to show their hostile disposition and criminal instincts, and that, 
briefly stated, the Bulgarians have committed the folowing acts: 

(1) On the night of the 6th to the 7th ultimo, the Turkish inhabi- 
tants of the district of Doxato, encouraged by the Bulgarian troops 
who had invaded that district, and infuriated against everything 
Greek, rebelled and attacked the Greek inhabitants and the men of 
the flying column under the command of Adjutant Constantine Lim- 
beri. An encounter followed which caused the death of two Turks 
and the capture of twenty-eight, of whom, however, thirteen were freed 
by force from the prisons by the Bulgarian soldiers of Doxato. 
Sergeant Panayotis Demetracopoulo of the flying column was slightly 
wounded in the left foot. 

(2) On the night of the 8th to the 9th of the same month, seven 
gendarmes of Sarnitz Post and Sergeant Tryphon Yannari, the chief 
of the post, and an equal number of men from the Yenikioi post in- 
cluding Sergeant Stamatios Chrysafides their chief of post, were killed 
by the rebel Turks and the Bulgarian comitadjis. 

(3) At Oxilar, four gendarmes whose names are not known were 
killed, together with eleven soldiers and a sergeant with their 
lieutenant. 

(4) On the 10th ultimo, the gendarme Demetrios Papas with his 
comrade Athanasios Amaxopoios of the police sub-precinct of Saris- 
saban, while accompanying the public treasurer of Keramiti, were 
attacked by Bulgarian soldiers, and in this attack Papas was killed 
and Amaxopoios severely wounded in the shoulder-blade, as I reported 
also in my letter of the 12th ultimo. 

(5) The gendarmes of the flying column of Prosotsani and the 
commander of the flying column, Adjutant Constantine Gali, were 
disarmed and insulted by Bulgarian soldiers; having been re-armed 
by the police precinct of Drama, they were again disarmed and, after 
being beaten, were ordered to return to Drama. 

(6) The Turks of the district of Moustratli, immediately after 
the invasion of the Bulgarians, armed themselves and attacked the men 
of the police post, whom they would have killed had these not suc- 
ceeded in escaping. The Turks entered Doxato and proceeded to 
plunder and exterminate the Greek inhabitants, and this provoked an 
encounter with the gendarmerie, as is mentioned in the first paragraph 
of the present report. 



96 

(7) The refugee inhabitants of Yenikioi and Dariovi, in order 
to escape the fury of the Bulgarians, fled to Cavalla, but on their way 
they were robbed by the Turkish rebels. 

(8) The gendarmes of all the sub-precincts and posts of the police 
precinct of Drama were disarmed and those who were not killed were 
beaten and sent to Drama in wretched condition. 

(9) Three gendarmes of the police sub-precinct of Pravi, while 
escorting to Cavalla two Turks accused of robbery, were attacked 
on their way by Bulgarian soldiers. Their fate is unknown. 

(10) The Bulgarians sent word from Drama to Cavalla, where 
there was a dearth of provisions, that fifty carts should be sent to 
them, in order to receive these provisions, which were sent in the 
custody of three gendarmes and three soldiers. The Bulgarians cut 
off the fingers of both hands of one of the soldiers, and disarmed 
the gendarmes and sent them to Cavalla. 

(11) The chief, Comitadji Panitsa, at the head of comitadjis, goes 
about freely in the District of Drama, robbing, killing, etc. 

(12) All the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants of Eastern Mace- 
donia, assisted by the Bulgarian army, are killing the Greek inhabitants, 
and plundering and destroying their properties ; the latter, in face of the 
danger which hangs over them, flee panic-stricken to Cavalla and from 
there to Thasos, leaving everything at the mercy of the murderers 
and persecutors, the Greek authorities not being in a position to afford 
them the slightest help. Thus Eastern Greek Macedonia is at the 
absolute disposal of the hereditary enemies of the nation. 

Troupakis. 

No. 70 

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia; to Mr. E. 
Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Sofia, December 5/18, 1916. 

I am informed by a subordinate official of ours who came from 
Serres, that many prominent men have been either imprisoned or 
expelled from there, and that Bulgarian night-patrols have entered into 
houses and plundered them. The population is suffering from the 
terribly high prices and the harshness of the Bulgarians, and there is not 
a single German officer to supervise the Bulgarian administration. The 



97 

roofs of the military barracks and of the School of Agriculture have been 
removed in order to furnish timber for the construction of trenches. It 
is said that after the deportation of the population of the district of 
Bairacli-Djoumaya because of military necessity, Bulgarian soldiers, ac- 
cording to the orders they had received, plundered houses and carried to 
an unknown place the spoils of their plundering. The above mentioned 
city was completely destroyed by the bombardment and the popu- 
lation was transferred to Pozarevitch. I am informed from Drama 
that the Greek authority exists only in form. Taneff, the military 
governor, dismissed the Greek mayor of Cavalla, with all the munic- 
ipal council, and replaced him by a Turk. Lastly, the mayors of 
the villages were dismissed and Bulgarians and Turks were appointed in 
their places. In some villages the churches and schools were taken pos- 
session of, and the teaching of the Bulgarian language has been begun. 
Many plunderings and violent requisitions without payment have 
taken place and it is said that the village of Nea Midia was completely 
destroyed and the inhabitants murdered. Many of our compatriots 
from Drama and Cavalla [words illegible] are detained as prisoners. 
The native Turks in the beginning plundered many villages and 
killed a good many of the Christian inhabitants. It seems that now 
some kind of order has begun to be established, but on account of 
the high prices of the provisions and the insufficiency of bread the 
population of the occupied places is suffering much. Plunderings have 
not taken place in Drama, but in Cavalla all the houses have been 
forcibly entered into, and the movable property will soon be trans- 
ported to Sofia by special trains. The refugees of the district of 
Serres were taken by force to Drama, where they suffer intensely 
from hunger, and [words illegible] deaths from hunger were noted. 
The above mentioned refugees will be transported to Serbia for resi- 
dence there. I have taken the indicated steps with the Prime Minister 
concerning the above situation, and have telegraphed to the Royal 
Legation in Berlin in order that proper action may be taken. 

Naoum. 



98 



No. 71 



Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. 
Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, December 13/26, 1916. 

From the telegram of our minister at Sofia dated the 5th instant 
you are informed about the horrible situation in which the inhabit- 
ants of our provinces occupied by the Bulgarians are found. Plun- 
derings, thefts, destruction and even murders are the order of the 
day. Our people, reduced to misery and starvation, are decimated. 
The Greek churches and schools have been taken possession of by 
the Bulgarians, while the prominent men of our cities and villages have 
been thrown into prison. 

We earnestly beg the German Government to take the most serious 
steps in order to put a stop to this deplorable state of affairs; particu- 
larly to take away from the Bulgarians the administration of the 
country and to entrust it to German officials. 

You should tell the German Government that it is inconceivable 
that, after having occupied or left to be occupied Eastern Macedonia, 
which is, indirectly, it is true, the cause of all the misfortunes from which 
Greece now suffers, after not keeping the express promises given in 
writing not to occupy the three large Macedonian cities and to respect 
individual liberty, private property and the religious status quo, it 
now leaves the Bulgarians free to exterminate the Hellenic element 
in Macedonia. 

You should add that we have the right to expect from the Imperial 
Government radical steps for the security of our nationals in Eastern 
Macedonia, and of their properties, as well as of those belonging to 
the State. 

Please take immediately the above mentioned step and communi- 
cate the result to me. Be guided by the present telegram without 
leaving a copy of it. 

Zalocostas. 
1 See document No. 70. 



99 

No. 72 

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. 
Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Sofia, January 1/14, 1917. 

In continuation of my telegram of December 5th, 1 I have the 
honor to inform you that General Taneff, the military Governor of 
the occupied territories in Eastern Macedonia, has just arrived in 
Sofia. In the course of the visit which he paid me today, I explained 
to him at length the sad situation of our nationals, as I had already 
done in a note presented to the Bulgarian Government. General 
Taneff attributed some of the excesses which have been committed 
to the bad conduct of the Turks towards our people, and some to the 
disorder resulting from the entrance of foreign troops into our ter- 
ritory, but he nevertheless admitted that most of my remarks were 
well founded and promised to take all the necessary measures for 
the amelioration of the situation. 

I shall not fail to follow as closely as possible, all that concerns 
our nationals in occupied Eastern Macedonia, and to make, from time 
to time, the necessary representations. 

Naoum. 

No. 73 

Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. 
Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia. 

(Telegram) 

Athens, January 5/18, 1917. 

I thank you for the information contained in your telegram of the 
1st instant. 2 Please follow closely this very serious question and 
report to me from time to time. 

Zalocostas. 

1 See document No. 70. ■ See document No. 72. 



100 



No. 74 

Mr. A . Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. Zalocostas, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) 

Sofia, February 15/28, 1917. 

The Prefect of Drama telegraphs that economic distress having 
arisen among the laboring classes on account of the anomalous situa- 
tion created in his district and the want of work, [illegible words] 
many deaths are noted from starvation in Cavalla and in other parts 
of the province. In order to remedy this situation, I proceeded to 
establish in the principal places of the Province economical bakeries 
in order to distribute gratuitously bread at least to the hungry people ; 
but, since in the district of Drama, apart from the families without 
work, there have flocked thither thousands of refugees from those that 
had been installed by the Greek Government in the district of Serres, 
who were forced by the Bulgarians, for military reasons, to leave that 
region, the maintenance of these economical bakeries by private in- 
itiative alone becomes impossible on account of the steady rise of 
prices of provisions. The Prefect, therefore, begs that the Royal Gov- 
ernment approve a credit of at least 200,000 drachmas for their mainte- 
nance, in order to avert numerous deaths from starvation, particularly 
among those families to many of whom an allowance was' being given 

by the Commission for the Establishment of Refugees. 1 

Naoum. 

No. 75 

Report of a high public official of Eastern Macedonia dated March 9, 1917, 
transmitted, from Germany through the Royal Legation at Berlin, to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

I have the honor to report the following facts which, during my 
forced residence in Cavalla, I personally witnessed or heard reported 
by reliable persons occupying high social positions. 

1 This telegram wa.s transmitted on February 25 to the Ministry of the Interior, 
which returned it on March 1st with a note that the question should be submitted 
to the Ministerial Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote on the returned 
document: "[Action deferred] until more favorable financial conditions. For the 
present to be filed." 



101 

On Tuesday, August 30 (0. S.), 1916, the day following the depart- 
ure of the Greek troops which were in Cavalla for Drama and Germany, 
a company of the Bulgarian Army stationed along the line of the 
fortresses of Cavalla entered the city. Immediately upon their en- 
trance, the Commander of the company, assuming at once the duties of 
military governor of the city, placed sentinels at the doors of the public 
buildings and particularly at those of the military depots of war 
material; likewise, the inhabitants who had gathered on the shore in- 
tending to leave Cavalla were ordered to return to their homes, and to 
bring back with them, at the same time, their furniture and other things 
which were piled up on. the shore for shipping, the departure from the 
city of any person and all communication with the shore being strictly 
forbidden. The Greek flag which was waving on the fortress was hauled 
down and torn to shreds by the Turkish populace, which, immediately 
after the entrance of the Bulgarians, had to a man renounced the Hel- 
lenic State and from motives of self-interest had received the Bulgarians 
as the Allies of the Ottomans in the present pan-European War. All the 
inhabitants, through a public crier, were most strictly ordered to re- 
main in their homes from sunset to next morning with all lights ex- 
tinguished. These matters being thus arranged, there began, without 
delay, the systematic emptying of the public stores of war material and 
its transportation by night outside the city by the Bulgarian officers 
of the Commissary Department who had come there for this purpose. 

Likewise, the Bulgarian Military Governor of the city having ap- 
pointed Hamdi Bey, a Turk, to the vacant place of Mayor (he at once 
formed a Municipal Council composed of Turks, the Greek members 
of the Council having been, for some time, treacherously imprisoned 
with this very object in view, as being suspects), there began an im- 
placable robbery of the properties of the Greeks by the Bulgarians and 
Turks through false requisitions of the goods in their stores, through 
extortions of money, through arbitrary plundering from the houses 
and shops of all material which was useful or salable, and through 
a skillful and shameful increase in the price of provisions and articles 
of first necessity. 

Although nobody's life was at that time threatened, the Bulgarian 
terrorism of the first months purposely held the fear of death steadily 
over the heads of the Greek inhabitants of the city. Nevertheless, 
order was always preserved in Cavalla by Bulgarian patrols, and ex- 
cept for a few murders which were committed at night for purposes of 



102 

robbery, and which were attributed to Bulgarian and Turkish soldiers 
(the Turkish inhabitants in spite of their claim to Hellenic citizenship 
being impressed into the army by the Bulgarians and forming a separate 
Turkish corps), full security prevailed. There existed, however, a 
great distrust, during the first months, on the part of the Bulgarians 
toward the Greeks, (particularly the Greek military men) whom they 
considered as Venizelists, or at all events as suspects. As soon as 
such persons were discovered by the Bulgarians, they were imprisoned 
for many days and after various privations and humiliations were 
taken out of Ca valla to Drama or Sofia (such was the fate of 
Eustathios Pharaclas, a retired colonel of the Commissary Depart- 
ment and bookkeeper of the storehouse of material for fortifications in 
Cavalla and of J. Botagas, Second Lieutenant of the Infantry Reserve, 
etc.). Likewise, the Greek officials of posts and telegraphs of Cavalla 
were removed from there as suspects and sent to Drama, where they 
still remain. 

Since there were no Greek authorities in Cavalla, the interests of 
the city were intrusted to Hamdi Bey, the Turkish Mayor, who, with 
his Municipal Council, which was composed exclusively of Turks, 
played great havoc not only with the public property of the city but also 
with the private property of its Greek inhabitants. On account of the 
Turks' lust for robbery and the complete indifference of the Bulgarian 
military authorities in the city to the horrible consequences of their acts, 
there was created a scarcity of bread, provisions, and things of prime 
necessity, unprecedented and unheard of even in the annals of cities 
long besieged. This caused a great moral and material upheaval and 
a terrible famine, with deaths, from starvation, of 10 to 15 persons 
a day, on an average. All these things took place with the toleration 
and utter indifference of the military authorities of the city, who 
busied themselves only with the emptying of the public warehouses 
and the big commerical shops of the city which had been abandoned 
by their owners. This was followed by a downright looting of private 
houses in broad daylight under the pretext of a search for government 
military supplies, which had not been turned over to them by the 
inhabitants, as they had been repeatedly called on by the public 
crier to do. 

As a consequence of the complete indifference of the Bulgarians, 
nay, of their cooperation (for they had imported from Bulgaria 
various articles of first necessity in order to resell them for a sordid 



103 

gain), the cruel and wild cupidity which was carried on by the Turks 
and Hebrews of the city has raged and is raging still, till it has 
raised the prices per okka as follows: 

The price of bread (a miserable mixture of wheat, in imperceptible 
quantities, of maize, of rye, of barley and of various impure substances) 
went up to 8-10 lebs (leb, a Bulgarian drachma, forced by the Bul- 
garians into circulation in the market of Cavalla and arbitrarily made 
equivalent to the Hellenic drachma), the price of meat and of dried 
beans to 8-12 lebs, that of cheese to 24-36 lebs, of butter or fat to 40-50 
lebs, of salt to 12-30 lebs, of sugar to 60-80 lebs, of rice to 24 lebs, of 
vegetables to 4 lebs, of potatoes to 6-8 lebs, of wine to 8 lebs, of milk, 
always unscrupulously adulterated, to 4 lebs, of barley to 10 lebs, of 
eggs to 60-80 centimes each, of leeks to 1 leb the bunch (three leeks to 
a bunch), of charcoal to 1^- lebs an okka, etc., etc. 

After the Bulgarians had emptied the public warehouses, they pro- 
ceeded, under the pretext of commandeering, arbitrarily to empty all 
the large shops (that of Mr. Rakidji, e.g.), the groceries (that of Mr. 
Sertsos, e.g.), the hardware stores, whose owners were absent through 
fear, having left Cavalla a little before the Bulgarian occupation of that 
city and also to search all the private houses, most systematically. 
This was carried out by Bulgarian officers and sub-lieutenants, at the 
head of a squad or platoon by order of the Bulgarian city authorities. 
On this occasion, in addition to the small number of things for military 
use-, which were thus found (rifles, revolvers, blankets, canteens, etc.), 
the Bulgarian officers seized and carried away, without giving any 
receipt whatever, all the uniforms, howsoever found by them, of the 
Greek officers of the garrison of Cavalla, who, on departing hastily on 
the 28-29th of August 1916 (0. S.) had left them to be cared for in the 
houses or hotels where they resided, as well as all other articles of mili- 
tary character and the furniture and other valuable things belonging 
to them and to their families, such as e.g. the property of Lieutenant 
General Ghennadis, the Commander of the IVth Army Corps (in the 
upper part of the house where the officers of the Army Corps were) 
that of Division Commander Colonel I. Hatzopoulos (in the house 
of the former Mayor of Cavalla, Mr. N. Serdaroglou), that of J. Costaki, 
Major of Artillery, and of Majors G. Kortsa, C. Capodistria, J. Coum- 
oundouros, Infantry officers who stayed at the Grand Hotel of Cavalla, 
as well as that of numerous superior and inferior officers, who lived in 
Cavalla either alone or with their families. Even in the very streets 



104 

of the city, any inhabitant wearing anything of military character, or 
similar to it, was stripped of it by the first Bulgarian or Turkish soldier 
who chanced to meet him, and such property was delivered to the 
appropriate Bulgarian or Turkish storehouse, the sale of articles of 
this nature being strictly forbidden in the city. 

After this search, the plundering of Cavalla as above described 
having been as far as possible completed, Mr. Anghelof, the Bulgarian 
sub-lieutenant of Reserves, was appointed Governor of the city. He 
dismissed the Turkish Mayor and appointed the Greek Serdaroglou 
and a Municipal Council composed of Greeks. Thanks to the energetic 
action of Mr. Serdaroglou, the scanty importation of flour (once or 
twice a week) , which during the mayoralty of the Turk had been begun 
in order to prevent the entire annihilation of the Greek population of 
Cavalla by starvation, through distribution of bread cards at the 
bakeries was considerably increased. The quality of the bread was 
somewhat improved, the poor of the city were well cared for (dis- 
tribution of bread and food were gratis) and generally the city of Cavalla 
began to be greatly relieved from the evils from which it had been suf- 
fering for many months. Still, a great number of the houses of the 
city, which were left vacant on account of the speedy departure of 
their owners, were plundered, during the first months, by the Turks, 
Jews and refugees, with the toleration of the Bulgarians, and whatever 
could be taken away was plundered (tiles, timber, windows, ceilings, 
doors, glass, things of iron, etc.), so that only the walls are now standing. 

Finally, the large military depot at Kioutsouk-Orman containing 
material for entrenchment was, in the early days of the Bulgarian oc- 
cupation, completely pillaged by the Bulgarian Army, which utilized 
all this material for the various works of entrenchment constructed 
in and outside of Cavalla, and along the line of the fortifications of 
the city. It also took away all the wood contained in the warehouse 
belonging to the city of Cavalla, which was to be used for housing of 
the refugees, and generally the Bulgarians carried away arbitrarily 
and without giving a receipt whatever would be in the least useful to 
them, no matter whether it belonged to the Greek Government or to 
the city of Cavalla, or to individuals, whose goods were, to be sure, 
commandeered, but were appraised — those that had such good luck 
— at the twentieth of their actual value. 

In Drama, where from the beginning there was a Greek Governor 
(Mr. N. Bakopoulos) and a Greek Mayor (Mr. Phessas), and some 



105 

other Greek officers, as I was accurately informed, during my residence 
there for a few days (9-18 February), there were committed far fewer 
arbitrary acts and plunderings of the properties of the Greeks and of 
the Greek officers of the garrison of the city, by Bulgarians and Turks, 
and the populations suffered less from the dearth of provisions and were 
much less decimated by starvation, the Greek authorities having taken 
their measures in time. However the Bulgarians gave free vent there 
too to their cupidity, for their own advantage, having repeatedly 
brought from Bulgaria various things of prime necessity and sold them 
at exorbitant prices in the market of Drama, prices which differed 
only a little from those in the market of Cavalla. 

No. 76 

Mr. A . Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. Zalocostas, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

Sofia, March 27 '/April 9, 1917. 

I have the honor to submit to you, herewith attached, a copy of 
a more recent document, sent, on March 23d, to the Prime Minister, 
concerning the critical situation created in Macedonia by reason 'of 
the total lack of provisions and particularly of bread. 

In Cavalla, in consequence of the difficulties of transporting pro- 
visions from Drama and the lack of every care on the part of the Bul- 
garian military authorities for the organization of more or less regular 
communication between Cavalla and Drama, the inhabitants have for 
months suffered from the insufficiency of provisions, and particularly 
of bread, which was even sold at from 10 to 15 drachmas the okka. In 
the beginning such hardships were noticeable only in Cavalla, where a 
good many deaths occurred from starvation. But recently, and par- 
ticularly during the last month, the crisis has extended generally to 
all parts of Eastern Macedonia, a great many deaths occurring from 
starvation not only in Cavalla, but also in Drama and Serres. Un- 
doubtedly the same situation prevails in the various villages where 
the situation is unknown because the villagers are forbidden for mili- 
tary reasons to go from the villages to the cities, which certainly 
aggravates the crisis in provisions which was felt only in the cities. 
During the last forty days alone, 1,800 persons have died from starva- 
tion in Cavalla, according to official and reliable information which I 
have received from there, and thirty persons a day, on an average, 
die in Drama. Two months ago the Bulgarian Government sent to 



106 

Eastern Macedonia a quantity of wheat for the needs of the native 
population, and although that was not enough, it did suffice to re- 
lieve the situation somewhat. 

The wheat which was furnished was not given gratuitously, but 
the administration of Drama each time paid the price to the Bulgarian 
Government. But, for nearly two months now, the quantity furnished 
has been gradually decreased, until it has been reduced to 60 grams of 
bread daily for each person. Other things of first necessity are either 
totally wanting or are sold at exorbitant prices, which even the richest 
inhabitants can not afford to pay. Therefore, during these last two 
' months the situation in Eastern Macedonia has become critical and, in 
fact, desperate on account of the large number of deaths from starva- 
tion which have occurred, [particularly] amongst the Grekes, because 
the Turkish army has furnished provisions to the Mussulmans and the 
Bulgarians to the Slavic-speaking villages. In Drama and in some 
other cities, thanks to the initiative of the Greek Prefect and the 
praiseworthy financial aid of the rich, soup kitchens were established 
for the relief of the poor, but unfortunately these kitchens can not be 
operated regularly because provisions can not be purchased. 

Concerning this desperate condition created in Eastern Macedonia, 
I have up to the present day repeatedly made, both in writing and verb- 
ally, strong representations to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs here and 
to the Prime Minister, to whom I have addressed a strong protest 
against the destruction carried on in Eastern Macedonia. I reminded 
him of the express promises given to Greece for the safeguarding of 
the lives and properties of the inhabitants and called his attention to 
the deplorable impression which the policy of the Bulgarian Govern- 
ment would create in Greece, since it could not but influence public 
opinion there and the existing friendly relations between the two coun- 
tries. Not satisfied with these steps, I called also on Mr. Dobrovitz, 
the Director of the Political Office of His Majesty, to whom I ex- 
plained in the most detailed manner the deplorable situation in Eastern 
Macedonia, and begged him to bring all these facts to the notice of 
the King, in the hope that His Majesty would intervene energetically 
with the Bulgarian Government for the amelioration of the situation. 
I protested strongly to Mr. Dobrovitz against the indifference shown 
in this matter by the Bulgarian Government and emphasized the fact 
that if this continues, it could not but considerably influence the 
relations between the two states. Mr. Dobrovitz pretended a com- 



107 

plete ignorance of the situation but promised to transmit to His 
Majesty the King all that I said to him. 

I also took similar steps with the official German circles here and 
asked our Royal Legation at Berlin to take this matter up with the 
•German Government. Naoum. 

appendix 

Mr. A . Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Dr. V. Radoslavoff, 
President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria. 

Sofia, March 23/ April 5, 1917. 
Mr. President of the Council : 

The Legation of His Hellenic Majesty has repeatedly, by verbal 
and written representations, called the serious attention of the Royal 
Government of Bulgaria to the critical situation in the part of Hellenic 
Macedonia occupied by the Bulgaro-German troops, caused by the want 
of provisions and particularly of bread, and insisted on the absolute 
necessity of taking without delay the necessary steps to remedy a really 
deplorable situation. 

Unfortunately, up to the present time all these representations have 
brought no practical result, and, according to accurate information 
which I have received, more than 1,800 persons have died in Cavalla 
from starvation within forty days; in Drama, about thirty persons die 
daily from the same cause, and the same deplorable occurrences are re- 
peated in all the other centers of occupied Greek territory. Last 
month, hardly 60 grams of bread were daily distributed to each of the 
unfortunate inhabitants, who totally lack any other food. 

Reminding Your Excellency of the express obligations undertaken 
at the time of the entrance of Bulgaro-German troops into Hellenic 
Macedonia, I consider it my duty to inform you that, if this situation 
continues unabated and if no radical and urgent steps are soon taken, 
all the Hellenic population of the occupied places will be exterminated 
either from starvation or by epidemic diseases. 

In the presence of this desperate situation, I must raise my voice 
against these proceedings and these cases of neglect which daily cause 
the death of a great number of Hellenic citizens and will cause more in 
the future, and, placing the entire responsibility upon the Bulgarian 
Government, must insist with all my energy that, independently of all 



108 

other considerations, be it only for reasons of humanity, steps finally be 
taken and strictly carried out to put an end to a situation which, I am 
sure, Your Excellency is the first to deplore. 

Please accept, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of 
my high esteem. Naoum. 

No. 77 

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. A. Zaimis, President 
of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens. 

(Telegram) ^^ ^ ^ m? 

The Bulgarian authorities in Eastern Macedonia recently notified 
the inhabitants who desire to go to the interior of Bulgaria in order to 
be established there, or to find work, that they should enter their 
names in special registers. A large* part of the population, suffering 
from want of food and dying from starvation, accepted the proposal 
and the transportation of them with their families to the interior of 
Bulgaria has begun, they being temporarily established at Tatar- 
Bazardjik, Kara-Bachli, Philippopoli, northern Bulgaria and in Dob- 
roudja. The refugees who are arriving in large numbers are in a 
desperate condition on account of privations. It is said that in the 
registers of Drama alone 10,000 [words illegible] have been registered, 
a step taken to render the population less dense in order to facilitate 
the re victualling of Macedonia and also to increase the laborers in the 
cities and villages of Bulgaria, where there is now a great dearth of 
laborers, but perhaps this measure is intended as a systematic removal 
from Macedonia of the Hellenic population, for hidden political reasons, 
namely, to destroy the present Hellenic character of the country. It 
is not known whether Slavophones have emigrated, but about 5,000 
Mohammedans have arrived in Bulgaria and some in Sofia. In con- 
sequence of the action of the Turkish consul at Philippopoli, they 
are to be sent to Turkey. 

According to an official report, up to the 15th of April (O. S.) 6,000 
persons had died from starvation in Cavalla, and in Drama and Serres 
the situation is the same. The condition of the people is literally 
lamentable, for, apart from the reduction of the population owing to the 
thousands of deaths from starvation, the economic situation of the in- 
habitants has become desperate on account of the exorbitant rise in the 
prices of the things of prime necessity. The mayor of Cavalla, in order 



109 

to save the population, begs the Royal Government to send him aid 
in the form of money as a loan to the city, assuming the obligation 
to repay it on the reestablishment of the former situation. 

I am proceeding to make the proper representations concerning 
the transportation of the population to the interior of Bulgaria, and 
am asking for explanations and the affording of protection by the local 
authorities to the families which are being thus deported. 

Naoum. 



<6 



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